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Abstract: 
The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that 
minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us 
throughout our entire life.  There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of 
the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism.  Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of 
givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences.  Enactivism says 
there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which 
modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic 
patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential 
mineness.  Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS).  I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of 
affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to 
understanding minimal selfhood.  Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the 
PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is 
present whenever there is awareness.  It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of 
mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain.  (ii) The phenomenological part of the 
PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and 
affective experience.  It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with 
the environment.  It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the 
later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it.  It is the 
subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects.  We 
have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.   
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“[T]he very fact that we employ notions like first-person perspective, for-me-
ness, and mineness in order to describe our experiential life, the fact that it is 
characterized by a basic and pervasive reflexivity and pre-reflective self-
consciousness, is ultimately sufficient to warrant the use of the term ‘self.’"1 
 
INTRODUCTION   
What is a ‘self’?  What is a ‘sense of self’?  Do these two ideas equate?  If there is a 
self, does it have some foundation or core (what we might call a 'minimal' self)?  If there is a 
minimal (sense of) self, is it just a useful conceptual idea of only instrumental value, or is it an 
actual entity with a corporeal or embodied realization?  If we have it at some early point in our 
lives, does it disappear or fade away, or does it ‘hang around’?  How many components are 
there to the self and how do they relate to each other?  The purpose of this project is to 
demonstrate and focus on the fact that yes, there is a minimal self, and that this minimal self 
has a phenomenological ‘sense’ to it.  It will demonstrate that this minimal self is not only an 
instrumentally useful idea, but that it actually has a physical basis as well.  It will show that the 
minimal self is something that arrives early in our development and continues to remain and 
influence us throughout our life in all our experiences. There will be two areas of research 
which will shape my understanding of the minimal self:  
(i) Phenomenology emphasizes a sense of givenness, ownership or mineness that 
accompanies our experiences.2  
(ii) Enactivism shows that there is a sensorimotor coupling between us and the 
environment which modulates the dynamic patterns of self development, 
laying down the basic patterns that help make us who we are – by giving rise 
to the phenomenological mineness just highlighted.   
Based on these ideas, this project will argue for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self 
(abbreviated PEMS).3  Within these two broad research areas, I will be emphasizing the role of 
                                                          
1
 Zahavi, Dan.  “The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications.”  Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and 
Dan Zahavi (Eds). Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, & Indian Traditions.  
(UK: Oxford, 2011), 333 (emphasis original). 
2
 Within philosophy, the term ‘phenomenology’ has been used in different ways by different 
philosophical traditions (i.e. the analytic and the continental).  In this project we will be drawing upon 
phenomenology as it is understood in the continental tradition (as should become clear shortly). 
3
 In this project the PEMS acronym will be used two ways (i) to indicate the theory and (ii) to indicate the 
phenomenon.  The context of use should make it clear which meaning is in play. 
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the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important foci of 
phenomenology and enactivism relevant to understanding minimal selfhood.  
Studies of the self have frequently focused on and discussed the so-called ‘narrative’ 
self (also sometimes called an autobiographical self or social self, since it is based on the 
stories which we – and others – tell about each other).  Although the purpose of this project is 
to focus on what the minimal self is, it will accept that there is a narrative self, but it will argue 
that the narrative self is something which emerges later than, and is always influenced by, the 
minimal self.   
 
1. Locating the Minimal Self within the framework of the debates on the self. 
If selves do exist then what are they and how do they emerge?  In our progression 
from a foetus through infancy and childhood, to adulthood and old age, how does the self 
emerge, develop, and change?  Foetuses and infants lack the cognitive development of an 
adult 'self,' yet the adult self cannot exist without having gone through the infant stage.4  Is 
there some process in our development which lies behind our conscious, reflective awareness 
(some type of pre-reflective awareness) that grows into our more familiar reflective self?  If so, 
then how?  The key question here is 'Who Are We'?  Answers in this debate have ranged 
across much territory.   However, because I wish to focus on and present what makes up the 
minimal form of self, I will be selective in the ideas that will be presented so that my position 
can be better oriented. 
1.1 The Kantian notion of the Self 
Let us begin by looking at the different conceptions of the self that exist to see where 
my arguments will fit within this scheme.  Consider first the Kantian idea of the Self.  The 
argument here says that although we have different experiences, there is one thing they all 
have in common – they all have the same subject.  Behind the constant change to our stream 
of consciousness, the self that we are remains the same throughout these shifts in experience.  
To explain further: our experiences always necessarily refer back to a ‘pure’ subject.  This 
subject of experience cannot be given as an object of experience, thus, although we can infer 
                                                          
4
 That is to say, the adult self cannot exist without going through the infant stage outside of the 
fantasies of science fiction or philosophical thought experiments. In this project I will not be concerned – 
or dealing with – these types of fictional hypotheses.   
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that a self exists, the self is not something which we can experience ourselves.5  As Kant says: 
“it is...evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know 
any object.”6  Another way to understand this view is that of a transcendental account.  A 
transcendental approach looks at the conditions of possibility for the knowledge we have of 
ourselves and everything else.  For Kant there is an a priori structure to our mind which is 
independent of our actual experiences.  The mind and self are thus prior to any experience.7  
The Kantian self is a static structure that lies behind experience, whereas the PEMS is based in 
dynamic experience.  As we will see, PEMS will emphasize dynamic structures and processes 
which don’t lie prior to experience, but create experience as the process.  The Kantian self 
statically lies behind experience, PEMS will argue that the self emerges as part of the 
experience. 
1.2 The Fictional Self 
Daniel Dennett views the self as a ‘narrative gravity.’  He argues that the self is best 
understood as a fictional character in a story ‘told’ by the physical organism.  This means the 
self is more or less based in – and emerges from – our biological need for self-preservation.8  
That is, along with the basic adaptive strategy we have as animals to procure food and seek 
out reproductive partners, we have something else over and above other animals, and that is 
the unique way in which we present ourselves to others and ourselves.  This is an abstract 
perspective, where the numerous stories we tell about ourselves intersect, but are tied in with 
our most basic biological nature.  Dennett describes these theoretical fictional selves as 
follows:  
“Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-definition 
is...concocting and controlling the story we tell others – and ourselves – about who we 
are.  And just as spiders don’t have to think, consciously and deliberately, about how 
to spin their webs...we...do not consciously and deliberately figure out what narratives 
to tell and how to tell them.  Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don’t spin 
                                                          
5
 Zahavi, Dan.  Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.  (MA: MIT Press, 
2005), 104. 
6
 Kant, Immanuel.  Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Norman Kemp Smith).  (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 
365. 
7
 Gallagher, Shaun.  Phenomenology.  (UK: Palgrave, 2012), 22. 
8
 Dennett, Daniel.  “The Origins of Selves.”  Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin (Eds).  Self & Identity.  
359. 
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them; they spin us.  Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their 
product, not their source.”9 
According to Dennett these narrative streams are simply the outcome of how we represent 
ourselves under constantly changing circumstances.  The tales we spin of ourselves creates a 
centre of narrative gravity which we call the self.  This self is the result of an adaptive strategy 
that has evolved over time because it has had some fitness advantage for us (e.g. based on us 
seeking out food, shelter, mating partners, etc).  The human environment contains not only 
food, shelter, and mating opportunities, but also a world based on words and 
communication.10 
Unlike Kant, Dennett has an idea of a minimal self.  He says:    
“a minimal self is not a thing inside...it is something abstract which amounts 
just to the existence of an organization which tends to distinguish, control, and 
preserve portions of the world, an organization that thereby creates and maintains 
boundaries.”11 
This is the first time we’ve seen a definition of a minimal self other than the brief mention I 
made of my view at the very beginning.  What are we to make of this view, and how does it 
relate to what I am pursuing?  Dennett says the minimal self amounts to ‘an organization 
which tends to...preserve portions of the world [and] creates and maintains boundaries.’  
There is something about this definition that would fit in with the account of the minimal self 
that I will be developing: the idea of closely bringing together the give and take relationship of 
the organism and world into one of the minimal conditions for selfhood.  The general idea of 
the organism creating, organizing and maintaining boundaries, is consistent with the view I 
wish to develop. However, Dennett doesn’t go far enough with his understanding of 
interaction, and we will see that there is a lack of phenomenology in his account.  A detailed 
comparison of this view and mine will have to occur later12, but here, at least, we’ve seen a 
conception of what a minimal self might look like.   
  
 
                                                          
9
 Dennett, Daniel.  Consciousness Explained.  (MA: Back Bay Books), 418. 
10
 Dennett.  Consciousness Explained.  417. 
11
 Dennett, Daniel.  “The Origins of Selves.”  Self & Identity.  358 (emphasis original). 
12
 And it will in the last chapter when other competing views of the self are evaluated and compared to 
mine. 
12 
 
1.3 No-Self  
Like Dennett, Thomas Metzinger adopts a biologically-based viewpoint; however, he 
presents it as a type of ‘no-self’ view.  Dennett thought that different physical subsystems 
influence the language centre of the brain to produce abstract narrative ‘selves’ that reflect 
the organism’s struggles in the world.  Metzinger goes further and argues that it is not only the 
self, but our entire view of reality which is a simulation.  Dennett says the self is a product of 
the language centre of the brain, thus giving it a linguistic or narrative basis, but Metzinger 
places the human perception of the world and its self-model in a type of simulated virtual 
reality, which is not ‘real,’ thus the ‘no-self’ view.  He calls his theory the ‘phenomenal self-
model’ (PSM) account; it works as follows.  The PSM of the organism as a whole is created and 
activated by the brain.  It is the brain that gives us a phenomenal – or experiential – means by 
which things subjectively appear to us.    
“The PSM of Homo sapiens is probably one of nature’s best inventions.  It is an 
efficient way to allow a biological organism to consciously conceive of itself (and 
others) as a whole.  Thus it enables the organism to interact with its internal world as 
well as with the external environment in an intelligent and holistic manner.”13   
The representational content of our PSM (our conscious experience) is filled with feelings of 
‘mineness’ and a conscious sense of ownership, that is, the things that are part of our 
conscious Ego have this sense of 'mineness' or we feel we have ownership of it.  We may, for 
example, be imagining ourselves climbing up a mountain, but it would be our body doing it, 
and our thought of doing it.  However, this “ongoing process of conscious experience is not so 
much an image of reality as a tunnel through reality.”14  Our Ego is simply the content of our 
PSM in a particular moment in time, “[i]t is not reality itself but an image of reality.”15  That is 
to say, we don't actually have some "deeper, holistic sense of self," instead it is simply just "a 
form of representational content" that "can be selectively manipulated."16  In Metzinger’s view 
we don’t consciously experience reality, rather, we tunnel through it.  The brain first creates a 
simulation of the world, and from there it creates an inner image of our self as a unified whole 
within this world.    The Ego we experience is simply the centre-point of a self-model within a 
world-model.  In Metzinger’s understanding, there is an experience occurring, but this is 
                                                          
13
 Metzinger, Thomas.  The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self.  (NY: Basic 
Books, 2009), 4-5. 
14
 Metzinger.  The Ego Tunnel.  6 (emphasis original). 
15
 Metzinger.  The Ego Tunnel.  8. 
16
 Metzinger.  The Ego Tunnel.  6. 
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based, first, in feelings and bodily sensations.  These experiences give us our point of view.  
And secondly, we are unable to recognize our self-models as models.  The means by which 
conscious information reaches us is something which we are unaware of – a large portion of 
our PSM becomes transparent to us.17  Because of this there is no self: the biological organism 
is not a self, and the Ego is not a self (it is just a form of representational content).  For 
Metzinger we are never directly in touch with reality: the sensory components in our brain are 
simply serving as filtering mechanisms.  Moreover, “the phenomenal content is determined 
locally, not by the environment at all but by internal properties of the brain only.”18  This last 
sentence is key to one of the differences between his account and the PEMS view I will be 
arguing for, which relies heavily on the biological organism’s direct contact, interaction, and 
reciprocal modulation with the world – Metzinger isn’t thinking about the environment in the 
right sort of way according to the PEMS account.  PEMS will be heavily focusing on feelings of 
‘mineness’ and bodily ownership, but it will be arguing for an intimate, undivided, and direct 
mutual relational modulation between the organism and the environment which includes the 
brain, body and the environment as all being key structures in this operation.  Let us now 
move directly into what I will be arguing for in regards to what makes up a minimal self. 
 1.4 Phenomenological notion of Self 
The Phenomenological perspective will be the starting point we will be adopting for 
this PEMS project.  The other notions of self will come up from time to time so as to keep 
ourselves oriented, but they won’t come up for sustained analysis until the final chapter 
(chapter 11) when we wrap everything up.  A phenomenological notion of the self (drawing on 
views from Dan Zahavi) “calls for an examination of the structure of experience,” it says that 
“the investigation of self and experience have to be integrated.”19  This notion of self is not a 
fixed transcendental structure like we found in the Kantian perspective.  It is also not a 
narrative construct that changes over time – it looks at the immediate experiential reality of 
our conscious life.  But as we shall see as we present it through the PEMS lens, rather than 
understand this experience as simulations of a unified self in a simulated world in the style of 
Metzinger, PEMS integrates self and world, and sees them as immediate and real.  This view of 
the self (when incorporated into PEMS) is minimal in form in that it is minimally necessary for 
selfhood at all (including a narrative self).  The phenomenological element of PEMS lacks the 
richness and complexity of the more robust self (which we can understand as the minimal self 
                                                          
17
 Metzinger.  The Ego Tunnel.  7. 
18
 Metzinger.  The Ego Tunnel.  10 (emphasis mine). 
19
 Zahavi.  Subjectivity and Selfhood.  106. 
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along with the later emergence and interaction of a narrative self); so what do we mean by the 
minimal self?  What we mean is that the minimal self is the simplest structure that can exist 
which we can call a self.  In sum, the structures revealed by the PEMS account are necessary 
and sufficient for selfhood in a minimal form, while this minimal form of selfhood is necessary 
for all more complex forms selfhood. 
A phenomenological notion of self looks at the first-person givenness of experience.  In 
the words of Dan Zahavi: “in its first-personal mode of givenness; it is a question of having 
first-personal access to one’s own experiential life.”20  What is this minimal dimension of 
ipseity (selfhood), and what is it made-up of?  Maurice Merleau-Ponty said ipseity was to be 
found in the integration of body and environment.  The first-person perspective that is unique 
to each of us is essentially embodied on Merleau-Ponty’s account: “The body is the vehicle of 
being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite 
environment.”21  How does this body-world relationship work?  Merleau-Ponty says: 
“In so far as I inhabit a ‘physical world,’ in which consistent ‘stimuli’ and typical 
situations recur...my life is made up of rhythms which have not their reason in what I 
have chosen to be, but their conditions in the humdrum setting which is mine.  Thus 
there appears round our personal existence a margin of almost impersonal existence, 
which can be practically taken for granted, and which I rely on to keep me alive.”22 
Let’s consider this more closely.  Lying behind those instances when I think or reason about 
some particular stimuli in the world, lies the much larger, constant, rhythm of being-in-the-
world that is largely taken for granted by us.  A phenomenological notion of self based in this 
perspective says that our experiences should not be viewed as objects which we reason about, 
but instead are what provide us with access to objects.  Our first-person givenness makes our 
experiences subjective; it “entails a built-in self-reference, a primitive experiential self-
referentiality.”23  To understand ipseity, we should not focus on just the ‘subject of 
experience,’ but on the ‘subjectivity of experience,’ the latter interpretation emphasizes the 
primitive self-referentiality that makes up first-person givenness.  This first-person givenness 
can also be described as a sense of mineness.  Under normal circumstances, any immediate 
and noninferential subjectivity of experience has a sense of being my experience.  As Zahavi 
says, “The mineness is not something attended to, it simply figures as a subtle background 
                                                          
20
 Zahavi.  Subjectivity and Selfhood.  ibid. 
21
 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  Phenomenology of Perception.  (UK: Routledge, 1962), 94. 
22
 Merleau-Ponty.  Phenomenology.  96 (emphasis original). 
23
 Zahavi.  Subjectivity and Selfhood.  122. 
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presence.”24  A minimal sense of self does not stand apart from, or above our experience, the 
mineness experienced is pre-reflective, it lies before any attempt on our part to consider, 
analyze, or reflect upon what our experience is.  The minimal, or core, sense of self is not 
something parallel with or even opposed to our normal stream of consciousness.  The first-
person givenness of the stream of consciousness constitutes the mineness of the experience.  
Julian Kiverstein provides a succinct view of the minimal self which is very PEMS friendly, when 
he states that for “a minimal sense of self...my conscious states immediately reveal themselves 
as mine...[t]o be aware of a state of mind as your own is to have a minimal sense of self.”25  
  1.5 The Enactive notion of Self  
We just saw that the phenomenological perspective on ipseity says the core sense of 
self is ‘immersed in conscious life,’ and that it ‘is an integral part of its structure.’  What is this 
structure?  We will see that the phenomenological account will be able to properly explain a 
vital component of minimal selfhood (that is, it can explain how we understand and respond to 
our being-in-the-world), but it doesn’t show what the structures are that make it up and give 
rise to it.  Phenomenology, by itself, doesn’t do enough to explain the minimal self.  My 
contribution towards elucidating what minimal selfhood is will be to lay out a version of the 
phenomenological interpretation of the self, but to complete the missing aspects of the 
resulting account of selfhood by introducing insights developed from the perspective of 
enactivism.  I will argue that enactivism is the approach that is necessary in order to show 
what the structures are that create the phenomenology, and demonstrate how it operates.  
Furthermore, I will be expanding the phenomenological and enactive views in a new way by 
bringing in and emphasizing the importance of affects as vital and essential structural 
members of these views. 
What is enactivism?  Enactivism is a research approach found within the cognitive 
sciences, in what has recently been called 4E cognition.  4E cognition says that mental 
processes are embodied, embedded, enactive, and/or extended (explanations to follow).26  
These concepts were influenced by work in psychology and (neuro)biology, along with being 
influenced by phenomenological philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and 
                                                          
24
 Zahavi.  Subjectivity and Selfhood.  124. 
25
 Kiverstein, Julian.  “Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain.” (Synthesis Philosophica, 44, 2007), 
341 (emphasis original). 
26
 Rowlands, Mark.  The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. 
(MA: MIT Press, 2010), 3. 
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty.27  The 4E approach says that cognitive processes are (i) embodied, 
which means mental processes are at least in part made up of, or are structured in 
fundamental ways, by bodily forms and processes, (ii) embedded, which means that mental 
processes work in close causal partnership with and subtly exploit structures in the 
environment, (iii) enacted, which means that cognitive processes are not just composed “of 
neural processes but also things that the organism does more generally” – how it “acts on the 
world and the way in which [the] world, as a result, acts back on that organism,”28 (iv) 
extended, which means that mental processes do not occur just within the boundaries of the 
head, or the body, but extend out into the environment.  All four of these related approaches 
are based in an idea that context and situation contribute to our understanding of how mental 
processes operate.  Indeed, mental processes are in fact dependent (causally or constitutively) 
on the contextual situation in which we find ourselves.29  Although this project draws on ideas 
that are found in the embedded and embodied categories, it will primarily be focused on 
developing the category of enactivism as a way of lending support for the phenomenological 
notion of a minimal self.   
We have just introduced the 4E approach to cognition, so how does this reveal the 
structures underpinning the minimal self?  Let us break enactivism down into more detail.  We 
will briefly look at five ideas that are central to the approach and to what will follow.  Evan 
Thompson, one of the main proponents of enactivism, has proposed the following five ideas 
that serve to characterize the view:30  
(i) Living organisms “are autonomous agents that actively generate and maintain 
themselves, and thereby also enact or bring forth their own cognitive domains.”   
(ii) “[T]he nervous system is an autonomous dynamic system” that “actively generates 
and maintains its own coherent and meaningful patterns of activity.” 
(iii) “[C]ognition is the exercise of skilful know-how in situated and embodied action.” 
(iv) “a cognitive being’s world is not a prespecified, external realm, represented 
internally by its brain, but a relational domain.”   
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(v) “[E]xperience is not an epiphenomenal side issue, but central to any 
understanding of the mind.”31 
The emphasis of this project will be to take these ideas and see how they manifest 
themselves at the level of the human being in regards to creating and maintaining the minimal 
self.  It will be argued that the sensorimotor coupling between a human being and the 
environment modulates the dynamic patterns of self development, laying down the basic 
patterns that help make us who we are.  The way in which this relational modulation is 
experienced enhances our understanding of selfhood (thus the emphasis on phenomenology 
and its examination of the subjectivity of experience).  Looking at this enactive and dynamic 
approach to self will help explain ipseity and subjectivity by showing how the subjectivity of 
selfhood arises.  Enactivism gives us another benefit, in that it encompasses a framework and 
perspective which applies to the intentionality and the intersubjectivity of self experience.  It 
was stated that the minimal self emerged through sensorimotor coupling with the 
environment; this is an environment which includes dynamic interaction with other selves.  
“We do not first perceive non-intentional movements,” says Shaun Gallagher, “and then make 
inferences to what they mean.  We perceive the actions and emotional experiences of others 
as a form of intentionality – i.e. as meaningful and directed;”32 this in part gives us the first-
personal sense of mineness.  The way we perceive and interact with others depends on 
embodied sensorimotor processes.   We perceive others in their intentional movements as 
they are engaged in projects – and directed at goals – with the world, a world of which we are 
obviously a part.  This is one important way in which enactivism plays a part: in a type of bodily 
intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is part of the minimal self.  We develop a sense of self in part 
through our interactions with other selves.  This (bodily) intersubjectivity begins in the minimal 
self and is then expanded upon in narrative levels of self.  For the purposes of the PEMS 
theory, then, phenomenology will give us the ability to more clearly understand the givenness 
and mineness of our lived experience, and enactivism will allow us to see how these 
phenomenological elements are dynamically generated; and these two elements of minimal 
selfhood will all come to be developed through sensorimotor movement, affects, and how 
they mould, shape and create our intentional and intersubjective experience.  
This all-too brief overview of the subject just given should provide the beginning of a 
picture of a self forming.  This is a picture that shows a narrative self that is dependent on a 
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more basic phenomenological-enactive self.  There is a narrative element to the self, but it 
presupposes and is continually influenced by a minimal self.  When we look at a complete, full 
picture of the self, we usually take the person’s abilities, interests, traits, and beliefs into 
account, as well as their responses to family, community, strangers, and other social 
interactions.  This is undoubtedly what is necessary for coming to an understanding of what 
the self is in the big picture: a fully developed understanding of the self can only be 
understood by taking into account personal subjectivity along with personal intersubjectivity, 
and this has a narrative element to it. What this project on the phenomenological-enactive 
minimal self will explore, develop, and argue for, is that there is a starting point which kicks 
this process off and continues to play a role throughout the lifespan of the individual.   
 
2. Thesis and Layout of the Project 
The aim of this project is to show that there is a minimal self.  This will be done by 
drawing on a variety of empirical scientific data and models and using the phenomenological 
and enactive frameworks to interpret, synthesize, and unify them.  Many of the views that will 
be looked at have argued for – or included – some idea of a ‘core’ or minimal form of self.  
Here they will be brought together in a new way which has not been done previously, by 
showing the importance of the body and affects in the constitution of this minimal self.  This 
will be accomplished by dividing the project into three different parts: (1) The Bodily Self; (2) 
The Affective Self; (3) The Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self. Each of the three parts will 
be building us up to a clearer understanding of what the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal 
Self is.  Each of the first two parts will have something unique to say about what the minimal 
self is, with Part I demonstrating its bodily aspect and Part II providing us with the important 
role that affects play, and how they’ve been neglected in previous inquiries into selfhood.  Part 
III will then pull it all together to show us the whole picture.  
Merleau-Ponty’s views on the phenomenology of the body will form the background 
for what we will explore in Part I: The Bodily Self.  The purpose of Part I is two-fold, first, to 
show the dependence of the minimal self on a type of embodiment, and second, to 
understand what conception of ‘the body’ is in play in developing our most basic 
understanding of ‘self.’  Although initially inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, the arguments to 
be made will be accomplished by drawing on modern discussions which have emerged from 
the embodied/situated cognition debate, and how they are asking us to question our previous 
conceptions of the body.  If we are to understand how an enactive account can assist us in 
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exploring one’s minimal sense of self, we need to ask questions which get at the very core and 
emergence of the body and all that springs from it.  This first part will demonstrate how the 
body serves as the focal point of the minimal self through five chapters.  We will begin in 
chapter 1 by exploring work done in developmental infant psychology.  This will reveal how the 
minimal self first emerges through embodied actions and interactions.  The very beginning of 
sensorimotor dynamics and meaningful patterns of activity are established at this time.  The 
look at infants will show how through their own movement and watching others move they 
acquire a greater understanding of the world and their place in it.  It will show what these early 
emerging patterns of self look like.  Discoveries based on work done with so-called 'mirror 
neurons' will make up the next chapter (chapter 2).  This chapter will reveal how neurobiology 
can help explain part of our ability to relate intersubjectively to others, and acquire meaning 
and understanding of their movements, through their movements.  This intersubjectivity has 
its basis and development in bodily understanding.  Mirror neurons assist in establishing the 
primal embodied subjectivity that is important in forging the minimal self.  Mirror neurons 
reveal that our understanding of ourselves and others is based on understanding of not just 
mechanical motions of the body, but the actual intentions of our movements via their bodily 
movements.  If the first chapter on infants indicated how understanding and meaning emerges 
in early development, chapter 2 with its analysis of work on mirror neurons will provide one of 
the neuroscientific underpinnings of this meaning or understanding of movement. The work of 
mirror neurons underlie our conscious, reflective awareness, and as such, it gives us an 
intriguing insight into one of the neurobiological components of a pre-reflective minimal self.  
Looking at aspects of what are called the 'body schema,' 'proprioception, and the 'body image' 
will make up chapter 3.  The terms just mentioned are used frequently in discussion of 
embodiment and by looking into them we will get a clearer understanding of the embodied 
character of our existence.  As such, this will be vital for laying the framework for getting our 
mind around what it is to be embodied in the world and how the reflective elements of self 
reflection can emerge from – and interact with – pre-reflective components.  The terms and 
ideas that will be explored in this chapter will provide us with the first tools with which we can 
interpret the data which we will have looked at, and which we can keep in mind for what will 
follow.  More than that, these proprioceptive structures which will be examined will assist in 
explaining the self-reference which makes up our subjectivity or experience. In chapter 4 we 
will explore self ownership and self agency.  These ideas, along with the body schema/image 
distinction, will be re-analyzed in a way which should demonstrate what a minimal self looks 
like and where it can be found.  New terms will also be introduced to help us unify this idea of 
a minimal self.  For example, instead of using a static term such as ‘body schema’ to describe 
20 
 
the sensorimotor capacities of the body that function outside our conscious awareness, we will 
see that a term that better portrays the embodied, flowing, ever-changing nature of these 
bodily capacities is ‘corporeal kinetic patterning.’  This chapter will also examine a notion of 
Minimal Self that Shaun Gallagher has.  Part I will end in chapter 5 with a look at the meaning 
of gesturing.  By looking at the relationship between gesturing and language use in children, 
along with those who are deaf and blind, we will get an important insight into the importance 
of the body in structuring – or even serving as – our thinking.  The emphasis here being that 
our gesturing may reflect vital aspects of our self, yet lie behind our conscious and reflective 
awareness, and thus make up part of our minimal self.  All five of these chapters will allow us 
to build up an understanding of a minimal bodily self that shows the pre-reflective origin of the 
self, and how it transitions into – and continues to influence – the reflective aspects of self.  It 
should demonstrate that our ‘higher-level’ forms of self are based in a bodily self which forms 
its basis and foundation.   
 A Heideggerian-style phenomenology will form the background for what we will 
explore in Part II: The Affective Self.  Martin Heidegger (in Being and Time, for example) asked 
questions related to what it is to be human – what is Being?  What is it to-be?  In doing so he 
frequently focused on affects (e.g. dread and anxiety) as ways of showing how affects alter our 
world view.  Affects can serve as a way of disclosing or opening up to the world.  Affects 
(emotions, feelings and moods) have to a large degree been neglected in attempts to lay out 
what the ‘self’ is, with notable exceptions being, for example, Antonio Damasio, Joseph 
LeDoux, and Jaak Panksepp.  Work by such thinkers has begun to show – and begun new areas 
of research on – how vital affects are to understanding cognition, being and selfhood.  I think 
that if we want to discover what the ‘self’ is, then we will have to explore the affects which are 
vital in the make-up of our being.  Part II will move this discussion forward by looking at 
affects.  Whereas the first part will have drawn together some diverse areas under the label 
‘bodily self,’ here we will look specifically at affects and how they can be understood, both 
empirically and phenomenologically.  Part II will be composed of four chapters: first, we will 
see that evolutionary development and neuroscience show that affects have a basis in 
maintaining bodily equilibrium (chapter 6).  This chapter will show how neurobiology, the 
body, and affects are intimately intertwined, and thus this will begin to give us a unified 
picture of the contributions of body and affects to the formation and maintenance of the 
minimal self.  Next we will critically examine cognitive accounts of affects, that is, the idea that 
our emotions are actually ‘judgments’ or ‘choices’ that we make (chapter 7).  We will see that 
although some 'higher' level evaluative emotions (more at the narrative level of self) can be 
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understood as judgments or choices, most of our emotions are based in a more basic, or 
‘primitive,’ bodily phenomenology.  We will see in chapter 8 that phenomenology can provide 
us with an understanding of affects which shows that they are not just ways of maintaining 
bodily equilibrium, but that they provide us with an ‘opening up to the world’ (i.e. the way in 
which we encounter and interpret the world).  Finally, in chapter 9, we take our examination 
of affects and explain how they operate for the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self.  The 
focus in this second part is not only to find a bodily basis for affects, but to show how a 
phenomenological account fits with the physical-basis of emotions. 
 Part III: The Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (PEMS) will take the ideas 
presented in the first two parts and bring them together – along with some other unifying 
concepts – and finally give us the Phenomenological-Enactive Theory of Minimal Self.  This final 
part will be broken down into two chapters.  The first of these (Chapter 10) will present two 
theories of consciousness: a dual process theory of consciousness, and the nested neural 
hierarchy theory.  These two theories will show us how the pre-reflective (minimal) bodily self 
interacts with and relates to the higher-level reflective (narrative or socially constructed) self.  
The final chapter in part III (chapter 11) will be comprised of four sections, the first will 
formally lay out the Phenomenological-Enactive Theory of Minimal Self.  It will pull together all 
the ideas previously looked at throughout this project (e.g. those found in infant development, 
gesturing, and affects), so as to see what a minimal self is, how it comes to be, how it 
continues to influence us, and how –interestingly – all of these are intertwined.  We will also at 
this point see how the PEMS theory compares to other views.  In the second section of chapter 
11 we will return to Dennett and his theory of the self as a ‘center of narrative gravity.’  It will 
be shown that problems that arise in his view can be responded to much more successfully by 
PEMS.  The third section brings us back to Metzinger and his phenomenal self model (PSM).  
Again, we will see how PEMS is better than PSM at explaining the conscious experience of 
being a self.  The final chapter ends with a look at an alternative enactive account of the self, 
one put forward by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch.  By looking at their 
view – and how Thompson later expands upon it – we will highlight further strengths of PEMS. 
So, what is the minimal self that is going to be argued for here?  Let me identify the set 
of conditions which constitute the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self, so that we can 
see what will emerge by the end.  The PEMS, as I will present it, consists of the following:   
1. The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present 
whenever there is self-awareness.   It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of 
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mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain.  In the past 
phenomenologists like Matthew Ratcliffe and Dan Zahavi have given accounts of 
what some of these phenomenological structures are, but they haven’t gone far 
enough.  Although they have provided us with important insights, they haven’t 
done enough – there are gaps that have to be filled which explain what the 
structures are that explain the phenomenological ‘feelings of being.’  The PEMS 
theory will layout the structural components which explain the phenomenology. 
2. The phenomenological part of PEMS is formed by a bodily and dynamic integration 
of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience.  It is, ontologically speaking, 
the lived body – the body in enactive engagement with the environment.33  
Evidence and models from developmental psychology, affective neuroscience and 
other areas will be interpreted through an enactive lens, and this will give us the 
additional conditions and structures we need to understand the PEMS.  There have 
been a few enactivists that have explored portions of this territory (e.g. Evan 
Thompson and Giovanna Colombetti).  What PEMS will do is to identify 
implications for the role enactivism can play in supporting phenomenology to see 
what implications this has for minimal selfhood. 
We will see by the end of this project that although there is a narrative self (however one 
might want to conceive it); it is only possible because there is a constant, non-conceptual, 
ongoing, pre-reflective self-awareness that is built into our very experience.  Viewed from 
different interpretive angles, the minimal self is real, because it is the embodied subject.  It is 
the embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the narrative self, which 
emerges from it, and which is continually influenced by it.  It is the subject enactively engaged 
with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects.  We have an identity, but it 
emerges from relational and dynamic processes.  The mineness or sense of ownership is what 
constitutes the PEMS.  There is a whole dimension of ipseity that hasn’t been systematically 
examined or explored, and it is hoped that the account of the Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self that will be presented here will provide us with a new perspective from which to 
answer the question of whether a 'self' exists, what it is, and how it emerges.  
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Part I: The Bodily Self: The Body - Its Function and Meaning 
 
Chapter 1: The Body's first encounter with the world: a look at Infants. 
"...it is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being...by considering the 
body in movement, we can see better how it inhabits space."34 
 
If we are to function in the world and understand what lays the foundation for the 
sense of self which we have (the sense of mineness, or givenness), the investigation into 
infants which we will explore in this chapter will provide one of the key components of the 
foundational - or minimal - self with which the narrative self later becomes associated.  The 
key component of the minimal self – and the origin point of mineness – is bodily motion.  
Communication, object perception and manipulation all need a point of origin for their 
development and it will be argued that this is in bodily motion; and it is by examining these 
three phenomena that that bodily point of origin will be exposed.   
Recall this quote from Merleau-Ponty from the introduction:  
“In so far as I inhabit a ‘physical world,’ in which consistent ‘stimuli’ and typical 
situations recur...my life is made up of rhythms which have not their reason in what I 
have chosen to be, but their conditions in the humdrum setting which is mine.  Thus 
there appears round our personal existence a margin of almost impersonal existence, 
which can be practically taken for granted, and which I rely on to keep me alive.”35  
Merleau-Ponty’s key claim in this passage is that the ‘rhythms’ of life are not tied to 
reasons we’ve chosen, but rather the everyday ‘conditions’ and situations which are ours.  
Although this entire project will be touching on these ideas from different perspectives, this 
chapter will show how the ‘rhythms’ of these settings are based in bodily movement, 
exploration and imitation by the infant.  We will see that infant movement creates for the 
infant that ‘almost impersonal existence’ which ‘can be practically taken for granted’ in 
adulthood. This ‘almost impersonal existence’ (note the qualifier ‘almost’) which Merleau-
Ponty speaks of is a pre-reflective element of the minimal self I will be arguing for.  It will be 
shown that although it has been taken for granted in the past, an examination of the infant’s 
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embodied and situated cognition is a foundational element in the emergence of selfhood, and 
can actually say something interesting regarding our phenomenological sense of identity.  This 
chapter will demonstrate how this Merleau-Pontian idea comes to be realized.  
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate via the way infants in their earliest 
development begin to form their understanding of objects and subjects, that the point of 
origin for the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self is through sensorimotor development 
and the interaction of the body with others and the environment.  Within the process of 
understanding how objects, our bodies, and other subjects inhabit and navigate in space and 
through movement, we will see the earliest and minimal forms of a phenomenological and 
enactive minimal self emerge.  Movement does not simply provide us with a sense of spatial 
location and understanding, it also provides us with something meaningful at a basic, or 
primitive, level, and this lays the foundation for our later conscious understandings of subjects 
and objects.  The emergence and growth of self in an infant (as well as the adult) is not merely 
the product of many phases of development, but is rather a process enacted through this 
animate movement.  Before any sophisticated mental processes have formed and developed 
which involve complicated abstract thought and language use, infants must develop a meaning 
and understanding of objects and events through the various sensorimotor capacities of their 
bodies.  It is through these early interactions with their environment that they learn the 
meaning of the objects and events which make up the world.  The meaning and understanding 
of itself, other objects, persons and the environment are instrumental to the earliest forms of 
ipseity.  Much of this has been taken for granted, but it will be shown that this humdrum 
setting which the infant finds itself is essential for creating the first sense of mineness.    
An underlying theme which will be appearing throughout this chapter is the 
importance of experiments which look at how infants perceive objects, how they learn to 
move about, and in what their earliest forms of communication consist.  Although these three 
ideas may seem to consist of distinct ideas or approaches (such as communication versus 
object manipulation, or communication versus bodily motion), we will see that these instead 
develop very closely together and rely on each other to lay the foundation of the self.    
Philosopher Mark Johnson, drawing on work by Eleanor Gibson and Anne Pick, says that 
infants must master these three types of developmental tasks if they are to function fully in 
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the physical and social environments in which they find themselves.36  These three overlapping 
stages are:  
1. Communication.  From the time infants enter the world, there are some rudimentary 
capacities within them to allow communication with other people. 
2. Object perception and manipulation.  At four months the infant develops a sense that the 
world is filled with objects which they can manipulate and use for certain purposes. 
3. Bodily motion.  After six months, their locomotive abilities provide them with a deeper 
meaning; the objects they interact with are now used to open up new possibilities for reaching 
goals and for realizing intentions they may have.37   
These are not fully developed psychological capabilities, instead, this bodily meaning-making is 
pre-theoretical, pre-linguistic, pre-personal, and pre-conceptual, and forms the underlying 
foundation for the more psychologically sophisticated linguistic and personal aspects of being 
which we deal with as adults.  Just as importantly, they are not capacities which we will do 
away with once we mature – some of these will remain with us into adulthood functioning in 
the background, underlying our reasoning and abstract thought.38   
 Developmental psychologist Daniel Stern holds a similar view, arguing that the infant 
experiences the process of organization as it emerges through bodily interaction, along with 
the results of this interaction.39  Infants in his view are 'predesigned' to seek out learning 
opportunities, and since these learning activities must have a point of reference, or a point of 
focus, he argues the body is this reference point.  The body, through motion, object 
perception/manipulation, and 'primitive' communication - which involves gestures and sounds 
– creates and constructs these earliest learning opportunities.  The various qualities of feelings 
which the infant experiences - both within, and from the behaviour of others - are what Stern 
calls vitality affects - "the infant is immersed in...'feelings of vitality.'"40  It is the pattern and 
flow of lived experience which precede any formal or abstract acts.  And again, these are not 
capacities which we leave behind; as Johnson says (in support of Stern's vitality affects) "we 
only extend and build upon them."  "Vitality affects are meaningful to us at the most 
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primordial levels of our bodily understanding of our world and our experience."41  Vitality 
Affects – with the body as the locus – are where those first moments of phenomenological 
mineness appear at this pivotal time, laying the groundwork for all that is to come.  The 
experiments done with infants we are about to look at will bear out this view.  We begin with 
experiments which shine light upon early infant object perception and bodily motion.  This will 
make clear that communication and object perception/manipulation involve preconceptual 
mineness through bodily movement and interaction. 
 In one experiment cited by Stern, three-week old infants were blindfolded and given a 
pacifier to suck on.  The pacifier was then removed and placed next to another with different 
surface properties.  The blindfold was then removed.  The infant, after looking at each of the 
pacifiers, focused most of their attention on the one they had just sucked (75 percent of the 
time).42  Through the physical experience of touch (sucking), the infant was able to make a 
visual identification; this is an early form of (touch-type) object perception and understanding.  
 Andrew Meltzoff and Keith Moore argue that newborn infants begin with some ability 
to grasp other people and the fact that these other people are like themselves.43  Their 
research presents a two-pronged approach to infant embodiment and the development of a 
sense of self which encompasses: (a) an infant's understanding of what an object is, and (b) an 
infant's developing understanding of what a person is.   
 In regards to an infant's understanding of object identity, Meltzoff and Moore see the 
infant as going through three different levels of understanding.  The first stage of object 
understanding is restricted to objects which exist in a steady-state in the visual world, that is, 
their understanding of an object is based entirely on what they see either as it sits at rest, or if 
it is in a steady trajectory of movement without getting obstructed in their visual field.  This 
occurs during the first four months of life.  For the second level of object identity – which lasts 
from 5 to 8 months – an understanding of object transformation is achieved.  This allows for 
objects moving and coming to rest, and others that are at rest and beginning to move.  The 
third level is from 9 to 18 months.  At this level, the infant can maintain identity of the object 
even if it disappears, or is occluded.44   
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 What is important about this development of understanding the identity of objects is 
that different criteria are used for different sorts of objects to understand and maintain 
numerical identity.  This is important because in the words of Meltzoff and Moore: an “infants’ 
developing grasp of the nature of objects profoundly influences their idea of persons.”45  What 
are these different criteria that are used to grasp numerical identity?  In the process of an 
infant's ability to understand the features, trajectory, and permanence of an object, the infant 
goes through a developmental progression of understanding that begins with what Meltzoff 
and Moore call 'proto-objects' in level one and two.  A 'proto-object' as defined by Meltzoff 
and Moore, is a more fragmented, or incomplete, understanding of what an infant sees or 
understands of an object in comparison to what an adult perceives; these 'proto-objects' lack 
the complete set of properties which an adult would assign to them.46  It is only in stage three 
that the infant achieves a full – adult – understanding of the actual object.47  It is through a 
series of cognitive re-structurings that the infant develops a more robust understanding what 
it is viewing, and thus reaches the understanding of an object in its entirety.  However, the 
problem of identity applies just as much to people as objects, for people – just like objects – 
are traceable across areas of space and over periods of time.  So in this regard they are quite 
similar.  On the other hand, when it comes to the movements and reactions of people, things 
can be far more complex than when one is just dealing with inanimate objects.  How do 
children respond to this? 
 In regards to an infant's understanding of what a person is; Meltzoff and Moore's 
research in this area focused on an infant's imitating facial expressions of adults they had seen.  
This look into how an infant interacts with adults begins to take us away from object 
perception and manipulation, and into (pre-verbal) communication.  Meltzoff and Moore 
learned that infants as young as 42 minutes to 72 hours old showed the ability to successfully 
imitate a facial expression.48   In a different research project, they focused on infants in age 
from 12 to 21 days old.  In this study, four adult gestures were made: protruding the tongue, 
opening the mouth, protruding the lip, and moving a finger.49  The results of this study showed 
that initially the imitations were not exact copies, but over time the infants made corrections.  
Meltzoff and Moore interpret this as being goal-directed, and the intended actions (in a very 
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primitive sense) are different from the consequences.50  The infants were, in effect, selective 
with respect to which aspects of the stimulus they would imitate (some infants might copy an 
adult opening their mouth by opening theirs quite large, and others would make a small 
mouth opening, but hold it for a longer duration).  The infants also seemed creative in their 
imitation (for example, if they saw an adult tongue protrude out from the side of the mouth, 
they sometimes would imitate by protruding their tongue out to the side, and other times 
would protrude their tongue out straight and then turn their head to the side).  There is also 
what Meltzoff and Moore called volition.  Here the infant may perform a gesture that it 
remembered from a previous encounter, rather than the one they had just seen.51   
 The view that there is a pre-verbal type of communication and imitation between 
infants and their caregivers is supported by others as well.  Mechthild Papoušek says in regards 
to research that had been done with mothers and their infants that "infants had a capacity and 
intrinsic motivation to detect and control intrinsic events and build up expectancies; they 
accommodated and finely attuned their motor acts to the requirements of the task in a goal-
directed manner; they invested considerable efforts in restoring disrupted reinforcement rules 
when expectations were violated, and protested or withdrew when they were unable to solve 
the problem."52  The everyday interactions between an infant and its caregiver are built from a 
dynamically adjusted group of categories which include the infant's affective states, 
behavioural dispositions, interests, and motives, along with how its movements and 
expressions are being mirrored or understood by its caregiver.53  Through the imitation of oral 
and manual gestures between the infant and adult, they come to act together in 
"intersubjective emotional relatedness," this is a component of what Stern (cited above) 
referred to as 'vitality affects,' or ‘affect attunement.’54  For Papoušek, there are two main 
elements that play a role in early infant communication, one is the adaptive imitative elements 
which help form the basis for intersubjective social communication that we've just looked at, 
and the second is mirror neurons and their ability to provide a neurobiological basis for 
perception, action, and affect sharing (mirror neurons will be examined in the next chapter).  
Mirror neurons “may provide the neurobiological basis for the phenomenon of newborn 
imitation, of mutual facial and vocal mirroring, immediate coupling of perception and action, 
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and of early intersubjective affective sharing.”55  Over the long-term, the human interaction 
between child and caregiver provides feedback which provides the infant with ways to adapt 
to changing situations and the ability to expand its repertoire of (re)actions.  
 We next look at experiments which deal with challenges to an infant's mobility and 
bodily motion.  The first experiment deals with infants that were confronted with a change in 
slope as they moved.  In this experiment, infants at age 14 months were placed in walkers, or 
were allowed to crawl, and were placed near slopes of various grades.  Those in walkers were 
cautious of slopes of 20° or more, which they either refused to descend, or else attempted to 
slide down.  If they were crawling, however, they were more confident.56  As the infants were 
confronted with these dilemmas, they showed an increase in knowledge and learned to avoid 
the steeper slopes.  Interestingly, when they switched from a crawling to a walking mode of 
mobility, this knowledge did not transfer - they seemingly had to learn it all over again through 
experience.  This is in part because visual associations have to be made anew, as well as the 
fact that a new series of muscles needed to be utilized to engage in ambulation and maintain 
balance and posture.  Esther Thelen and Linda Smith have argued that the knowledge gained 
by the infants was not 'domain-general' knowledge, but instead developed through the actions 
they performed, and was action-specific.57 
 Another example has to do with the stepping motions of an infant.  An infant, when it 
is held suspended above the ground, is able to perform relatively well-coordinated stepping 
motions, yet when it reaches its second month this knowledge seems to get lost or disappear.  
Then, between the 8th and 10th month, as the infant is learning to walk on its own and 
support its own weight, this form of motion reappears.  In that first stage the stepping is 
involuntary (some have called it reflexive), and in the second instance the stepping is more 
intentional.58  Yet in between this time period when they are not walking, if an infant is placed 
and held on a treadmill, it is able to coordinate and alter its stepping pattern to changes in the 
treadmill's speed.59  Andy Clark thinks this is evidence against a 'grand plan, single factor' view, 
where some central source provides a gradual development of mobility knowledge over time.  
He says: "The developmental pattern is not the expression of an inner blueprint.  Rather, it 
reflects the complex interplay of multiple forces, some bodily (leg mass), some mechanical (leg 
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stretching and spring-like actions), some fully external (the presences of treadmills...), and 
some more cognitive and external (the transition to volitional - i.e., deliberate - motion)."60  
These two studies seem to show that the infant's body in early life has to adjust to 
environmental challenges as it meets them, and that these challenges are met - and motor 
knowledge is developed - through physically confronting and dealing with each of these 
context-dependent challenges as they arise.  The studies indicate how the infants begin to 
acquire a greater mastery of their bodily self and how they fit within the world. 
 What do the studies that we have examined thus far have to say regarding 
differentiation of the minimal self and an infant’s learning about themselves and others?  
Colwyn Trevarthen and Vasudevi Reddy provide a good summary of the results in a way which 
tie-in the original three developmental tasks we looked at that infants must master 
(communication, object perception/manipulation, and bodily motion) with how the minimal 
self emerges:   
 Between the 8th and 16th week of gestation the foetus begins to differentiate 
between its hands, face, and other senses.  The "brain systems and sensory and motor 
structures of the [embryo] body...become active and responsive to the 
environment...before it senses anything."  "The developmental rule is that intentions 
are mapped out inside the embryo brain and body, and then elaborated in sought-for 
engagement with the environment."61 
 At the 24th week of being in the womb, it can react to the touch or movement of its 
mother, or a twin.   
 By the 32nd week in the womb, the face, mouth and hands become active. 62   
 During the first 8 weeks after birth, the infant is learning its initial regulation of 
biological processes and of stimuli.  The baby has certain core concepts or strategies 
for learning and adapting to perceived phenomena.  Infants and adults develop a co-
consciousness through feelings of sympathy.  Imitation of face and hand gestures 
emerge, and the infant is motivated to know other human beings and their emotions 
in a related way.63     
 After 4 months infants have reached an ability to track motions and watch displays in a 
more complete way similar to adults.  Although reciprocal exchange between the 
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infant and caregiver began earlier, by this point infants are more socially self-other 
aware (commensurate with the story laid out by Meltzoff and Moore). 64 
 At 18 months language and expressive thoughts develop; this is not just about 
perceived objects, but about a shared sense of participation.65 
Trevarthen and Reddy think there is a 'primary consciousness' that is manifested in an animal.  
It begins in the animal's body as a way to coordinate movement as it is engaged in the world.  
These bodily anticipations and movements cause the brain to project feelings onto the objects 
and properties which are encountered.  This helps determine what is, or is not, learned.66  In 
regards to humans specifically, their view can be summarized as follows: Consciousness is in 
formation in the embryo and early foetus.  This consciousness becomes latent in the late 
foetus as it engages more with its surroundings.  Through active life as a newborn, 
consciousness becomes nascent as it explores things outside its body and encounters the 
emotions of other human beings.  As the infant develops collaborative relationships, 
consciousness continues to develop and emerge.  And once language arrives and formal 
education takes place, consciousness becomes reflective or transcendent, in that we now see 
the emergence of culture and the symbolic arts.67  This quick bullet-point run-through of the 
emergence of the minimal self can be further elaborated upon by examining the more detailed 
stages that Daniel Stern has of the developmental layers of the self which accumulate in the 
infant as it ages. 
 Daniel Stern's view of the development of the self in infancy is worth considering at 
this point, in part because we will be looking at it again later when we delve into more mature, 
adult, and social, theories of the self.  His theory of self involves a layered model that argues 
for accumulation of senses of self (starting with the most basic, there is the emergent self, 
then the core self, core self-with-another, intersubjective self, verbal self, and finally, the 
narrative self; we will examine each of these categories more thoroughly in a moment).  In his 
scheme, none of the previous layers disappear; rather, they continue to interact with the other 
layers as they emerge.68  Of these layers, the ones most relevant for the current discussion are 
the two most basic: the emergent self and the core self.  Although the emergent self does not 
sound at first as the proper starting point for a sense of self – the point is that the self is 
emerging – this is important, as the purpose of signifying it with the word 'emerging' is to show 
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that this very early form of self is based on a process; a sense of self is 'emerging' and hasn't 
'arrived' yet.69  It is through repeated and small interactive patterns with other objects and 
persons that a 'way-of-being' is developed.  He describes this 'primary consciousness ' as 
nonverbal and consisting of 'present moments' and the 'now.'  The signals that are received 
from the environment are not necessarily consciously attended to, and may not enter into 
reflective awareness; it is, as he poetically describes it: "the continuous music of being alive."70  
The key idea from this theory of Stern's is that "primary consciousness is the yoking together, 
in a present moment, of the intentional object and the vital background input from the 
body."71  The infant is literally discovering itself through movement.  The 'core self' which 
follows the 'emergent self' (along with the other categories of self which follow after that), can 
be given more specific names because at the points at which they arrive, the infant has 
reached some specific mile-stone which can be labelled and quantified much better. 
Let us look at Stern’s breakdown of the layers of self in more detail; for this will be 
important in seeing how a minimal self relates to a later narrative self.  Additionally, and 
without necessarily endorsing all of Stern’s picture of the layered self, I want to draw out some 
important elements which are relevant and applicable to the Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self (PEMS).  Stern’s model involves layers of self which emerge and accumulate on 
top of each other.  These different layers don’t replace the previous layers; rather, they 
continue to interact with each other.  His layered account is structured as follows:  
1. Sense of Emergent Self.  Of all Stern’s layers of self, this and the next one are 
perhaps the most important to my project of establishing a Phenomenological-
Enactive Minimal Self.  The idea of the self being ‘emergent’ is important for the 
PEMS, for as we saw above, it says that self is an emerging process of organization, 
a process of organization which allows the other elements of self that come after it 
to emerge.    This first element in the development of the self emphasizes that the 
organization that comes into being is a process; Stern says:  
“the emergent sense of self has to do with the experience of this 
process...[This primary consciousness] is not self-reflective, it is not verbalized, 
and it lasts only during the present moment that corresponds to ‘now’...[t]he 
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body is never doing nothing [...] All of these body signals come from the self – 
an as-yet unspecified self.  Such signals need not be attended to.  They need 
not enter into awareness.  Yet they are still there in the background.  They are 
the continuous music of being alive.”72   
Although his idea of process is important for my project, as well as the fact 
that these body signals lie in the background and aren’t attended to, we also see 
here that Stern is speaking of ‘present moments that correspond to ‘now’’ and 
how this is an ‘unspecified self.’  Thus, although he poetically refers to this process 
as ‘the continuous music of being alive,’ he seems to really be talking about 
individually disconnected notes which pass from moment to moment, rather than 
being continuous.  This first layer of the self that Stern talks about is perhaps 
better seen as the becoming of the self; the self is not there yet; we are in a grey 
area.  We won’t get the continuity of being alive until we have the core self next; it 
is with the arrival of the core self that the notes become music. The idea of there 
being an unattended awareness (or what we will call pre-noetic awareness) will be 
the focus of chapter 3, and the idea of background will be looked at more closely 
in chapter 3 along with chapters 6 - 8, when we look at Antonio Damasio’s idea of 
‘background feelings’ and Matthew Ratcliffe’s idea of ‘existential feelings,’ but for 
the moment we can see the first felt experience of self as Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone puts it (utilizing Stern’s ideas), “anchored in a dynamics of aliveness.”73  
Notice, also, that I’ve been speaking of a theory of self, whereas Stern speaks of a 
sense of self.  I want to argue that this emergent – or minimal – self is the most 
basic component for all that arrives later and builds on it, and thus should be 
considered part of a theory of a self, and moreover, because there is a 
phenomenologically felt experiential quality to this minimal self (the mineness or 
givenness), that it is also a sense of self – the sense that this experience is my 
experience.  So I am taking Stern’s idea of a sense in this case – which for him 
makes up his ‘dynamic forms of vitality’ – and having it play an additional role as 
well.   
2. Sense of Core Self.  This core self encompasses self-agency, self-coherence, and 
self-continuity.74  This layer of Stern’s – along with the emergent self we just 
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inspected – can be brought together and broadly endorsed by PEMS, for it shows 
that in spite of all this chaotic change in the vitality affects and background 
feelings, there is still a feeling of ‘sameness,’ a feeling that it is me that is having 
this experience.  At this layer, at “each time the infant is confronted with herself at 
moments of primary consciousness, she feels the ‘same’ by virtue of the invariants 
created from her vital background feelings and her vitality affects and their 
expression.”75  The core self supports the PEMS view by showing that there is a 
sense of continuity that exists over time in a process that never sits still or comes 
to an end in spite of being (again using Sheets-Johnstone’s terminology) 
“fundamentally animate and animated.”76  The infant enactively generates and 
maintains itself, and in turn enacts or bring forth its own patterns of meaningful 
activity.  The sense of phenomenological mineness requires continuity.   
We are also seeing with the sense of emergent self and core self not only the 
beginnings of phenomenological mineness, but also of the 
embodied/embedded/enactive/extended elements of the minimal self.  Recall 
(from the introduction) that the embodied view states that bodily structures and 
bodily processes in part make up mental processes, that the embedded view states 
that mental processes work in tandem with and exploit environmental structures, 
and that the enactive view says that our cognitive processes are not simply 
composed of neural processes, but also things that we as the organism do more 
generally in the reciprocal way in which we act on the world and it in turn acts on 
us (a type of mutual modulation).  The interaction and exploration of the infant 
with its caregiver and the world in its peri-personal space has demonstrated key 
elements of 4E structures as applied to the minimal self.   
 
3. Sense of Core Self-with-Other/Sense of Intersubjective Self.  Because of research in 
mirror neurons, we are getting a clearer idea of what and where the mechanisms 
are which allow us to synchronize our movements with others who are engaged in 
movement (see the next chapter for further details on this).  Notice again, 
however, this intersubjectivity is based on movement.  We engage in thinking in 
movement, and our understanding of other things and persons is similarly based 
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on movement.77  According to Stern, this emerges at around 9 months of age for 
the infant.78  Stern’s account of intersubjectivity is much richer than what I am 
drawing upon for the PEMS view; I am looking at an earlier and more primal type 
of intersubjective self (refer back to the Meltzoff and Moore data of 
infant/caregiver interaction that takes place literally hours after birth).  Thus, for 
my purposes it is the emergent and early core selves (#1 and #2) – where I am also 
including a more primal intersubjectivity – which are most important for my 
project.  Stern’s category of the Sense of Core Self-with-Other, with a richer 
intersubjective account is something which comes later as we begin to cross the 
conceptual bridge that connects the ‘minimal’ and ‘narrative’ selves.  As such, it is 
part of what emerges from the self as conceived in my PEMS theory.  
4. Verbal Self/Narrative Self.  This is the ability we have of telling a narrative about 
our experiences.  Stern sees this as a new capacity that “opens the way to 
completely new domains of the self.”79  It is a “process of construction [that] acts 
as a sort of laboratory in which a narrative self is forged, mistakes are corrected, 
elaborations added, and adjustments fine-tuned.”80  Stern sees the language 
aspect of this sense of self emerge at around 18 months, and the narrative aspect 
at around 3 years of age.  Again, this is indeed an important aspect of determining 
who we are and what we become – and it is an area about which much discussion 
has taken place in recent years – but it is not part of the minimal self of which I 
speak.  I want to argue – and I think the evidence bears witness to this view – that 
by the time these verbal and narrative aspects of self come about, ‘who we are’ 
has already to a large extent been established; and indeed once the 
verbal/narrative self comes onto the scene, there will be a constant interplay from 
then on between the minimal (i.e. emergent and core self in Stern’s terminology) 
and the verbal/narrative self.  There is much more to be said in regards to this 
view, but the upcoming chapters will deal with this.  
What we should be able to see from this, is what we might call a processual 
philosophy.  It is a process metaphysics which seems to best describe the development of the 
human being (and as we will see in chapter 5, other animals in general).  The self is a 
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constantly changing process of organization, this processual structuring allows the individual to 
create certain unchanging aspects which mark certain unique elements of that particular self 
(which we will see in chapter 3), along with enacting and bringing forth the minimal 
phenomenological meaningfulness that constitutes ipseity. 
 We’ve seen Trevarthen and Reddy’s summary of this early development of self, as well 
as Stern’s; so how does this fit in with the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self which I am 
arguing for?  Several things stand out.  First, we’ve gained our first insight into what the PEMS 
looks like.  The body serves as the focal point or reference to which knowledge and perception 
of objects first occur for this emerging minimal self.  From those earliest moments while still in 
the womb, the foetus is in the process of bodily learning, which sets the stage for the 
appearance of phenomenologically felt mineness.  Secondly, we saw a hint of how the more 
robust narrative self emerges as well.  For, after the child is born, communication occurs, 
where the very first feelings are developed though bodily imitation and coordination.  These 
intersubjective interactions allow the child to begin to master an understanding of its own 
body, of objects, and of others.  The phenomenological sense of personal mineness and 
givenness has its beginnings during these early bodily explorations and interactions (i.e. in 
‘intersubjective emotional relatedness’ and ‘affect attunement’).  Through the attempts the 
infant makes in crawling, walking and interacting with objects in its environment it develops 
bodily understanding of itself and its worldly being.  This brings up a third point – which is that 
this early engagement between the infant and its caregiver presents us with some clues as to 
what the self might consist in.  As Papoušek pointed out, mirror neurons may provide an 
immediate correspondence between the motor and affective systems, but it is the interaction 
between the infant and other which provides the ability to adapt to different situations in the 
long-term.  We saw that this bodily interaction is mostly taking place at the pre-linguistic, and 
pre-personal, sensorimotor level.  But this doesn’t mean that psychological phenomena can 
simply be reduced to some type of physical cause, for affects (emotions, feelings and mood) 
play just as important a role as the sensorimotor (see chapters 6-9).  For a very long time 
emotional content was either neglected, or explained away, Stern’s so-called ‘vitality affects,’ 
or Papoušek’s ‘intersubjective emotional relatedness,’ show that some type of sought-for 
meaningfulness is there from the beginning as well, tied to the sensorimotor.  As Papoušek 
showed, intersubjective emotional relatedness arises from imitation of such bodily activities as 
oral and manual gesturing between the infant and caregiver as they attune themselves in their 
shared activities.  This idea was shared by Stern, giving rise to affective attunement.  Chapter 6 
will develop in more detail the idea that affects are bodily based. 
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Although the primary purpose of this chapter was to look at the ‘birth’ of the PEMS, 
we saw that the narrative self was also peaking through.  This should give us pause for thought 
regarding the difficulty of trying to break up the self into distinct categories.  As we continue 
down this path of examining the self connected to the arguments of this thesis, we will see 
different scenarios where the importance of the body and the importance of affects underlie 
the full and complete self.  The next chapter on mirror neurons will provide us with a more 
specific look at how a certain neurobiological mechanism plays its part in generating a bodily 
and minimal self.  
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   Chapter 2: Mirror Neurons: A Neuronal look at Bodily Meaning and 
Understanding. 
"The sense of the gestures is not given, but understood, that is, recaptured by an act on the 
spectator's part...The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the 
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others...It is as if the other person's intention 
inhabited my body and mine his.  The gesture which I witness outlines an intentional object.  
This object is genuinely present and fully comprehended when the powers of my body adjust 
themselves to it and overlap it."81 
 
Having just looked in close detail at Stern’s breakdown of the different layers of self 
and seen how they fit within my PEMS theory, we noticed that our understanding of the core 
self in its immediate understanding of others incorporates the insights we’ve gained from 
mirror neuron research.  Mirror neurons could play the role Stern wants for connecting the 
core and narrative self, as well as illustrate one of the key points of the Phenomenological-
Enactive Minimal Self (PEMS) of placing intersubjectivity earlier and emphasizing a more 
primal notion that we saw in the work of Meltzoff and Moore on newborn infant interaction 
and communication with caregivers (and Papoušek’s idea of there being an ‘immediate 
resonance’ between child and adult), as well as explaining how we can lead fluidly and 
processually from intersubjective emotional relatedness (something at the PEMS level) into 
intersubjective/social relations at the narrative level.  Mirror neurons also emphasize the 
importance of movement; or the corporeal-kinetic aspect of self (again, we can think back to 
the previous chapter and our examination of infant object perception and manipulation).  
Mirror neurons are an illuminating example showing one of the places where some of the 
forms of vitality may be found.  Let us consider some of the details. 
 Traditional views in infant studies thought that infants were a 'blooming, buzzing, 
confusion' (to use a quote from William James), and the movements that infants made seemed 
to be random and lack direction or purpose.  Modern approaches to infant studies show that 
there is more 'going on' in the infant than previously realized.  New research on what are 
called 'mirror neurons' shows promising ways to further assist us in understanding this subject 
better.  We saw in the previous chapter how Mechthild Papoušek stated that the mirror 
neuron system provided an ‘immediate resonance in…corresponding motor and affective 
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systems,’ and that human interaction between the child and caregiver provided the long-term 
feedback which gave the infant the capability to adapt and change to situations, and expand its 
repertoire of actions.  Thus, that first, immediate reaction comes from a neuronal response to 
a situation, but the interaction between infant and caregiver over time expands and provides 
more and varied series of situations to which the mirror neurons can react.  The interactions in 
effect expand the repertoire of the mirror neurons.  We looked at the second area in the last 
chapter, now we are going to look at the first area.  The two main things that are going to be 
emphasized are, one, responding to another’s action has a pre-reflective basis to it, and, two,  
that this understanding of action is not mere simulation, but is a direct response to a situation 
which relies on intersubjective interaction and an ‘understanding’ of bodily action.  The 
argument being that the situation in which we find ourselves is one which involves the bodily 
subject actively generating meaningful patterns of understanding from observing and 
understanding others’ bodily movements.  We will see that the mirror neurons are yet another 
key to our desire to understand what makes up the PEMS at a primal level. 
 The classical approach to perception was one where a perception leads to cognition, 
and this in turn leads to movement.  However, work done in the 1990's by scientists in Italy, 
found that there are neurons – so-called mirror neurons – that are activated both when an 
individual performs an act, and also when the person observes the act being performed by 
another; these acts "are goal-directed and not merely movements."82  Their argument is that 
perception is not outside of cognition and movement, but is directly "embedded in the 
dynamics of action."83  Their key claim is that the brain doesn't simply act, it understands, and 
it does so in a way which is pragmatic in nature and is pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic in its 
way of understanding.  Thus the divisions that have been traditionally made between 
perception, motor, and cognitive processes, is mostly an artificial construct.  Corrado 
Sinigaglia, one of the proponents of what the discovery of mirror neurons can add to our 
understanding of action, says:  "the functional properties of MN's [mirror neurons] allow us to 
gain insight into the basic forms of action understanding that are 'below' and 'before' any 
deliberate mentalizing."84  What we will do next is to delve in to what mirror neurons can tell 
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us in general, and then we will apply this to what we discovered about infants and PEMS in the 
previous chapter. 
 Mirror neurons code for motor acts, not individual movements.  When a monkey 
watches someone reach for something with their hand and move it toward their mouth, the 
observation of this movement triggers the mirror neuron in the monkey, this is regardless of 
whether this was done with the right or left hand, whether the mouth was opened or closed, 
or whether the hand actually picked anything up when it reached for the object and moved 
toward the mouth.85  Mirror neurons also become active when certain things occur within a 
specific space around us.  In one instance, a mirror neuron fired when a certain part of a 
monkey's forearm was brushed, this same mirror neuron also fired when the hand moved 
close to the monkey's forearm, but did not touch it.86  Giacomo Rizzolati and Corrado Sinigaglia 
argue that "objects and space seem therefore to refer to a pragmatic constitution by which the 
former appear as poles of virtual acts and the latter is defined as the system of relations 
deployed by these acts and anchored to the various parts of the body...these processes are 
modulated by action."87  Objects, at least initially, give form to space, and the coordinated acts 
which we use to reach for them, are to be viewed as 'hypotheses of action' which mark the 
boundary and limits of our different aims and gestures.88  The motor system, under this 
understanding, possesses a wealth of functions that well exceeds basic control of movement; 
the functional dynamics of action involve objects and the bodies of others in terms of 
possibilities as well as actualities of action.  To clarify, the primary function of mirror neurons 
according to its advocates is to understand the meaning of motor events performed by 
others.89  The mirror neuron system perceives meaning from the intentional act, this motor 
knowledge, for Rizzolati and Sinigaglia, is both "a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
immediate understanding of the acts of others."90  
 So, how does this tie in with our exploration of infant consciousness?  The discovery of 
mirror neurons seems to show that the way in which infants categorize objects and come to 
learn how to understand place and function within a certain space, takes place according to 
the motor possibilities which they offer.91  In recent studies that have been done using 
ultrasound, we have come to learn that unborn children are engaging in different types of 
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motor activities, so that a very simple motor representation of space is already there in the 
early stages of development at this time.  And this movement is not uncoordinated or 
unpatterned: at the 22nd week of gestation, the hand movements of the foetus show signs of 
being patterned and being reliant on the goal of the performed motor act.  Even at this early 
stage of development there are early connections being made in motor centres which control 
the mouth and hands; these, then, become more sophisticated and versatile after birth when 
the infant can interact with more objects and people.  At this later point in time they become 
more goal-directed toward the objects in the larger space around their body.92  One important 
thing we can say from looking at this data, is that the patterns of motor acts form early before 
we are born, and are ripe for further development once the child is born.93  The other 
important lesson that can be drawn is that this doesn't all happen at once, but occurs 
incrementally and builds up in a more sophisticated way over time.  After birth, for example, 
the infants crystalline lens is not fully operational, thus they can get a basic visual 
representation of only their peri-personal space, and this works only in a way which allows 
them to distinguish near from far; their eyes acquire the ability to converge only during the 
first three months, it is only after that point they get the ability to look into the distance.94  
Mirror neuron researchers hypothesize that this is at least in part because of a mirror neuron 
system [MNS] in infants: “an innate MNS is already present at birth, which can be flexibly 
modulated by motor experience and gradually enriched by visuomotor learning.”95 
 Mirror neurons also provide insight into infant communication and imitation as well.  
In the words of Rizzolati and Sinigaglia, "Imitation requires a system which controls the mirror 
neurons, and this system must have two functions: facilitory and inhibitory.  It must facilitate 
the transition from potential action, coded by the mirror neurons, to the actual execution of 
the motor act itself...but it must also be able to inhibit this transition.  If this were not so, our 
system would go into loop mode; every motor act we see would immediately be replicated."96  
Rizzolati and Sinigaglia argue that a rudimentary form of this mirror neuron system is already 
possessed by newborns, and this can help us explain Meltzoff and Moore's data on infant 
imitation of tongue protrusions of adults.97  If the imitation is not perfect, that is in part due to 
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the low amount of myelinisation that has occurred at this point in the development of their 
axons, and the lack of a fully developed visual system.98 
 Mirror neurons may also be able to partially explain emotional exchange between 
infant and adult.  Our ability to successfully interact with the environment and the people in it 
is based on the ability to perceive and understand the emotions of those people.  The ability to 
see a look of disgust, happiness, sadness, or anger, and understand what that means, is vital to 
the development and survivability of us.  Those like Rizzolati and Sinigaglia, who are advocates 
for the explanatory power of mirror neurons, think that the ability of an infant to articulate 
and differentiate different emotions as a way of leading to basic social skills can also be 
explained by mirror neurons.  However, in this area they put in a word of caution: 
"experiencing disgust and perceiving it in others have a common neural substrate...However, 
more direct evidence is needed to substantiate the existence of a mirror mechanism and to 
guarantee that the same region of the insula becomes active both when we experience 
revulsion ourselves and when we see it expressed by others."99  
Perhaps understandably some scepticism has occurred regarding the explanatory 
power and details of mirror neurons.  For example, Melvyn Goodale has asked whether the 
role of mirror neurons is to compute the goal or intention of some agent, or simply the 
command required to achieve a goal?100  Sinigaglia responds by saying "There is no doubt that 
the context [the presence of certain objects] provided relevant cues.  These cues however 
could only take on full significance in virtue of the intentional chains that belong to the 
animal's motor patrimony."101 This approach shows why there is not an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach to how these chains are selected.  From previous experience we learn how to handle 
a hot mug of coffee; either by handling it differently than, say, a cold pint of beer, or even the 
possibility of deciding not to grasp the mug at all until its contents have cooled down; for not 
all intentions result in a future action.  When I see a hot mug of coffee, this may very well 
cause me to wait before picking it up, this is something which is initially learned when we burn 
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ourselves by picking it up too early, or by picking it up at the wrong part of the mug.  After 
several such experiences, the chain of intentions associated with how and when to pick up a 
hot mug of coffee is established.  Thus it is not simply a case of reducing intentions into a set of 
physical behaviours which occur within a certain degree of regularity under certain contexts, 
instead, "It is…a question of recognizing the role of chains of motor goals, and the fact that 
they shape the motor expertise which is at the base both of the agent's capacity to act and to 
represent his/her ability to understand the immediate significance of the actions and 
intentions of others.”102  And as this "motor knowledge grows, the intentional chains that 
shape it become more articulate."103 
 In most of the situations in which we find ourselves interacting with others, the actions 
which we perform and see others perform fill us with immediate meaning.  This instant 
meaning may not rely on the complicated sets of beliefs and desires that are usually adopted 
to explain the attribution of intentional states to others.  Although mirror neurons may not be 
the explanation for this understanding of others, the evidence that has been collected seems 
to show that they nonetheless seem to play a very important role.  It is only in recent decades 
that new studies have shown us something about the infant that we didn't know before.  The 
‘understanding’ these neurons provide us with is based on a situation that the body finds itself 
in.  This is one more step in our ability to understand the primal intersubjectivity of others as 
emphasized by PEMS.  However, although these neurons may provide us with an immediate 
response to a situation, this is just the beginning; for social and intersubjective interaction is 
needed for further change and development.  This is why Sinigaglia’s discussion of our 
continual development of intentional action chains is important.  Papoušek had said that 
mirror neurons provided us with ‘immediate resonance’ in our motor and affective system, 
and that interactions between the infant and caregiver provided the variety of situations and 
contexts which are needed for further development.  Perhaps we can now see that these early 
‘intersubjective emotional resonances’ – which occur between parent and offspring – create 
these intentional chains and further develop our motor ‘understanding’ of different motor 
acts.  As the child and parent engage in shared bodily expressions, new intentional chains 
develop building up an increased closeness and understanding.  The mirror neuron system 
seems to play a key role in the development of this primal understanding for the PEMS view.  
We can also see that this PEMS can also be influenced by the narrative self, that is, interactions 
with other subjects (and objects as well, of course), can incorporate themselves into the PEMS 
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via the role of action chains that develop through repeated contact and interaction.  What we 
can say, is that there is a new theory of embodiment emerging, where it seems the 'body' 
shapes the 'mind.'  As we saw with Meltzoff and Moore, Stern, Trevarthen, Johnson, Papoušek, 
and others, the new theories inspired by these discoveries are causing us to re-evaluate our 
original assumptions about our understanding of cognition.  And this is leading us to see 
cognition beginning at a minimal bodily level (through shared, intentional action chains), which 
precedes and sets up the scaffolding from which a more robust narrative self can emerge.  The 
benefit of chapter 2 has been that we’ve gotten a closer look at how one of the ‘forms of 
vitality’ might operate from the perspective of neuroscience.  However, more work needs to 
be done in this field, and a broader and more encompassing view needs to be taken to fully 
understand the implications of a kinaesthetic approach to the self.   
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Chapter 3: Body Schema, Proprioception, Body Image 
"The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross.  This is 
because its parts are inter-related in a particular way...I am in undivided possession of 
it...through a body [schema]."104 
       
 If we are to understand the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self which underlies 
and continually influences our narrative self, then it would be helpful to be able to draw on a 
common vocabulary which can provide us with clarity and a better understanding of what we 
are dealing with.  Both Shaun Gallagher and Brian O'Shaughnessy have contributed greatly in 
this regard, and for this chapter we will be drawing heavily on their work to achieve a greater 
degree of clarity on this issue (chapter 4 will take the terms and vocabulary introduced here 
and further analyze and expand upon them).  There is a dual role for this chapter, however, 
and that is not only to provide vocabulary which increases clarity and understanding, but 
which also contributes to – and has a key role in – elucidating what the structures are which 
provide us with that phenomenological sense of mineness which is a key element of the PEMS 
viewpoint.  Through the analysis of proprioception and its structures, for example, we will 
discover how they can make up and explain the primitive self-reference that makes up our 
subjectivity of experience.  This chapter hopes to add to, enrich, and fill in, the areas explored 
in the first two chapters on infant development and mirror neurons.  It will begin by looking at 
some key terms for the area of embodiment and enactivism of interest to us and by defining 
them.  Along with building on what was covered in the first chapter on infants, in this chapter 
we will apply these new terms and ideas to the case of Ian Waterman, a person who because 
of an accident affecting his bodily movement, provides a good way of understanding the 
different divisions within embodied selfhood.  The four key terms which we will be focusing on 
in the first part of this chapter, are: pre-noetic, body schema, proprioception, and body image. 
 Noetic operations are processes which we are all familiar with; these include memory, 
judgment, and perceptions that take place at an aware, conscious level.  When we look at pre-
noetic structures, we are dealing with processes which lie beneath, or below the noetic 
structures.  Pre-noetic analysis looks at how the body 'anticipates,' or sets the stage for 
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consciousness and implicitly shapes or forms it; as such, they lie behind our conscious 
awareness, or they occur before we know about it.105    Much of the analysis of the 
phenomenal aspects of our experiences has been focused at the noetic level.  However, as 
we've seen, recent work has caused us to not so much question or overthrow this approach, 
but to look deeper.   If we are to understand how the body 'grips' the world, and learn what it 
'does' for us, the argument that I want to make is that it is pre-noetic structures which form 
the foundation, or basis for this.  By getting a clearer understanding of the pre-noetic 
structures, we will have something which we can point at and say ‘here are some of the bodily 
structures which provide us with the phenomenological sense of mineness’ which we 
experience. 
 The pre-noetic idea which is most important for us in this regard is the body schema.  
Gallagher defines the body schema as "a system of sensory-motor capacities that function 
without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring."106  It is the body's capabilities, 
abilities, and habits, which set up the constraints on what movements we do, or are able to do 
(Just as important to this is the body image; this is the "system of perceptions, attitudes, and 
beliefs pertaining to one's own body."  However, we will look at the body image in detail at the 
end of this part of the chapter.)107  The body schema is not a set of "perceptions, beliefs, or 
attitudes," but are subpersonal (which we can understand as internal, automatic adjustments 
to changes) and as such subpersonal processes act below any type of self-referential 
intentionality.108  The body schema is the most primitive aspect of a body being able to 
function.  The body schema is what provides us with our typical unreflective posture.  Even at 
complete rest the body is 'active,' it is the body schema which plays the background role of 
keeping us upright in an unaware way when we sit at our desk and type on our computer.  And 
it is the body schema which subpersonally and preintentionally coordinates our hands in using 
a fork and knife at the dinner table to feed ourselves while we are intentionally involved in a 
personal conversation with others.  A lot of terminology has just been introduced, so let us 
summarize the three main aspects of the body schema: (i) it lies "prior to or outside of 
intentional awareness;" (ii) the body schema is "subpersonal;" (iii) the body schema is holistic 
in the way it manages the entire body as a unity, rather than dealing with individual body 
parts.109   
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 Things get a bit more complicated when we arrive at the idea of proprioception.  
Proprioception provides us with a difficulty, because it encompasses aspects of both the pre-
reflective body schema, and the reflective body image; it is a concept which straddles and 
serves to connect the body schema with the body image.  Gallagher breaks proprioception up 
into two areas.  Proprioceptive Awareness, for him, is predominantly a self-referential but 
normally pre-reflective awareness of our movement (although he says it can also be reflective; 
we will address that potential inconsistency in the next paragraph).110  Proprioceptive 
Information, is a non-conscious understanding of movement performance that acts at a 
subpersonal – or automatic – level which is constantly updating the movement and posture of 
the body.  Proprioceptive Information is a pre-noetic operation, thus the emphasis on it being 
subpersonal and non-conscious, it lies behind or before our conscious awareness.111   
 This leads us to the problem mentioned above of how much of proprioception is pre-
reflective and how much is reflective?  Let us summarize one more time how Gallagher wants 
us to understand proprioception before we delve deeper into this difficulty.  Proprioceptive 
Information "contributes to the body-schematic control of posture and movement, and plays 
an essential role in the operations of body schemas."112  If I am running across a field and 
reaching outward to catch a frisbee in flight, I am not aware of all the adjustments and 
alterations that occur in my neural structures and the muscle adjustments that need to be 
made to allow me to accomplish this task.  This is the automatic subpersonal Proprioceptive 
Information that occurs before – or behind – my conscious awareness.  The Proprioceptive 
Awareness comes to play in a usually pre-reflective way when I run about the park catching 
and throwing the frisbee and being aware in a vague sort of way that I am engaging in a 
physical activity.  I am not so much focusing on a specific body part or area during this activity, 
but I am aware that I am moving about for the purpose of throwing and catching the frisbee.113  
These two types of proprioception communicate with each other (i) intermodally as 
communication between proprioceptive awareness and our visual capabilities, and (ii) as 
communication between all the various sensory systems and the motor system.114  The next 
part of the discussion – drawing on O'Shaughnessy's view of proprioception – delves further 
into its functions as a bridge of sorts between our discussion of body schema which we 
addressed before, and the body image which is coming up.   
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 Like Gallagher, Brian O'Shaughnessy has also looked in some depth at what 
proprioception is.  He says "it takes a back seat in consciousness almost all of the time."115  He 
clarifies:  "I employ [the term proprioception] to stand for our awareness of our own limbs and 
body - vaguely conceived...it is not to be described as a 'kind of information', if that means the 
possession of cognitive attitudes.  And it is to be sharply distinguished from the attentive 
awareness of bodily feelings."116     
 Next, for O'Shaughnessy, we ask: how does proprioception attend to the body, both its 
parts and as a whole?  O'Shaughnessy ventures that "we all of the time perceive the body as a 
whole, recessively and with a limited measure of differentiation of detail, and that particular 
bodily sensations...usher into being a perceptual awareness of the body point...singled out, an 
awareness that takes place on the 'ground' of the body as a whole."117  Thus the body sits in 
the background most of the time and only under certain circumstances does a specific aspect 
of it rise forth in greater detail (In the next paragraph keep in mind that O’Shaughnessy’s idea 
of a ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ body image is different than Gallagher’s (I will use the term as 
Gallagher uses it).  These ideas are being introduced for the purpose of leading up to an 
examination of O’Shaughnessy’s proprioceptive ‘origin points,’ which are of importance to the 
PEMS project). 
 O'Shaughnessy delineates proprioception into a short-term body image, and a long-
term body image.  The short-term body image is, roughly speaking a consideration of how 
potential – and actual – bodily encounters with the objects and the environment are dealt with 
from moment to moment as bodily attention shifts.  We are dealing with contents of bodily 
proprioception at any moment.  Consider a violinist and how their body maintains posture in 
spite of the continuous (potential and actual) arm movements necessary for the playing of the 
instrument during a performance.  At any given moment there are a series of spatial, bodily 
states of affairs that will have to be allowed for (if the performance is running smoothly, then 
rehearsed actions can continue as practiced, but if a string breaks, or someone else in the 
orchestra makes an error, an immediate change may have to be made in their performance).  
For our purposes, however, it is the long-term body image of O’Shaughnessy that is important, 
so we will focus on that. 
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The idea of a long-term body image for O'Shaughnessy is "an unformed or vague or 
malformed concept."118  This is in part due to the messy way in which it has been used in 
different social settings and how it is described or understood by the general public (e.g. when 
the media talks about how certain anorexic teens may possess a certain ‘body image’ of 
themselves, the term is used here in a very loose sense).  There is, then, an ambiguity in the 
mentalistic concept that is used to describe how a person – like a teenager – may describe the 
body image they have of themselves, and a less mentalistic sense of the idea where we might 
argue that some infants have a simple body image of themselves.  Still, despite terminological 
difficulties, he thinks of the long-term body image as another 'reality' which follows the 
previous three short-term concepts (this long-term body image is perhaps closest to what 
Gallagher calls the body image, in that there is some type of conscious attending to the body).   
 The problem involved in a long-term body image is that the existence of these 
proprioceptions are in need of explanation – how does one come up with a starting point for 
our proprioceptions?  That is, if our spatial content is based on feedback from bodily 
sensations, then what is the cause – or starting or beginning point – of our bodily 'knowledge'?  
If a sensation is based on a previous sensation, which is in turn based on a previous sensation, 
then it seems that we are in danger of an infinite regress.  O'Shaughnessy's solution is to 
describe three 'origin properties' which organisms possess.  We begin with the changeless 
innate; this is to have a certain natural, or particular feature of the body, which is ‘changeless’ 
in that it appears and functions the same from person to person, such as a finger, or toe; these 
digits exist as an innate and natural part of our body from the very beginning of our existence.  
Then there is the developmental-acquired, which is what naturally happens to that organ (i.e. 
our fingers and toes grow and change shape and form as we grow, and our body has to 
naturally adjust to this change in size and shape).  Lastly, there is the experience-acquired; this 
is our continued experience of using the particular body part.119     
Let us develop O’Shaughnessy’s proprioceptive origin points further.  At this point it 
might be instructive to see how they might work by expanding upon one of the cases we 
looked at earlier in chapter 1 when we looked into infant bodily motion.  The experiments 
(drawn from the work of Esther Thelen and Linda Smith) involve an infant’s coordinated 
stepping motions.  When held above the ground a young infant can make relatively good 
stepping motions.  This skill seems to disappear, however, around the second month, and only 
reappears somewhere around the 8th to 10th month, when the infant can support its own 
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weight.  Interestingly, between the first stage when the leg movement was more reflexive, and 
the second stage where the walking movement reappeared and became more intentional, one 
could still get the infant to coordinate its stepping pattern if it was placed on a treadmill.  It 
was argued at that point that this research showed there is not some inner blueprint which is 
followed, but that these developments emerge and change with the infant through a complex 
interplay of forces (including in this case: the leg mass, leg moving actions, exterior influences 
such as the treadmill, and deliberate choices).  The proprioceptive ‘origin points’ of 
O’Shaughnessy fit into this suggestion.  The leg, for example would be part of this ‘changeless 
innate’ part of the infant – it is a body part which has been with the infant from its earliest 
development.  The change in the infants’ body and leg mass in this vital early period fits in with 
O’Shaughnessy’s ‘developmental-acquired,’ which expressed the constant change which 
occurs as the leg (and body which the legs eventually would have to hold up) were in a 
constant state of growth and development.  Lastly, the ‘experience-acquired’ category of 
O’Shaughnessy shows the infants’ continual response to the environment (i.e. being held 
above the ground, being placed on a treadmill, trying to walk on its own, etc).  This theory and 
data of the infant coming to terms with its body, and having its body as the focal point of 
understanding itself, other objects, and other persons, all supports the enactive approach by 
bearing witness to the fact that the infant is actively generating its own identity.  It showed 
that cognition of self and other emerges through this embodied action and that this is 
relational and brought out via its attempts to couple with the environment.  This gives us a 
clear example of how the ever changing and growing body can adjust to changing 
circumstances and maintain unity even as new things arise.  O’Shaughnessy has provided 
categories of organization and development which support the enactive idea of autonomous 
agents actively generating and maintaining themselves, and by doing so bringing forth their 
own cognitive domains.  This is based on relational modulation between the infant and 
situations encountered in the environment.   
We can perhaps also see that these proprioceptive structures can help explain the 
primitive self-reference that makes up our subjectivity of experience, for as our body 
progresses through the ‘developmental-acquired’ and ‘experiential-acquired’ stages, there will 
be a different way in which we relate to our bodily self.  Consider an adolescent; while a teen is 
making their way through this ‘developmental-acquired’ stage, there is frequently a feeling of 
awkwardness as they adjust to their constantly growing body.  We can also think of a slender 
individual, who in a short period of time gains a considerable amount of weight; this 
‘experience-acquired’ change will also typically have a strong effect on how this person feels 
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and thinks about themselves, and they will see some opportunities fade or drift away (other 
useful examples along the same lines would be the necessary adjustments a pregnant woman 
must go through, and the physical changes associated with old age).   These structures are also 
part of the explanatory framework for the phenomenological component of the 
Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self. 
 One question that arises at this point is: whose terminology should we be using to 
understand these concepts?  I will be using some of Gallagher’s terms (with a re- examination 
of ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’ occurring in the next chapter), but arguing that 
O’Shaughnessy’s ‘origin points’ is a important starting point for the creation of our most basic 
body schema and early proprioception, and to emphasize the important PEMS related concept 
of mineness.  This is still a difficult terminological and conceptual issue, for we still haven't 
found the transitional piece to the puzzle between the pre-reflective and reflective, and until 
we do, this will be a difficult area to navigate, and we are terminologically and conceptually 
bereft as a result.  This issue will be looked at in more detail in Part II when we examine affects 
(feelings, moods, and emotions) and how they operate.  For the moment, we can recall the 
infant stages of transition that Stern (as well as Trevarthen and Reddy) had, with the 
progression from the emerging infant self into the narrative level.  In the process of this 
change, we see the infant develop from actions that occur outside its reflective awareness, to 
that where it can create a narrative about itself (we will see more of this in chapter 5 when we 
look at gesturing and its relation to language). 
 There is one more thing that should be considered when it comes to proprioception 
and body schemas, which shows that they may be even more expansive and important in what 
they do than even Gallagher and O'Shaughnessy think.  Vittorio Gallese and Corrrado Sinigaglia 
have recently tried to further articulate what the bodily self is and what it does.  They argue 
that the body is not only something that is already given to us, but that it is primarily given to 
us as a 'source' or 'power' for action.120  This means the different variety of motor possibilities 
which exist for us literally defines the landscape – or horizon – of the world in which we can 
interact and direct things with our bodies.  They think that much of the discussion and talk of 
body schemas and proprioception speak as if they are the only modalities which provide 
information about the body.  Also, the implications of much of these discussions imply that the 
body is isolated from the world.  For Gallese and Sinigaglia, proprioception is (i) not the only 
sensory mode of providing bodily information, and (ii) the body is not simply a body that is 
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being experienced, "the body as experiencing body is always in 'excess' of the body that is 
experienced...a further step is required, consisting in the investigation of the way in which the 
experiencing body unfolds its 'excess' in the very making of experience."121  The idea of ‘excess’ 
here means the different variety of motor possibilities which exist for us in the world as 
possibilities for action. 
By way of evidence to show that body schemas are not just sensorimotor (in that it 
focuses on physical postures, or the boundaries of the body), but also powered for action (in 
that it “reflects the power for action that may exceed the actual domain of actions available to 
the body.”122), Gallese and Sinigaglia looked at other research where they found that tools can 
be used to shape a person's body schema.  In one such case, a hand-held tool that allows 
someone to extend their reach was used with healthy people, those with brain damage, and 
those with visuo-tactile handicaps.  The results of these experiments showed that reaching a 
visual stimulus with the tool had similar interference effects as those that were reached with 
the hand.  Moreover, when using the tool to reach, the effects relied on the tool and not on 
hand posture as it did with people who just used their hand.123  For those with brain damage, 
the reaching tool increased or decreased their handicap depending on how the tool modified 
their grasp (they were in effect getting the same results using their hands as they were using 
the reaching tool).  The way the body was able to modify and remodulate its motor acts and 
tactile feedback based on this tool that extended their ability to reach, seems to show that 
there is more to a body schema and proprioception then simply monitoring and maintaining 
parts of the personal body.  They argue these findings show that the body schema is comprised 
of "multi-sensory integration and dynamic plasticity.  The construal of the body schema in 
terms of a set of sensory-motor laws working at a mere kinematic level, with the only function 
to control the postural adjustments required by movement execution does not fully account 
for the...above-mentioned properties." 124  The peri-personal space – that area of space in 
which objects are within reach of us – seems to be quite flexible in its range, depending on our 
motor goals, actions, and what means are used to extend or subtract it.  The ability of our 
bodies to use tools to augment our bodily capabilities may require us to delve deeper into the 
relationship between body schema, proprioception, and how they coordinate our action.  
 The relation between bodily action and bodily self-awareness in Gallese and 
Sinigaglia's view goes beyond the simple control or anticipation of action, for both presuppose 
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the body as a source for action.  Consider the following experiment and conditions: In what is 
called the 'Rubber Hand Illusion,' a person sees a rubber hand being stroked along with one of 
their own, unseen, hands.  In this experiment vision dominates touch, for if the stroking of the 
real and rubber hands occur in synchrony, the person will move their real hand toward the 
location of the false hand; the person’s “active movements [in effect] integrate distinct body 
parts into a coherent unified self-awareness of the body.”125  The people involved state that 
they literally feel the rubber hand as being part of their body.126  In a situation such as this, the 
active movements are integrated by us into our own body and placed into a coherent and 
unified whole.  Consider the next two disorders.  Asomatognosia is a disorder where, because 
of a premotor lesion which causes a defect in motor intentionality, a person feels that a part of 
their body is missing, or has disappeared from their physical awareness.  They in effect lose 
self-awareness of some body part(s).  And Somatoparaphrenia is a disorder where the 
ownership of a part of a person's body is denied, or where that part is thought to be a part of 
another person's body.  These disorders cause the person to feel a separation from their body, 
or a deluded belief that the affected body part belongs to someone else.  This seems to show 
that the body schema does more than just monitor posture, or monitor the body’s boundaries. 
Indeed, Gallese and Sinigaglia want to argue that cases like these show that the body schema 
does not just "reflect the physical postures or boundaries of the [organic] body, but reflects 
the power for action that may exceed the actual domain of actions available to the body."127     
 We saw earlier that there is some question as to where the non-aware sensorimotor 
body aspects end for proprioception and where conscious monitoring begins.  We will now 
look more closely at the conscious aspects of our bodily self: the body image.  We will quote 
again the definition of body image from Gallagher: the body image is the "system of 
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body."128  Gallagher breaks the 
body image down into three subcategories: (i) the Body Percept, which is the perceptual 
experience the subject has of their own body.  (ii) the Body Concept, which is our conceptual 
understanding of our body – both scientifically and of that through folk psychology.  And (iii) 
the Body Affect, which is our emotional attitude to our body.129  These subcategories cover a 
vast conceptual range of ideas the person can have of their body, and all are important.  
Although the focus of this part of the discussion will be more on the first idea of the ’body 
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percept,' the 'body concept' will return as the background concept which will be the focus of 
Part II when we look at the Affective Self, and the 'body affect' will also be an important 
concept that will underlie the discussion of Part II.  Thus, it is quite important to come to an 
understanding of the first – and most foundational aspects of – these three categories of body 
image.  
 We have already seen in our look at infant development, mirror neurons, and the 
exploration in chapter 3 on body schemas and proprioception, some of the ways in which a 
body schema emerges. This should now allow us to see how the body schema can play a role 
as an important component in the minimal self.  All these cases show how the body lays the 
groundwork for our earliest means of understanding ourselves, and this is done in a way which 
lies mostly at a pre-reflective level.  Whereas the body schema predominantly takes place prior 
to any form of representation and abstract reasoning, the body image does possess some 
abstraction and representation, since here we are dealing with the way we personally 
interpret and see things; and when we go about a particular, focused, activity, we are usually 
looking for, or at something specific.  We could say that the body image represents to us what 
we experience from our attentive, reflective, first-person perspective; it occurs during those 
instances when something specific is attentionally brought into consciousness for purposeful 
focus or reflection.  Thus, where the body schema was pre-personally pragmatic in its attempt 
to find an overall bodily way of coming to grips with an environmental situation, the body 
image is our personally attentive – sometimes abstractly analyzed – focus on a specific aspect 
of the body, or even a specific part, relevant to a situation in which we find ourselves at a given 
time.130  Furthermore, the body image is also influenced by the language which a person uses 
to express themselves as an embodied being.  Thus, cultural factors play a distinct role in how 
the person appears to themselves.  From this we can see that the body image is something 
which is not just innate, but develops over time as we become better at consciously attending 
to our body.  Because of this, we can begin to see how the development of a personal body 
image is something which follows on from our development of a pre-personal body schema. 
 Perhaps the best way to highlight the difference between the body schema and the 
body image is to look at the case of Ian Waterman.  His case will show us in clear detail what 
happens when a person loses most of their body schema and must replace it with their body 
image.  Most of us experience our body as ours; it is something of personal significance.  
Through our body schema we develop a posture, gait, and movement, based on how our body 
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morphology can best navigate the environment.  And the body image provides us with a more 
reflective perspective.  But what would happen if that pre-reflective body schema were 
impaired?  That is what Ian Waterman had to deal with.   
 Due to sensory neuropathy which damaged the fibres below his neck, Ian Waterman 
lost his sense of touch and proprioception from the neck down.131  This means, in the words of 
Gallagher, that he "is still capable of movement and he experiences hot, cold, pain, and muscle 
fatigue, but he has no proprioceptive sense of posture or limb location." 132  Initially when this 
happened – when Waterman was 19 – he lost motor control and the ability to maintain 
posture.  When his body schema became disabled (at least below the neck, it is important to 
remember that from the neck up he still has proprioception), he had to learn new ways to 
navigate and move about.  This happened by attempting to substitute his body image for his 
body schema.  As you recall, the body schema is largely a pre-reflective ability for the body as a 
whole to function, whereas the body image is largely a specific body area or part being 
consciously attended to.  Thus, Waterman's ability to maintain posture or to walk meant that, 
initially, he had to consciously attend to each of his feet as he took each step, as well as try to 
remain aware of others around him so as to avoid falling when he got bumped by someone, or 
something.  This was a slow process, since, with no tactile feedback, he had to rely heavily on 
his visual sense.  This becomes even more apparent if he is blindfolded, or left in the dark 
without the ability to see his body; in such cases he is not able to control his movements.  
What Waterman has managed to do is substitute at a conscious and reflective level what most 
people manage at a subconscious and pre-reflective level, by using his visual sense and by 
imagining what he is about to do.   
 Still, doesn't the body schema precede the body image?  If the body image is based in 
part on the body schema, then if the body schema is damaged, how is Waterman able to use 
his body image?  I think there are three factors that need to be taken into account: (i) This 
sensory neuropathy didn't occur until Waterman was 19, thus he spent most of his youth with 
a body schema which had developed enough for a body image to develop.  (ii) We have also 
seen the importance of continually operating mirror neurons in allowing us to at least embed 
the dynamics of bodily action within us, through the context of situational motor acts (action 
chains), providing us with an ‘understanding’ of action.  Once laid down, the mirror neurons 
seem to give us another method in being able to relate and react bodily to the world.  In the 
case of Waterman, the neural network would have to be re-configured when he lost his body 
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schema to re-adjust to the body image taking over.  An interesting question that arises from 
this is: did this re-configured neuronal system mean that his ‘interpretation’ (at the mirror 
neuron level) of others’ movement change due to the re-configuration? And (iii) Waterman 
still maintained proprioception above the neck.  However, even with a body schema developed 
in youth, and some proprioception above the neck, once Waterman lost his proprioception 
below the neck, this impaired his body image, and he had to learn not only to compensate the 
body image for the body schema, he also had to learn to use his body image anew.  Gallagher 
points out four ways in which Waterman's compensation of a body schema through visual 
body imagery is limited.  First, there are limits to what Waterman can attend to at any given 
time; he can only focus on a few things at a time.  Two, because he has to focus on every step 
he takes along with other potential environmental hazards, his movement is slowed down.  
Three, the duration of his motor activity is of a short duration due to the amount of mental 
energy it takes to keep it going.  And four, single and combined, or compounded, movements 
require a large amount of energy.133  From this data we can perhaps add as a possibility that as 
Waterman has had to make the adjustment of using his body image instead of his body 
schema, that some of the neuronal configurations in his brain have restructured themselves 
according to his new requirements; one thing that has emerged in recent years is how truly 
plastic the brain can be in recovering and adjusting to impairments. 
 A difficulty arises when we look at infants, for we are seeing a life form emerging and 
in transition; does an infant have a body image?  Gallagher and Meltzoff think that if the infant 
didn't have some type of primitive body image, then it wouldn't have an awareness of its own 
face which makes it able to improve its imitative performances of facial expressions.  Not only 
is the body schema working to make the infant physically competent in its environment, but 
the infant is also in the early stages of developing a body image as well.  What Gallagher wants 
to argue, is that "the neonate...does have, in the most general sense, a proprioceptive 
awareness of its own face.”134  Gallagher thinks this proprioceptive awareness constitutes for 
the infant the bare beginnings “of a primitive body image.”135  Here is an example of how the 
phenomenological givenness that makes up part of ipseity develops and emerges. 
Near the end of chapter 1 we looked at the larger picture of development going all the 
way back to the womb (drawn from the work of Colwyn Trevarthen and Vasudevi Reddy).  The 
enactive view is born out with the timeline of development of theirs which we looked at.  As 
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early as the 8th week (and sometimes starting as late as the 16th week) of gestation the foetus 
begins its ability to differentiate between its hands, face, and other senses.  This is the time 
when we first see the systems of the brain along with the motor structures of the body 
becoming active through movement.  Notice that this is before the developing human 
organism ‘senses anything.’  It is in the embryo body and brain where we see the origin points 
of proprioception first appear.  This would also seem to be the place and time where the ‘body 
schema’ is getting laid down.  As with anything at this early stage in development, it is difficult 
to point at a specific point and say “this is where THE Self begins!”  In fact, as we can see, there 
is a broad 8 week period where this might emerge, so specifics make this very difficult indeed 
to pinpoint.  But at the very least we seem to be able to say that it is in this broad 8 week 
period where some elements of the minimal self first begins to appear.  At the 24th week of 
being in the womb the developing foetus is able to react to the touch and movement of its 
mother or of a twin.  This, we could argue, is the time of origin of its first experience and ability 
to react and respond to ‘otherness’ (again, through bodily movement).  A further milestone is 
the 32nd week of being in the womb, when the face, mouth and hands become active.  If the 8-
16 week development seems premature for establishing origin points for the body schema, 
then perhaps it will seem more plausible that it is at this point – when there is bodily 
movement and motion – where the most basic motoric ‘understanding’ begins and emerges. 
The details of this scenario are worth exploring in much greater detail at a later time, for one 
can perhaps already see the different ethical dilemmas that emerge (i.e. abortion) from trying 
to work out when selfhood of some kind might first appear in an embryo.  However, for the 
purposes of this project, all that is necessary to establish, even with some of the vague time 
frames which we have looked at, is to show the strong evidence for a very early emergence 
and development of components which make up an Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self.   
As presented in this chapter so far, the body schema represents a process for us which 
lies largely below our conscious awareness (being prenoetic).  It is considered a part of what I 
am calling the Minimal Self that first appears in the time frames which we saw discussed by 
Stern in the age breakdown of his ‘emergent’ and ‘core’ self (i.e. from possibly the 8-16 week 
of gestation, but much more likely emerging after the 24th week, with even more evidence 
pointing to after the 32nd week of gestation, and then developing further during the first few 
months after birth).  The body image is viewed as a noetic process which lies within our 
conscious awareness.  It is through the emergence of an infant’s proprioceptive awareness of 
its own face that a primitive body image begins to emerge. Thus, although it emerges later in 
our development, we see that it still has a basis – and is influenced by – the body schema 
58 
 
which comes before it.  Our examination of the proprioceptive origin points, the body schema, 
and body image, should be seen as evidence that despite our animate origins there are some 
core foundational elements to our bodily orientation and understanding.  Proprioception, body 
schema and body image create a type of bodily unity which is formed in our never-ending 
primal animation from our very beginning, and remains with us and adjusts itself as we enact 
new forms of bodily meaning throughout our lives and in situations – like Ian Waterman – 
when we experience a loss of some kind to full bodily access and control.  However, we saw an 
issue raised by Vittorio Gallese and Corrado Sinigaglia which argued that the body was a 
‘source’ or ‘power’ for action.  They think that just relying on proprioception is too limiting, 
that it seems to imply that the body is isolated from the world, that it is the only sensory 
modality providing information about the body.  Rather ironically, this is also a limitation we’ve 
found when we looked at their arguments on behalf of mirror neurons in the previous chapter 
(2).  But just as mirror neurons were seen to be a piece of the puzzle, we should be able to 
agree that proprioception is also only a piece of the puzzle of understanding the lived, dynamic 
body. 
In this chapter we have looked at body schemas, proprioception, and body images.  
Whereas in chapters 1 and 2 we looked at some ideas in isolation that argued for an enactive 
and phenomenological understanding of the minimal self, with an emphasis on earliest 
development, in this chapter we have been able to arrive at a more unified understanding and 
vocabulary which further fleshes out the bodily importance and foundation for our 
development and action in the world.  More than that, this chapter has given us further 
insights into the structures involved in the development of a minimal self and how the most 
basic sense of mineness arises. The next chapter will take what we’ve looked at here and 
further expand upon it. 
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Chapter 4: Vitality Dynamics: A Critique of Bodily Agency/Bodily Ownership, and re-
evaluating Body Schema/Body Image 
 
“Even if all of the unessential features of self are stripped away, we still have an 
intuition that there is a basic, immediate, or primitive ‘something’ that we are 
willing to call a self."136 
 
This chapter is going to expand upon what we just looked at.  It is structured as 
follows.  First, we will take a critical look at Shaun Gallagher’s idea of bodily ownership and 
bodily agency.  This conceptually fits in with the body schema/body image.  Just as we found 
difficulties navigating through the breakdown in the concepts and ideas of body schema/body 
image/proprioception, here we will see – by bringing in the critiques of Sanneke de Haan and 
Leon de Bruin – that a clean break between bodily ownership and agency is likewise difficult.  
During this analysis of Gallagher we will be recalling ideas originally discussed in the previous 
chapter to show how they fit within the larger picture that is emerging, this will include 
Gallagher’s understanding of what a minimal self is.  Since Gallagher’s understanding of what a 
minimal self is, is quite close to mine, this will be useful in allowing us to see from several 
perspectives how a minimal self can be understood, and how data supports it.  The second 
thing we will do after we’ve found problems in Gallagher’s system, is to bring in the insights of 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone as a way of giving us an alternative approach to the bodily self by 
interrogating Gallagher’s ideas of the body schema and the body image.  Although so far we’ve 
adopted these terms as useful in helping us to reveal the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal 
Self (PEMS), we will find that we will need to modify this view slightly, and new terms will be 
introduced (e.g. corporeal-kinetic patterning, corporeal-kinetic intentionality, and 
kinaesthesia) which better capture essential aspects of PEMS.  The chapter ends by returning 
to some core enactive ideas and seeing how they relate to the bodily self.  
 
Bodily Ownership and Bodily Agency  
The discussion of the Bodily Self thus far has emphasized a distinction between the 
body schema and the body image.  Now we will see this from the perspective of our sense of 
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ownership (SO) and sense of agency (SA).  Let us begin with the sense of ownership.  Gallagher 
defines this as: “The sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience.”137  This would 
include “the sense that my body is moving regardless of whether the movement is voluntary or 
involuntary.”138  Thus, according to this view I would feel a SO of my body regardless of 
whether I had picked up a cup of tea to drink, or if someone came up to me from behind and 
gave me a push.  Either way I would have a sense that this body was mine.  A SA according to 
Gallagher is: “The sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action.”139  This 
would be “the sense that I am the one who is causing something to move, or that I am the one 
who is generating a certain thought in my stream of consciousness.”140  So, if I picked up a cup 
of tea, I would not only have a SO, I would also have a SA for this action.  However, if someone 
pushed me from behind, although I would still feel a SO of my body as it was propelled 
forward, I would not have a sense of being an agent of this movement.  
Both our SO and SA can lie within immediate first-order experiences and in higher-
order consciousness, which is reflective or introspective (which could be tied in with the body 
image).141  These two aspects, then, have the following relationship: a sense of agency usually 
implies a sense of ownership; however, a sense of ownership does not imply a sense of 
agency.  Something else emerges from this new distinction, and that is a distinction between 
different aspects of the self that can be associated with ownership and agency.  These aspects, 
with which we are already familiar, are the ‘minimal self’ and the ‘narrative self.’  The minimal 
self – as Gallagher describes it – is “consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of 
experience, unextended in time” (it is unextended in time in that it does not rely on memories 
of the past or intentions of the future).142  Although this minimal self depends on processes in 
the brain and a body embedded within the world, one nevertheless “does not have to know or 
be aware of this to have an experience that still counts as a self-experience.”143  This minimal 
self, then, is something tied-in with immediate first-personal experience.  Gallagher thinks the 
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access we have to our self “in first-person experience is immediate and non-observational.”144  
This does not “involve a perceptual or reflective act of consciousness,” rather, “the immediate 
self that is referred to here is the pre-reflective point of origin for action, experience and 
thought.”145  We can see this tying in with the ideas of a prenoetic body schema, so we can get 
a clearer understanding of this by building connections with what we looked at in the previous 
chapter.  The narrative self is a “more or less coherent self (or self-image) that is continued 
with a past and a future in the various stories that we and others tell about ourselves.”146  This 
sense of self, instead of being unextended in time and immediate like the minimal self, is 
instead extended in time (that is, it includes past memories and future intentions) and 
something which we are self-conscious of.  It is a self that includes memories of our past and 
intentional possibilities for our future.  One can perhaps see how the body image can tie in 
with the idea of a narrative self, since it is the way in which we perceive ourselves in a 
consciously aware way.  Having introduced these two divisions of self – the minimal and the 
narrative – we shall be focusing most of our attention in the remainder of this chapter on the 
minimal self and some of the difficulties related to the ideas of ownership and agency.  The 
PEMS theory – broadly speaking – accepts Gallagher’s basic definition of a minimal self; 
specifically that it is ‘consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience,’ which 
PEMS would call the ‘subjectivity of experience;’ and that it is a ‘pre-reflective point of origin 
for action, experience and thought.’  Gallagher also describes his minimal self as ‘unextended 
in time,’ and as dependent on brain processes and a body that is ecologically embedded.  In 
regards to the phenomenological sense of time and the dependence on brain processes and an 
environmentally embedded body, PEMS will be exploring the difficulties of this terrain in much 
greater detail in Part II (chapters 6-9).  For the moment, we can be reminded that in chapter 1 
that Stern also thought of his ‘emergent self’ as unextended in time (i.e. ‘present moments 
that correspond to ‘nows’’), and that PEMS disagreed with this; PEMS argues for the 
‘subjectivity of experience’ – the phenomenological sense of mineness – as emerging through 
the process of lived experience.  Again, this will be developed more ahead. 
 In the first few chapters of this project, we’ve looked at examples of infant 
development and movement that have provided support for a pre-reflective and pre-linguistic 
perspective on how infants acquired information through perceptual experience.  We saw in 
our exploration of the facial gestures of infants to their caregivers (such as tongue protrusion) 
the imitation that occurred ruled out the idea that it was mere reflex.  There was: (i) a 
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distinction between self and other, (ii) the ability to proprioceptively use specific body parts 
(their tongue, head, and face) in a way which reflects self-agency, and (iii) they could recognize 
that the face they viewed was similar to their own (self-ownership).147  This would seem to 
show that neonates possess a primitive kind of self-consciousness (an idea which we saw is 
supported by the views of Trevarthen, Papoušek and Stern in Part I, and will be supported by 
Jaak Panksepp in Part II when we look at affects); a self-consciousness which encompasses to 
some degree a basic or primitive self-ownership and self-agency.  Using the terminology that 
we’ve just introduced, these experiments would seem to show that infants possess a minimal 
self, and that this self is enactively attuned to oneself, others, and the environment, while 
dynamically generating new stages of development and growth. 
A further example can help us get a grasp on the ideas of ownership and agency; we 
shall look at the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI).  The RHI (looked at briefly earlier) is an experiment 
where the person under study watches a rubber hand getting stroked at the same time as their 
own unseen hand is stroked.  This causes the person to incorporate the rubber hand into their 
own experiential body; it in effect becomes part of their body-ownership.148  Now for this body 
ownership to occur during the RHI, the rubber hand has to be viewed in a certain location to fit 
within the person’s pre-existing representation of their body (so if the rubber hand is at a 90 
degree angle from their real hand, or the rubber hand shown is a right hand when the left 
hand of the subject is the one hidden from view, then the illusion doesn’t hold, for it has to be 
‘anatomically plausible’).  Additionally, this shows that body ownership “is also modulated by 
top-down influences based on prior visual and functional (e.g. proprioceptive, postural) 
representations of the body.”149  The RHI shows us that body-ownership appears to arise from 
interaction from both bottom-up processes (which are multisensory), and top-down processes 
influenced by the body image and cognitive body representations.150   
Gallagher and colleagues also think agency can modulate body-ownership during the 
RHI.  The problem in this instance is that that the RHI lacks bodily movement (the hand lies still 
and it is someone else’s hand which strokes theirs).  However, when the finger of the subject 
was being stimulated, the subject didn’t just experience ownership of the finger, but of the 
entire hand.  In this way Gallagher and colleagues think that feelings of ownership can be – 
and needs to be – distinguished from the actual location of stimulation and indeed feelings of 
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bodily ownership go beyond simple perceptions of the pattern of stimulation.151  This view was 
tested in an experiment.  This variation of the RHI was created from several different types of 
stimulation.  The subjects saw on a monitor an image of their hand at the same time that they 
were either actively (self-generated) or passively (generated by the experimenter) moving 
their index or little finger.  It was thought that the subjects in the experiment would receive a 
sense of ownership from both the active and passive experiences, and that a sense of agency 
would occur only in the scenario when they were actively generating the movement of their 
finger.  This was shown to be true – it was active movement and not passive movement which 
triggered a global change in their proprioceptive awareness.  Conclusions drawn from these 
experiments suggest that “active movements integrate distinct body-parts into a coherent, 
unified awareness of the body in contrast to a fragmented proprioceptive awareness observed 
after sensory stimulation alone.”152   
Sanneke de Haan and Leon de Bruin take issue with Gallagher’s distinction between a 
sense of ownership and a sense of agency.  Whereas Gallagher presents them as separate 
aspects of experience (much like he separates body schema and body image; and we saw 
some of the issues with that earlier in chapter 3), de Haan and de Bruin want to argue the 
sense of ownership (SO) and sense of agency (SA) “are intimately related and modulate each 
other.”153  That is, that rather than there being a categorical distinction between SO and SA, 
instead what is found is a gradual means by which we interpret our experiences through a 
blending of SO and SA.154  Let us return to the example of being pushed from the beginning of 
this section.  If I am pushed from behind according to Gallagher’s account, I have a sense of 
bodily ownership that it is my body that is being pushed, yet I would not have a sense of 
agency since I had not been the instigator of this action.  Involuntary action on this account 
shows a distinction between SA and SO.  De Haan and de Bruin question this conclusion; they 
ask whether in this case my sense of agency has indeed disappeared.  If I have been pushed 
forward by surprise and against my will, then yes, to a certain degree I don’t have a sense of 
agency, but on the other hand, I would undoubtedly be responding bodily to my current state 
of imbalance, by trying not to fall and trying to regain my bodily equilibrium.  Is there not a 
sense of agency involved in this reaction I am performing?155  In fact, they argue, if you 
consider the case of riding one’s bicycle and getting buffeted by a gust of wind which puts my 
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sense of balance in question, not only do I not experience a loss of agency, but this type of 
situation might actually cause me to more fully experience a sense of agency, as I endeavour to 
stay upright.156  As we can see here, what we need to question is how fine a line we are able to 
draw between an action and a reaction.  
We can also call into question what the term ‘ownership’ means.  This term:  
“implicates a divergence between owner and owned that makes it in fact very 
unsuitable for describing prereflective self-awareness that is addressed at the sense 
level.  For at the prereflective level there is precisely no division between the subject 
and her experiences: rather they coincide.  Only at the level of attribution do we find 
such a divergence between a judging subject and her body that would allow for the 
use of a term like ownership.  Whereas the sense level refers to the felt body, the body 
that I am, the attribution level refers to the body that I have.”157   
To put it simply, the sense level refers to the lived body, and the level of attribution refers to 
the body as an object.  They go on to say: “A weak sense of ownership for the body could refer 
to the prereflective awareness of my body which could be cashed out in terms of 
proprioception.  It is less clear, however, what would be the equivalent of a weak SO for a 
specific body part.”158  So, although a weak sense of ownership for the entire body could be 
referenced to proprioception, it is less clear if this can apply to a specific body part.  For if I had 
a basic pre-reflective proprioceptive awareness of my body, and had it for a specific part of my 
body, then how can they both be pre-reflective?  If a body part is standing out from my body 
as a whole, it is more difficult to argue that this is still pre-reflective.159  As a result of this 
difficulty, de Haan and de Bruin don’t speak of a sense of ownership of a body part, but rather 
of an attribution of ownership to a body part.   
This leads us into a discussion we need to have regarding sensations – are they entirely 
passive?  An example that de Haan and de Bruin explore is that of having a massage.  When we 
first decide to get a massage, there is a sense of agency involved in making the choice of when 
and where we are going to have the massage, however, once we arrive and are lying on the 
table, we can perhaps say that we will be undergoing a passive experience.  However, there 
may be conflicting bodily messages, for our body may be tensed in anticipation of what our 
experience might be like, or, we may be quite looking forward to this experience and thus 
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already have relaxed to some degree.  The question raised in a circumstance like this is 
whether the resistance of our tensed body, or our bodily surrender, part of something passive, 
or are these in fact acts themselves?160     
Let us further expand upon this debate by exploring this question from another 
perspective, that of reflexes.  Looking at SO and SA from reflexes is useful, since one would 
expect this to be the best way to look at and understand something which is purely passive.  If 
I am sitting on a bed in a Doctor’s office, for example, and she taps my knee and my knee jerks, 
this would appear to be a good example of my body unintentionally reacting to something.  
When this occurs I do not feel a sense of agency for the reflexive action; yes, my knee has 
jerked, but this was triggered from an outside force.  The body is a mechanistic object and has 
replaced my sense of body as subject.  So perhaps here we can see that there is a way in which 
to separate SO from SA.  But is this true?  “Reflexes are always triggered,” and if we look at this 
“from a broader perspective, agency is all over the place…it [the reflex] would never have 
emerged if not out of previous interactions.  Proprioception develops through movements and 
interactions, so even at the most basic level SO is through and through interwoven with 
agency.”161  I had chosen to go to this Doctor, or that massage parlour, or to participate in this 
particular RHI experiment (perhaps eager to experience what it is like to not have a sense of 
agency).  The main point that de Haan and de Bruin want to make after looking at all these 
areas of involuntary movement, sensations, and reflexes, is that: “in cases of involuntary 
movement, agency is not completely lacking […] Sensations do not support a strict distinction 
between SO and SA either […] The only case of (relatively) normal experiences that do lack a 
SA is reflexes [however, the discussion reveals] a pervasive interwovenness of SO and SA and 
suggests a strong interaction between the two.”162  In a moment we will see how adopting an 
enactive perspective enables a positive case to be made for mutual modulation between SA 
and SO (instead of merely a critique of a view which promotes separate domains).  First, 
however, there is one more area to investigate.  We have just looked at involuntary 
movements.  What can we say about involuntary thoughts?  We will get a flavour of this in 
chapter 8 when we look at the phenomenology of depression and how it can alter our way of 
viewing ourselves, others, and the world.  What we will look at here will be focused more on 
schizophrenia and the unbidden thoughts that can afflict a person afflicted with this condition.   
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  Gallagher says that unbidden thoughts – those thoughts that seem to appear out of 
the blue – are “without an intention…and without a sense of agency for generating the 
thoughts.”163  Just like in several of the previous examples, this may at first seem intuitively 
plausible.  But further reflection on the matter may require us to rethink this.  As de Haan and 
de Bruin say, even if some thoughts do appear out of the blue, this: 
 “at no point…actually leads me to doubt if it was really me who generated 
them (as is the case in schizophrenic experiences of thought insertion).  In fact, we will 
usually not know precisely where our thoughts and images are coming from, nor do 
we know at what precise time they began.  But [this] does certainly not limit my sense 
of being their author.”164   
This would be true if we are defining agency as the source of any action or thought we make.  
But even if we know we are the source of some movement or thought, we still may not know 
where it had come from.  Schizophrenics many times have delusions of control when it comes 
to their movements and the insertion of thoughts into their head.  Gallagher says that these 
symptoms represent a loss of a sense of agency (SA), while their sense of ownership (SO) 
remains unaffected.165  But it seems that not only do some schizophrenics lack a sense of 
agency – they also lack a sense of ownership.  In cases of inserted thoughts and movements, 
many schizophrenics say that “[i]t felt different from my normal thinking.”166  The important 
distinction to make here in regards to schizophrenics and their experience of inserted 
thoughts, is that even if they claim an attribution of ownership rather than a sense of 
ownership and acknowledge this, the point is that it does not feel this way to them – there is a 
discrepancy between what they know and what they feel or experience.167  Thus an appeal to 
schizophrenia to show evidence of differences between SO and SA falls short because such an 
approach shows that there is a change in levels from the phenomenological feel of the 
experience to the attribution or knowledge.  So, if de Haan and de Bruin are correct in their 
analysis, a divide between SA and SO in both movement and thought falls short, and indeed 
shows them to be intertwined.   
We can now summarize this section before we move on to the case to be made for a 
terminology shift which is more PEMS friendly.  From our investigation into SA and SO thus far, 
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the only real distinction we might be able to make would be between actions that are agency-
inspired and what might be called mere bodily movements.  But is this distinction necessary?  
Even if we look at the most basic bodily processes that seem unintentional (such as breathing, 
heart rate, and sweating) we find that we can intentionally alter them.  De Haan and de Bruin 
have tried to show that SO always seems to possess some elements of agency in it, and in fact 
we might be able to say that a sense of agency might even help give strength to the feeling of 
‘mineness’ that we have in a sense of ownership.168  So, just as we saw difficulties in 
maintaining a sharp distinction between body schema and body image, we have now seen that 
there are issues between SO and SA.  Instead of a divide between levels, it is perhaps better to 
see them as intertwined, that agency and ownership can modulate each other, or that there is 
a close coupling between them.  This relational aspect is not just the initiation of some thought 
or action (for we saw that there is the question of deciding where to place the point of origin 
for the thought or movement), there is a constant adjustment and receptivity, “a constant 
modulation between acting and reacting and between forming and being formed.”169  This 
description of a constant ‘acting and reacting’ and ‘forming and being formed’ is a hallmark of 
enactivism.  Of course, there are some criticisms we can make of de Haan and de Bruin on this 
subject.  Their example showing that there is agency involved when we are pushed from 
behind and struggle to regain our balance provides a strong case I think for the interplay 
between SO and SA, and PEMS would support this immediate real-time response as 
demonstrating ownership/agency mutually influencing each other.  On the other hand, when 
we think of the example of visiting the GP and having our knee tapped, and then witnessing 
without a SA the reflex of our knee jerk, the argument that there was agency involved since we 
had decided to visit the GP in the first place minutes or hours earlier, is rather weak.  For if we 
are willing to step that far back from the situation, then of course we are going to find some 
agency, but this agency goes well beyond a minimal self and firmly into an instance of the 
narrative self playing a role.  Thus, although de Haan and de Bruin have made some important 
points regarding the SO-SA interaction in instances of minimal and immediate bodily 
responses, their argument loses some of its impact when we include a larger time frame and 
begin to include the narrative self.  Although they thought reflexes were a weakness, their 
argument doesn’t really bear on the minimal self, since their agency in reflexes is more at the 
narrative level; they have failed to distinguish between the minimal and narrative self. The 
dynamic mutual modulation view can allow these odd or unusual limit cases when there are 
unclear boundaries in interaction (like we have here).   
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Kinaesthesia and Vitality Dynamics: An Enactive-based Alternative 
This section will present an argument for ‘thinking in movement,’ where it will be 
shown that our self is built from the ‘bodily felt dynamics of movement;’ that as living 
creatures we are geared to the world according to the bodies that we have, and this is 
accomplished dynamically from across many different sense modalities.170  The thinkers who 
we will be drawing on for this will be philosopher and dance choreographer Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone, and Daniel Stern.   
In the previous section of this chapter we looked in some detail at sense of ownership 
(SO) and sense of agency (SA) and the problems that arises with these concepts.  De Haan and 
de Bruin spoke of a ‘constant modulation’ of ‘acting and reacting and between forming and 
being formed.’  A good way to look at this is to see what other terms might be available for us 
to use instead and see how this can alter how we should view the body.  In a similar vein, 
we’ve looked at the ‘body schema’ and ‘body image,’ but we’ve seen there are problems with 
them as well when it comes to there being a clear divide between them.  One problem is that 
the terms ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’ do not capture the dynamics of the phenomena 
that they are trying to specify.  In the first part of the project we are currently looking at the 
‘Bodily Self,’ and in the second part we will look at the ‘Affective Self,’ but in the lived-through 
phenomenology of life these really can’t be separated from each other except under certain 
specific conditions (i.e. pathological conditions, or conditions of isolated scientific 
experimentation, like the rubber hand illusion).  From the time we are born, to passing 
through infancy and being unable to speak, we live in a world of movement.  The intensity and 
timing of our behaviour creates this ‘affective attunement’ or ‘vitality dynamic’ (as Stern called 
it).  Our movement is not simply a series of sensations following one another; it is a felt 
phenomenon – it has a phenomenological feel to it, it gives us a meaning or sense of dwelling 
in the world.  Lived experience has a ‘vitality dynamic’ to it, but how can we get a better grasp 
of this idea?   
Sheets-Johnstone also takes issue with the terms ‘body image’ and ‘body schema.’  
The term ‘body image’ is misleading because it implies something visual, and begins with a 
construct we have of our body.  The term lacks any sense of animation, yet as we saw in 
chapter 1, movement and animation is the very first thing we do (even when we are in the 
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womb), and as we will see in chapter 6, there are primal affective action-based behaviours that 
we possess.  As an alternative to ‘body image,’ Sheets-Johnstone suggests ‘corporeal-kinetic 
intentionality.’171  This makes more sense because (i) the ‘corporeal’ emphasizes that it is 
relating to – or consisting of – a physical body (but not just a body, specifically not an image of 
a body); (ii) ‘kinetic,’ because it relates to the motion of material bodies and any forces or 
energy that is connected or associated with it; and (iii) ‘intentional’ because we are dealing 
with some intention or decision on the part of the being.  This phrasing is preferable to ‘body 
image’ because it encompasses the felt and perceptual experiences we have of – and toward – 
our bodies, along with the emotional and conceptual understanding we have.  It encompasses 
the phenomenological, the developmental, and the evolutionary.172  As for the term ‘body 
schema,’ the problem is that the word ‘schema’ implies a diagrammatic presentation of some 
plan or structure, it provides us “no sense of the kinetic dynamics that constitute the 
‘perceptual alterations in position’” in which the body finds itself.173  ‘Schema’ implies 
something static or positional, something which we would find on an engineer’s blue-print; 
and the body is not like that.  Maintaining balance when standing or walking; or maintaining 
posture while typing at the computer is not a static occurrence, there is always some ever 
changing movement occurring to ensure stability.  Sheets-Johnstone proposes that “a more 
appropriate term” would be “corporeal-kinetic patterning.”174  The reasons are similar to what 
we saw with her redefinition of ‘body image’: (i) ‘corporeal’ emphasizes the body (but not just 
a body, and especially not a schematic or static body); (ii) ‘kinetic’ emphasizes motion in itself 
and in relation to other forces acting on the body; and (iii) ‘patterning’ captures for us the fact 
that familiarity of our body-type – which emerges with us as we grow and develop – 
establishes patterns of familiarity to us that allow us to consistently maintain balance and 
posture in our body positions, while allowing that there is still movement involved in doing so 
(the idea of patterning is especially useful if we think of it as applied to O’Shaughnessy’s 
proprioceptive ‘origin points;’ we’ll revisit this more in a moment).  These terms of Sheets-
Johnstone were not initially put forth as part of a purely phenomenological or enactive 
programme, but, as we shall see, they can be expanded in scope and purpose, and be put to 
use in support for the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self. 
One of the problems with which the analysis of the previous definitions provided us 
was to show how mechanical and un-alive those terms were.  We can see here that terms like 
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‘body schema’ and ‘body image’ lack something.  What we need in our descriptions is what 
Sheets-Johnstone calls ‘interanimate meanings.’175  These biological aspects of our selves are 
not part of some “algorithmic machinations or some hypothesized brain entity or module,” 
instead, these “interanimate meanings are dynamically replicable across different sense 
modalities” through ‘affect attunement’ as the sense-making individuals that we are.176  The 
idea of ‘interanimate meanings’ that are replicable ‘across different sense modalities’ ties in 
well with the enactive idea of agents generating and maintaining themselves through different 
meaningful patterns of activity.   
There are other terms which we can draw upon to further develop the PEMS view.  
Here we will be further drawing on the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and Daniel Stern.  As 
brought up in chapter 1, I suggested that Daniel Stern’s choice of the terms ‘vitality affects’ 
and ‘vitality dynamics’ served well to cover the overall idea of a PEMS.  We’ve just begun to 
critique terms like ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’ for being too mechanistic and lacking the 
lived animate label that describes what we are, so along with Sheets-Johnstone’s terms, 
Stern’s ‘vitality affects’ and ‘vitality dynamics’ are much more appropriate in how they convey 
a description of our actual lived existence.  A general term which Sheets-Johnstone favours 
and which could serve our desire to find an over-arching term which encompasses the 
phenomenological as well as enactive elements of how a PEMS emerges and develops is: 
“Kinesthesia – the experience of self-movement.”177  Chapter 1 showed that corporeal-kinetic 
knowledge is the first thing we see emerge in infants – it is the ground on which everything 
else emerges – it is not something which we can turn off (although parts of it can be turned off 
under unusual circumstances, think back to the case of Ian Waterman in chapter 3 regarding 
the loss of most of his ‘body schema’...or corporeal kinetic patterning).  “[K]inetic dynamics are 
kinesthetically felt, which is to say it is experienced in the flow of movement itself, and with a 
sense of familiarity…generated through kinesthetic memory.”178  The most basic or 
fundamental kinetic melodies that form the foundation for our life to come are created in our 
infancy.  As daily circumstances unfold in our everyday adult life, our kinetic dynamics seem 
familiar and yet also connected with whatever new situation we find ourselves confronted 
with at that moment.  This is because the “[k]inetic melodies that are inscribed in our bodies 
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are dynamic patterns of movement.  They constitute that basic, vast, and potentially ever-
expandable repertoire of ‘I cans.’”179 
Here we can bring back a point made earlier in chapter 3 where we looked at some 
potential difficulties with understanding proprioception in relation to the views of Shaun 
Gallagher and Brian O’Shaughnessy.  O’Shaughnessy introduced the notion of ‘origin points’ 
for proprioception.  This notion was useful in helping us to explain the starting points for our 
proprioceptions.  The problem was that if our ideas of spatial content are based on bodily 
sensation feedback, then what is the starting point – or beginning – of this bodily knowledge of 
ours?  If a sensation is based on a previous sensation, the fear is that we are moving towards 
an infinite regress.  O’Shaughnessy tried to overcome this by identifying three origin points.  
The ‘changeless innate’ was the natural part of the organism (like a finger or toe for us); the 
‘developmental-acquired’ represented that natural change to part of that organism (the 
fingers and toes grow and change as we grow older); the ‘experience-acquired’ was our 
continual experience of a specific body part, which further expands our ‘understanding.’  These 
categories of O’Shaughnessy I think fit well with Sheets-Johnstone (as well as the PEMS view 
overall), and show us how a kinaesthetic memory can be laid down and inscribed in the body 
giving us our corporeal-kinetic patterning (i.e. the body schema), a patterning or ‘signature’ of 
our body which then tailors itself to our current situations as our life plays itself out.  If you 
think about, for instance, an infant or young child, the dynamic patterns of its movement – the 
kinaesthetic feel – are sometimes noticeable when you see the child stare at its fingers, arms 
or legs, or as it learns something new to do as its ever lengthening arms and legs allow it to 
reach or move towards something that it couldn’t reach before.  The very act of walking can 
give an infant a kinaesthetic ‘sense’ that can under various circumstances fit within the 
different categories of the ‘origin points.’  But we can do even more with the idea of kinetic 
dynamics which we’ve seen from our look at Sheets-Johnstone and at how kinaesthesia can 
encompass basic corporeal-kinetic patterning and corporeal-kinetic intentionality.  Indeed, a 
kinaesthetic approach can encompass even more aspects of our lived life; bringing back Daniel 
Stern’s ideas from chapter 1 can help fulfil this goal. 
We’ve seen some of the details of a corporeal-kinetic approach, and we’ve thrown a 
lot of terms around; however, in the end I think the term ‘dynamic forms of vitality’ is 
preferable as the term that gets to the heart of what the PEMS is.  In his writings over time 
Daniel Stern has used several terms – vitality dynamics, affect attunement, (and from our brief 
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look at Papoušek, he contributed a term of his own: "intersubjective emotional relatedness") – 
yet ‘dynamic forms of vitality’ perhaps works best since the term encompasses physical and 
mental vigour, an ability to develop or continue one’s existence, and to live and grow; these 
are all ideas which fall under what we are looking for in PEMS, since they enforce the ideas of 
agents generating and maintaining themselves, as well as explaining how this provides us with 
the phenomenological mineness  and givenness that constitutes the subjectivity of our lived 
experiences.  Although the body plays an anchoring role, ‘dynamic’ emphasizes the constant 
change that occurs in bodily movement as part of its being-in-the-world; ‘forms’ emphasizes 
the various dynamic structures (e.g. proprioceptive origin points, mirror neurons, corporeal-
kinetic patterning, and corporeal-kinetic intentionality); ‘vitality’ places emphasis on the fact 
that this is something which is lived and experienced.  By building up towards using Sheets-
Johnstone’s terminology, we’ve interrogated some of the life-less, mechanized terms which 
dominate in the literature, and replaced them with something more appropriate to explain 
lived bodily life and existence, and ‘dynamic forms of vitality’ is perhaps the simplest and most 
appropriate broad term for of all of this.  Having explored notions such as self ownership and 
self agency, and body schemas and body images, and having seen what is wrong with them, 
and switching to a new type of vocabulary (i.e. corporeal kinetic patterning, corporeal kinetic 
intentionality, kinaesthesia, and dynamic forms of vitality), we can now see what other ideas 
vitality can encompass and explain. 
Stern places five different categories under the phrase ‘dynamic forms of vitality’: 
movement, time, force, space, and directionality/intentionality;180 we will consider each of 
these in turn.  Movement should be familiar to us by this point.  Movement is an important 
aspect of self and has been perhaps the biggest underlying theme making up our discussion so 
far, and was most recently emphasized as primary during our encounter with the work of 
Sheets-Johnstone.  Time is important as well, for all movement has a ‘temporal contour’ or 
temporal profile in our experience; a sense of time is essential to our being, it gives us our 
sense of past, and allows us to plan for – or anticipate – the future.  Something else which 
accompanies movement is the idea of force; it is what lies behind – or within – all movement.  
Movement has directionality as well; it is always going somewhere for – or because of – some 
purpose or intentionality.181  If you look at any personal, aware, noetic, reflective aspect of 
what we think we are and who or what we want to become, all these categories would play a 
role.  But what needs to be emphasized is that these categories have their origin in association 
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with lived, pre-reflective bodily movement; that is the core of the PEMS from which everything 
else emerges and develops from and which it always belongs as the foundation.  Let us end 
this chapter by recalling some more of the core ideas of the enactivist part of PEMS and by 
assessing how we have progressed in our investigation so far. 
 
Enactivism and the Bodily Self: A Summary 
We end this chapter by expanding upon the enactive view, based on views given by 
Giovanna Colombetti and Evan Thompson (which will be developed even more in chapter 9).  
The arguments we’ve looked at from Sheet-Johnstone have led us on a path toward a PEMS 
view; several key quotes from her present themselves as supportive of this view: “change is 
not brought about only by…something external; it is brought about equally by the self-
organizing dynamics of the system itself;”182 and “[t]he movement that I actually create at any 
moment is not a thing that I do, an action that I take, a behavior in which I engage, but a 
passing moment within a dynamic process, a process that I cannot divide into beginnings and 
endings.”183  We can see that these statements are a virtual match with the enactive 
framework which makes up the PEMS theory we are arguing for, while also including the 
phenomenological feel that is a part of our everyday existence and which is also a vital and 
core component of PEMS. 
In the introduction we introduced several key areas from within the enactive approach 
according to Thompson.  In what follows we shall revisit the enactive view with Thompson and 
Colombetti:  
1. Living entities are autonomous agents that can actively generate their own 
identities.  We have seen that a sense of ownership and a sense of agency cannot 
be easily separated.  The processes that Sheets-Johnstone calls ‘corporeal-kinetic 
patterning’ (a dynamic rethinking of the body schema), lays a foundation for later 
development, and this patterning is something that we hypothesized could be 
based on the three proprioceptive ‘origin points’ that Brian O’Shaughnessy spoke 
about.  These base points then expand outward as ‘corporeal-kinetic 
intentionality’ (body image) which allows these autonomous agents to generate 
their own meaning.  The results are the ‘kinaesthetic melodies’, ‘kinetic melodies,’ 
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‘affective attunement’, or ‘vitality dynamics’ that create the Phenomenological-
Enactive Minimal Self.  This is where our (sense of) self and bourgeoning selfhood 
comes from.  The phenomenological sense of mineness can be seen to arise from 
our kinaesthetics – the experience of our self-movement.   
2. The nervous system is a non-hierarchical, autonomous system that operates in a 
circular fashion as networks of interacting, sensorimotor neurons.  This area will be 
covered in chapter 10 when we shall examine theories of consciousness which 
support the PEMS theory. 
3. Cognition should be viewed as a type of embodied action.  This idea came alive in 
this chapter as we encountered Sheets-Johnstone’s and Stern’s views which 
showed that ‘kinaesthetic melodies’ or the five aspects of ‘dynamic forms of 
vitality’ are based in – and are a continuous part of – animate movement.  Without 
that first movement within the womb and all that occurs during those first most 
important months of life outside it, we would not have the cognition, recognition, 
and interaction that we have.  The work of Stern, Trevarthen, and others have set 
the stage for showing that the bodily interaction between infant and caregiver 
create kinetic melodies that are kinaesthetically felt and which create an affective 
attunement between the two of them.  Not only is cognition based in embodied 
action, the infant studies and the discussion of chapter 3 have begun to show us 
that embodied action creates cognition (this will be explored further in the next 
chapter on gestures, and in Part II when we explore feelings, moods and emotions. 
4.  A cognitive being’s world is a relational domain that is brought forth through their 
agential coupling with the environment.  Affects play a vital role in self-world 
disclosure, and for that reason this relational domain will be explored further in 
Part II.  
5. Experience is essential to an understanding of the mind, and this requires insights 
from cognitive science and phenomenology.  We have begun to see how the 
sciences and phenomenology have a role to play in understanding the minimal 
components of ipseity. 184 
In chapter 4 we’ve seen that things are complicated when it comes to understanding 
the noetic and pre-noetic character of our existence.  Drawing on de Haan and de Bruin in 
regards to a dividing line between self ownership and self agency, and Sheets-Johnstone’s 
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critique of the body schema and body image, we’ve seen that terms like body schema and 
body image promote a static, impersonal, engineering blueprint-style view of the lived body 
that does not take into account its dynamic aspects.  As a response to this, we’ve changed 
‘body schema’ to ‘corporeal-kinetic patterning’ and ‘body image’ to ‘corporeal-kinetic 
intentionality’ to do justice to the animate and meaningful aspect of lived bodily life.  But even 
this was not enough, since it still promotes this (somewhat artificial) divide in our kinetic 
dynamics, so we’ve put forward the idea of kinaesthesia, for the idea of kinetic dynamics and 
melodies “are descriptive of the dynamic phenomena themselves [and] not a mechanical 
reduction of them.”185  The overall argument we’ve tried to make in chapters 3 and 4 on behalf 
of PEMS is that although the kinetic melodies we have of ourselves lie in the background, 
these kinaesthetics are not something which is entirely outside of our awareness.  The 
background we are referring to here is that which is pre-noetic or pre-reflective, and the 
awareness is the phenomenological awareness which provides our experiences with that 
natural givenness.  The kinetic dynamics that are underway are not only there if we focus on 
them (with a type of corporeal-kinetic intentionality), they are present and ongoing (a 
corporeal-kinetic patterning), and this ongoing process gives our PEMS its own unique and 
personal kinaesthetic melody.  Kinetic dynamics are kinaesthetically – or phenomenologically – 
felt or experienced in the familiar flow of our constant movement.186  These kinaesthetic 
melodies are the ‘forms of vitality’ that make up the PEMS.  This elaboration and expansion 
which we’ve undertaken, has focused on corporeal kinetic patterning/corporeal kinetic 
intentionality and sense of ownership/sense of agency; this has given us a broader view which 
allows us to move away from the somewhat reductionist orientation we’ve adopted when 
looking at mirror neurons, and the issues that Gallese and Sinigaglia raised in connection with 
proprioception.  We can now see much more clearly that a broader perspective needs to be 
taken.  The dynamics of running across a field to catch a frisbee, for example, requires a 
constant give and take between corporeal-kinetic patterning and corporeal-kinetic 
intentionality which is best explained in the PEMS kinetic dynamics model that is being argued 
for.  After spending this chapter sifting through some important conceptual ideas, we have 
arrived at a vocabulary which can encompass the primary and most important ideas for the 
PEMS theory.  The next and final chapter of Part I will look at gesturing, where we’ll see how 
the body plays a role in something traditionally associated with abstract, language-based, 
mental processes.  What we will find in the next chapter is that corporeal-kinetics has a role to 
play in the development and expression of thought and language.  This will further bolster the 
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argument that PEMS wants to make by showing how something normally considered firmly 
part of the narrative aspect of self, in fact has a basis at the pre-linguistic bodily level. 
77 
 
Chapter 5: Gesturing – The Sensorimotor basis of Language and Thought. 
"Speech, in the speaker, does not translate ready-made thought, but accomplishes it. [...]The 
spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture 
contains its. [...] Faced with an angry or threatening gesture...the gesture does not make me 
think of anger, it is anger itself."187 
 
 Let us take stock of what we have covered so far.  We first looked at the sensorimotor 
basis for the minimal self in early infant understanding of objects and others, through bodily 
exploration.  We then saw how even a neuronal approach to the self was closely associated 
with an understanding of bodily intentions.  Through our look at corporeal kinetic patterning, 
proprioception, and corporeal kinetic intentionality, we saw on a larger scale how important 
the body is to the emergence and development of self.  As we near the completion of our 
investigation of the bodily basis for our sense of self, there is one other area that should be 
looked at: the sensorimotor basis for language and rational thought.  Much of recent (analytic) 
philosophy and science has emphasized ideas such as a 'language of thought,' or the 
importance of 'propositional attitudes,' where the argument goes that our way of expressing 
ourselves, and the way in which we try to achieve our desires, or develop our beliefs, is based 
in some type of rationally structured system in our brain.  This chapter will take a closer look at 
gesturing, and show how this type of embodied movement relates to – and indeed even 
precedes – language.  The argument to be made in this chapter is that higher-order language, 
communication, and thought (things connected with the narrative self) are phenomena which 
are generated out of bodily movement; we will see that gesturing reflects something personal 
and unique about us – it expresses personal thoughts and desires to others, and thus it 
provides another key component of the PEMS. 
 In our inquiry into gestures and what their role is in communication and thought, we 
will be examining the following areas.  First, we will be investigating how gestures pave the 
way for the development of language.  By delving into the cases involving children, we will see 
how gesturing plays a facilitating role in early language development.  Next, we will be 
scrutinizing how sighted people, and people blind from birth, use gesturing to communicate.  
We will see here that blind speakers use gestures not only with sighted individuals, but even 
with other blind speakers.  This will demonstrate that gesturing and body language represents 
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a way of thinking which both precedes conventional, conscious, cognitive thought and 
language, and this means of expressing and communicating continues to accompany these 
higher-order phenomena in a very important way in adulthood, even among those who can’t 
see.  Then, we will look at how gesture differs when it is used on its own, and when it is used in 
conjunction with speech.  Here we will see that when gesturing is used with speech, gestures 
are unsegmented and image-like in form, and thus do not provide us with the same type of 
information that we find in speech.  However, in a different case when gesturing is used as 
speech, then it takes on a linguistic structure.  This section will be relying heavily on work done 
by the psychologist Susan Goldin-Meadow and her colleagues.  What will this do for PEMS?  
What we will see is that gestures have a personal nature of expression, something important 
for us in our development as persons.  How and what we express says something about us – it 
is our own unique, personal, individualistic way of expressing our thoughts and desires to 
others.  Additionally, whereas much work in language has been tied in with narrative notions 
of self, this chapter and the research cited should demonstrate that much of what we thought 
of as based in narrative, does in fact have a strong basis in the body, and indeed supports a 
PEMS view. 
Beginning with children, it seems that they pass through several steps in the transition 
from gesture to spoken language.  In one particular research project, M. W. Alibali and Susan 
Goldin-Meadow looked at the short-term development of mathematical equivalence and 
problem solving; they saw two to three different steps that the children went through; (i) The 
child began by producing gesture-speech matches which conveyed procedures which were 
incorrect; (ii) a period of instability occurred where the child produced gesture-speech 
mismatches; and (iii) a state of stability occurred where the gesture-speech matches 
represented correct procedures.188  In these cases some of the children progressed from stage 
(i) directly to stage (iii), and others passed through the intermediate stage (ii).  An interesting 
result of this work is that those children who went directly from stage (i) to stage (iii) were less 
able to generalize than those who passed through the intermediate stage (ii).  Goldin-Meadow 
thinks this might be because those who skipped stage (ii) didn’t learn the concept as 
thoroughly.189  The reason why mismatch is so important is that it serves as an index of 
variability, and variability is something essential to developmental progress.  So that children 
who produce gesture-speech mismatches are showing more than one approach – and trying 
different types of procedures – to manage a problem.  A final and important idea learned 
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about from this research, was that the ‘extra’ ideas that were expressed in the mismatches 
were only found in the gestures, and were not found in speech.  These mismatches were only 
noticeable by observing the gestures, and not by listening to what the children said.  So we are 
seeing that expressions of thoughts, desires, or personal preferences, have an important 
bodily component in their development.  Next we’ll take a closer look at the relationship 
between gesture and language development at our earliest stage of development.  The key 
idea to take from this is that thinking in movement – in animate being – is a vital component in 
development of thought and self.  So, just as infants experience their first thinking in 
movement (during the ‘emergent’ and ‘core’ self phases of Stern’s layered self view), the 
evidence continues for early childhood as well.  We can see a continuum building where the 
body and movement remain important not only for the embryo and infant, but also play a 
priority role for the young child as well as it comes up with ways to reach goals or to express 
desires. 
 Children begin to produce their first gestures usually after the ninth month, with 
verbal language following after that.  Even after they begin using language, they still use 
gestures in combination with words.  Jana Iverson and Susan Goldin-Meadows looked at 
children from 10-14 months of age, when the arrival of one-word speech occurred; and age 
17-23 months when two-word combinations arrived.  The goal was to see if “gesture serves a 
facilitating function for language learning.”190  They did this by paying attention to how 
communicative behaviour was expressed by either speech, gesture, or speech and gesture.191  
When it came to object reference and the first appearance of lexical development, they found 
that gesture appeared to provide the children the means to refer to objects for which they had 
not yet developed words.192  Initially they found that more items were represented in gesture 
than in speech, with there being many instances when children would switch from gesture to 
speech to express themselves (with the typical result being in a direction from gesture to 
speech rather than speech to gesture).  The results showed that children typically produced a 
gesture for a specific object three months prior to the time they developed a word for it.193  
 When we move from object reference, and first lexical development, to the point 
when gesture and two-word combinations appear, something new arises.  Here Iverson and 
Goldin-Meadow noticed that the children ‘supplemented’ and ‘complemented’ their gesture-
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plus-one-word combinations before the arrival of two-word combinations.  Children 
‘supplemented’ by way of pointing at an animal such as a bird and saying a word such as ‘nap;’ 
they ‘complemented’ by pointing at a bird and saying ‘bird,’ before arriving at two-word 
utterances – ‘bird nap.’194  Note that a supplementary gesture-plus-word combination is 
communicating two distinct semantic elements in a single communicative act, much like a two-
word combination does.  Iverson and Goldin-Meadow found that those children who used 
supplementary gesture-plus-word speech made quicker transitions to two-word combinations.  
This ability to convey two distinct semantic elements in a single communicative act seems to 
assist in developing two-word speech.   
Iverson and Goldin-Meadow argue that gesture seems to play a facilitating role in early 
language development.  But how does it do this?  Several possibilities present themselves.  
First, gesture may serve as a signal to the child’s caregiver that it is ready for a certain type of 
verbal input.  If a child points at her mother’s hat and says “mommy,” her mother might 
respond by saying, “yes, that is mommy’s hat,” in effect translating the gesture-plus-word 
combination into a more complicated multi-word utterance.  A second possibility is that 
gesture affects the learners themselves.  Gestures seem to exploit different representational 
resources than spoken language.  Gestures rely on the visuo-spatial memory, whereas spoken 
language relies on verbal memory.  We have already seen with our look at mirror neurons that 
spatial understanding begins to occur while we are still in the womb, so this explanation would 
fit well with what Goldin-Meadow and her colleagues have discovered with gesture being a  
precursor to – or at least appearing earlier and assisting – language development.  Lastly, 
because gesture relies on a different representational system than language, it may reduce the 
demands on memory.  It may be cognitively easier to convey a proposition in a gesture-plus-
word combination than trying to use multiple words.  What we can say, however, is that 
gesture seems to promote learning and seems to facilitate change in a child’s development of 
language. 
Let us explore this some more.  Sheets-Johnstone, drawing on work from psychologist 
Lois Bloom, has shown “single-word utterances are in fact ‘conceptual rather than linguistic.’” 
This means that if an infant says ‘buh-bye’ to someone, this is connected with the person 
leaving them, rather than, say, a locutionary statement, or saying something separated from 
the effect or intention of the statement.  Bloom says that “[s]ingle words are initially pared 
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with happenings of some kind or other.”195  Thus, if a child says ‘chirp, chirp’ when it hears a 
bird outside, it is saying a word based on perceived happenings or action.  If the child says 
‘custard, here,’ it is asking for food to be brought over.  The verbal expressions of the child are 
tied to movement and change (either of another object or person, or of its own body).  We 
saw in chapter 1 with experimental evidence from Stern along with Meltzoff and Moore on 
infants imitating tongue protrusion, identifying pacifiers my touch, and watching moving 
objects temporarily disappearing from view, that the infant’s understanding of itself and 
others in the environment is based in movement and change of both its own body and the 
objects/persons near it.  What Bloom’s research seems to show for Sheets-Johnstone (building 
on what we saw in chapter 1) is that an infant’s idea of objects is not tied to a mere visual 
experience of them – that is looking at them – but noticing what is changing about them.196  
Quoting Bloom, Sheets-Johnstone says: “when [children] begin to say words, their earliest 
words express something about objects that move.”197  What the research in infant and early 
childhood development shows is that before linguistic concepts and categories arrive, there is 
a conceptual foundation to be found in movement and change.  The work here in 
gesture/movement/change preceding and leading up to linguistic competency, is mirrored in 
what we saw in Meltzoff and Moore’s work in a bodily-self knowledge preceding and 
understanding of others’ body language.  Before we understand the other’s body, we have to 
possess a familiarity with how our own body moves, and this is true in language as well – our 
linguistic capabilities are based in bodily concepts of movement and change.  Chapter 1 
presented one look at what the body does and means for us; now we can see that it has an 
important foundational role for language as well. 
We are now going to move into studies of adults, and see how gesture and language 
relate once both systems are more fully developed and integrated.  We will also be looking at 
how blind and deaf people use gestures, and see to what extent they are similar to or different 
from those who are not sight or hearing-impaired.  This should give us further insights into 
how gesturing provides us with an embodied way to communicate and think, and thus plays a 
role in how we express our self.   
Iverson and Goldin-Meadow have also looked at the differences and similarities 
between blind speakers and listeners and sighted people.  They wanted to discover why 
people gesture.  They thought exploring the mechanisms as well its function would assist in 
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answering this.  In one study, Iverson and Goldin-Meadow wanted to know if speakers gesture 
because they see others gesture and the speakers then use this in turn as a model by which 
they learn to move their hands when speaking.  In a second study, they wanted to know if the 
reason people gesture is because they think the gestures may assist the listener in being able 
to comprehend what they are speaking about.  In both studies they used both sighted 
individuals, and individuals who had been blind from birth.198   
In study one, they classified hand movements as gestures only if there was an 
identifiable beginning and end that co-occurred with speech.  What they discovered was that 
there was not a significant difference between blind and sighted speakers when it came to the 
number of gestures that they used.  They found that blind individuals produced spontaneous 
gestures when they spoke even though they didn’t have any visual cues, and the gesturing 
they engaged in resembled that of the sighted participants.  From this they argue “the 
emergence of gesture in the speaking process apparently does not require the opportunity to 
watch others gesture.”199  In this same study they blindfolded sighted individuals to see how 
they might alter their gesturing, and found that the blind-folded subjects proceeded to 
“produce advanced explanations in gesture.”200  That is, through their perceived deficit, they 
tried to add more to their gestural explanations.  They also noticed that sighted participants 
had a tendency to hold their gestures in place over certain task objects longer than blind or 
blindfolded individuals, who instead added some type of motion.  But except for the instance 
when sighted individuals had their sight removed, overall, there was no real difference 
between those  who were born sighted and those who were born blind.  The conclusion?  The 
appearance of gesturing does not seem to require the ability to watch others gesture. 
In study two, they wanted to test whether gesturing might be used as a way to assist 
the listeners in comprehension.    Again, sighted participants and participants blind from birth 
were tested.  They found that even when the blind subjects knew they were communicating to 
a blind experimenter, they still used gestures.  And that this rate of gesturing was not reliably 
different from that of blind subjects communicating to a known sighted experimenter.  The 
conclusion that Iverson and Goldin-Meadow arrive at?  That “gesture does not appear to 
depend on speakers’ recognition that their gestures enhance communication to the 
listener.”201  They argue that our ability to gesture seems to be an inherent part of our 
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speaking process.  This again refers to a point that was mentioned previously:  that the 
function of gesture may be not so much to assist the listener to understand communication, 
but rather is some additional way for the speaker to express their personal thoughts in a way 
that may be too difficult to put into speech.  Gestures may also be (to quote Stern) part of the 
‘continuous music of being alive,’ in a way in which we might - continuing with the musical 
analogy – interpret as ‘conducting’ ourselves.  
We have seen in this chapter that gesturing seems to precede and lay some of the 
foundation for spoken language and communication, and also that gesturing may assist us in 
our ability to think.  Let us continue this inquiry by asking: Is gesture thought? And what type 
of communication is gesture?  For this part we are going to look at deaf people who have 
taken the use of gestures and used it as their language of communication, and compare it with 
non-deaf people who just use gesture in conjunction with their verbal communication.    
A child that is deaf is in a way deprived of a model for language, since they are not able 
to hear spoken language; children that find themselves in such circumstances make up for this 
deficit by gesturing.  Goldin-Meadow’s research in this area has shown that the gestures that 
deaf children create in place of speech are quite different from the type of gesturing that 
hearing people produce.  The gestures that hearing people produce which accompany speech 
are not language-like in form, they are more imagistic, and more closely tied in with the visuo-
spatial part of our brain.  Deaf people, on the other hand, produce gestures which are 
language-like in form.202  Interestingly, this remains true even when the deaf child is 
communicated to by a hearing parent who would communicate in the image-like gesturing 
that hearing individuals typically communicate in.  Whereas the hearing adults communicated 
in the fragmented, visual, gesturing, the deaf children’s gestures had the hallmarks of 
language.  That is, their gestures had some of the characteristics that spoken words have, for 
example, they had stability (they did not change much from situation to situation), and they 
were categorical (they were composed of a limited set of forms, each with a specific meaning).  
The gestures which created sentences had certain things in common with spoken sentence 
rules, such as word ordering (the gestures were consistent with thematic rules of word order in 
sentences).  There were also basic language-use rules which the deaf children used in their 
gestures.  These included here-and-now talk (gesturing to make requests, comments, or 
queries), displaced talk (communication about past and future events), narratives (telling 
stories about self and others), self-talk (gestures used to communicate to oneself), generic 
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statements (making generic gesture-statements about animate objects), and meta-language 
(referring to the gestures of oneself and others).203  The deaf children received as input 
gestures which were not language-like in form from their hearing parents, but they produced 
in output gestures which were language-like in form.  What is striking is that the appearance of 
these properties arose even though they were not found in the gestures of the others. 
So far in our discussion in this chapter, we have seen that gesture precedes language.  
We have also seen that gesture is used by blind people who have never seen, and 
communicate with others who cannot see.  And we have seen in deaf children without a 
language that gesture takes on the role of language for them.  A great deal of discussion has 
been made recently about a ‘language of thought,’ but what can we say about the relationship 
between gesture and thought?  Goldin-Meadow says, “when faced with a difficult problem to 
solve, people find it helpful to externalize their thoughts…it may be that gesturing lightens the 
cognitive load.”204  It seems to lighten cognitive resources and allows them to allocate some 
resources elsewhere.  Another thought is that it may not be lightening the load as much as 
simply moving it to a different area.  So, instead of relying on verbal memory, some of the 
cognitive load is moved into the visuo-spatial memory.  Of course, if this does occur, then one 
would expect that performing a spatial task would be more difficult (think of attempting to 
solve a spatial task – such as trying to recall a previous seen visual pattern – while at the same 
time gesturing), yet, it seems that in these cases that even if the speaker’s second task is a 
spatial one, the gesture still lightens the cognitive load of the individual.205  As we can see, 
many questions still remain on this matter.  What should clearly emerge as important from 
what we’ve seen so far is that embodied communication plays a very important role in the 
development of spoken language in normal sighted individuals, in blind individuals; and in deaf 
people, it can even take on the role of language.  And one conclusion that can be drawn from 
this is that gesturing seems pivotal in helping structure our ability to think and express 
ourselves.  Next we will look at some evolutionary ideas regarding gestures, and then try to 
draw some broader conclusions.    
Consider an evolutionary perspective.  The communication system that is used by 
primates is partly gestural, it is in part by looking at their posture and how they move, that a 
primate is able to read meaning and intentions into the others in their group, or in a rival 
group to determine their intentions.  Thus, from an evolutionary standpoint, gesturing in some 
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form is important as a way of communicating intentions and thoughts.206  In the case of 
primates – such as chimps – their gesturing requests things in the here-and-now rather than 
human children who use gestures to not only request, but even comment on, objects in their 
surroundings.  Even chimps trained in gestural communication systems rarely use this system 
to comment.  From the perspective of brain anatomy, Broca's area (which is a part of our brain 
tied-in with language), is homologous with the pre-motor cortex in primates.207  So from the 
evolutionary connection we see that there seems to be some connection between gestures as 
expressing meanings and intentions in pre-linguistic primates; and in similar areas of the 
language area of our brain (Broca’s), which tie-in with the motor parts of other primate brains.  
This is possible evidence for gesture functioning as a road to language.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Now we enter into some larger questions.  If language is in part based on – or emerges 
from – gesture, and if gesture is sensorimotor based, then is language and higher-order 
thought in some way based on corporeal-kinetic patterning?  Let’s put this another way.  We 
have seen that our corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP) underlies our most basic bodily 
movements in its daily and practical dealings with the environment.  We also have something 
like the corporeal-kinetic intentionality (CKI), which takes us out of the background and pre-
reflective level of bodily awareness, and into something which is more consciously attended 
to.  But CKP is still the core aspect of our bodily self.  Where, then, does gesturing fit in?  Does 
the fact that it presents some personal way of expressing our desires, and our conscious 
thoughts make it part of our CKI?  Or is the fact that many, if not most, of its operations seem 
to occur underneath our conscious awareness move it more into our CKP?  In the words of 
Shaun Gallagher: “can we say that part of what it takes to generate a linguistic act (a gesture or 
a speech act) depends on the body schema [CKP]?  Or is language something that transcends 
embodiment?”208  To answer this, we can use two conceptual categories that he uses: we need 
to understand better whether gesture is purely locomotive based (which would categorically fit 
it within his first question, and which would make it related to CKP), or whether gesturing is 
more based on instrumental concerns – movements that serve to support communicative acts 
(which is Gallagher’s second question, in which case CKP would play a lesser role, and CKI 
might be more important).  If we revisit the case of Ian Waterman (the man who lost his pre-
reflective CKP, but still possessed and replaced it with his personal CKI), we discover that when 
his neuropathy first set in, he not only lost control of his movement, he also lost the ability to 
gesture.  Once he regained some control of his posture and some basic movements, his ability 
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to gesture also returned.  Interestingly, where he had to consciously attend to his bodily 
movements with his CKI, his gesturing seemed to be spontaneous and take place on its own 
(larger, more encompassing gestures do require some conscious effort on his part and tend to 
be slower and more drawn out; small movements, on the other hand, seem to occur without 
conscious effort, and are quick and well synchronized).209 
Shaun Gallagher, having looked at Waterman’s case, thinks the conclusion we can 
draw is that gesturing is not a form of instrumental action, and not entirely locomotive either, 
but instead a form of expressive action. He says, “Gesture is not a form of instrumental action 
that takes place within a virtual or narrative space.  Rather, gesture is an action that helps to 
create the narrative space that is shared in the communicative situation.  This suggests that it 
is part of and is controlled by a linguistic/communicative system rather than a motor 
system.”210  The reason why, is that if Waterman has truly lost control of his CKP, and if 
gesturing was purely locomotive-based, then he shouldn’t be able to gesture (again, however, 
we need to keep in mind that Waterman still has proprioception above the neck).    Gallagher 
thinks that instead of gesture being CKP based, or CKI based, it is a linguistic and 
communicative process.  What is this linguistic/communicative process?  Gallagher says 
gestures involve a “mapping of meaning onto a linguistic space.”211  What he argues for is an 
'Integrative Theory of Gesturing,' which is composed of three components: (i) it is embodied in 
that it is "constrained and enabled by motoric possibilities;"212 (ii) it is communicative in its 
pragmatic intersubjectivity; and (iii) it is cognitive in that it contributes "to the accomplishment 
of thought, shaping the mind."213  Let us unpack and explore these ideas further and see how 
compelling Gallagher’s theory is.     
First of all, Gallagher says that his ‘Integrative Theory of Gesturing’ is embodied.  
Gesturing is embodied because it is based in – and constrained by – our motoric possibilities.  
This, I think, is largely uncontroversial, and I think it is fair to say that any theory of gesturing 
would have to include this commitment.  His second point is that it is communicative.  What is 
meant by this?  It is communicative in his view, in that it is pragmatically intersubjective.  As 
we have seen, aplasics, who are born without limbs, sometimes suffer from phantom limbs.  
Sometimes aplasics claim that they are gesturing with these non-existent limbs.214  According 
                                                          
209
 Gallagher.  Body.  111, 116. 
210
 Gallagher.  Body.  117-118 (emphasis original). 
211
 Gallagher.  Body.  120. 
212
 Gallagher.  Body.  123. 
213
 Gallagher.  Body.  ibid. 
214
 Gallagher.  Body.  121. 
87 
 
to Gallagher, this shows that gesturing does not depend on any “specific peripheral 
feedback;”215 however, an alternative explanation could be that this is based on some type of 
innate CKP.216  In our previous look at congenitally blind people, we saw that they gestured 
even though they had no previous visual model in which to develop this bodily reference.  
Again, though, this might only argue against a CKI basis that relies on a more noetic 
interaction, but a pre-noetic CKP that had developed when the child was in the womb, and in 
its first few months after birth when it was handling other objects, could still provide a 
foundation to gesturing.  Having said all this, it does seem uncontroversial that there is 
something communicative about gesturing.  The issue is: in what sense communicative?  
Gallagher thinks that “gesture is essentially language and functions primarily in communicative 
contexts.”217  However, only in deaf people does it develop into an actual stand-alone linguistic 
system, for everyone else it is something which helps lead us into spoken language, and then 
continues to supplement it.  So I would agree that gesturing is communicative, but what this 
communication consists in is still up for discussion.  To call it ‘essentially language’ may be too 
strong a statement.  Lastly, we arrive at Gallagher’s category of cognitive; that gesture 
contributes to the accomplishment of thought.    Although we may see a connection between 
gesturing and speech, gesturing, unlike spoken language, does not possess as many social 
conventions; gesturing is something which is much more personal or individual in its 
manifestations – it “is the injection of personality into language.”218  This last category suggests 
that gesturing represents that ‘personal touch’ to our ability to express or articulate something 
which we want to express; it accomplishes that part of our personal thoughts.  As we saw in 
the infant gesture studies earlier, it is at the level of the minimal self where we see gesturing 
playing a role – reflecting our personality and expressing desires and preferences in the step 
towards language and narrative development.  The three categories making up Gallagher’s 
‘Integrative Theory of Gesturing,’ although not perfect, do highlight the three main important 
issues which make up what gesturing means and does for us. 
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We have a strong bias in regards to language use.  We refer to infants as ‘pre-
linguistic,’ and speak of our hominid ancestors as having ‘proto-languages.’  This use of 
language implies a bias towards anything that uses language as being ‘better’ than those that 
do not.  The research explored in Chapter 5 is important, because it has looked at language 
and rather than accept it as the primary point of interest or focus, it has tried to show that 
even spoken and symbolic language use has a basis in movement.  Indeed, we could say (as 
Sheets-Johnstone does), that instead of referring to infancy as pre-linguistic or proto-linguistic, 
that we should think of language as ‘post-kinetic.’219  This should not be viewed as a way of 
trying to diminish the importance of language and symbolic language use, for if we want to 
understand the autobiographical or narrative aspects of self, culture, and all that we as human 
beings have accomplished, then language is absolutely vital for this.  What chapter 5 has done, 
however, is show that regardless of how important language becomes for us in our later 
development, that it has its basis in corporeal-kinetic dynamics. 
Evidence for ‘thinking in movement’ expanded in our look at adult cases of gesture 
and language in blind and deaf people.  Think again about the conclusions of studying blind 
individuals and gesturing.  Iverson and Goldin-Meadow concluded that gesturing seems to be 
an intrinsic part of our communication process and isn’t based on the speaker recognizing the 
gesture as some kind of enhancement to the listener.  The gesturing may instead be some 
additional way for the speaker to express their own thoughts in ways that is difficult to put into 
speech.  These conclusions support the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (PEMS) view 
which I am advocating, that even when we have moved into adulthood and into an 
autobiographical or narrative aspect of self, that what makes up the PEMS is still there 
contributing and playing a role. 
Let us reconsider the studies on deaf individuals and whether gesturing actually 
constitutes ‘thought’ (for one of the arguments being made is that we ‘think in movement’).  A 
child born deaf, because they cannot hear, is deprived of a model for spoken language; they 
make up for this by gesturing.  The research we looked at showed that the gestures they 
develop are different from those of hearing people.  The gestures of hearing people 
accompany their speaking, and are imagistic and not language-like in form, whereas deaf 
people gesture in place of speech, and thus it is language-like in form.  This remained true even 
if the deaf person was communicating with a hearing person gesturing in the image-like form.  
Deaf people in effect convert their gesturing into a form of language if they are not able to use 
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language verbally.  These studies lend evidence to the idea that not only does gesturing lead 
up to spoken language and expression, but if spoken language is not available, then the 
gesturing itself becomes this means of expression.  Gesturing is a vital component of thought 
and expression on multiple levels; it helps structure our ability to think and express ourselves.  
This chapter began with a quote from Merleau-Ponty.  Merleau-Ponty thought that 
language ‘accomplishes’ thought.  And he referred to ‘the spoken word’ as ‘a genuine gesture,’ 
which ‘contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its.’  For him, an angry 
gesture doesn’t make one think of anger, it is anger.  From what we’ve seen in this chapter, he 
seems to be largely right.  It is perhaps fair to say that thinking occurs partly in the gesture; 
sometimes it is communicative. The gesture is part of the process by which the minimal self is 
formed.  Language is a means of expressing thought which has a stronger, more abstract, 
cognitive emphasis, whereas gesturing has a stronger motoric basis, and represents our more 
individual personality.  But as we’ve seen throughout these sections, it is the sensorimotor 
elements of the body which seem to hold priority over the cognitively conscious aspects of 
ourselves.  
With this chapter we’ve looked at how gesturing fits within the categories of 
corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP) and corporeal-kinetic intentionality (CKI).  Let us now see 
how this fits in within our larger and more encompassing forms of vitality (or corporeal-kinetic 
model).  A question we can ask is: does language depend on and emerge from our CKP/CKI, or 
does it in some way transcend it?  Ian Waterman was an individual whom we looked at in 
chapter 3, and revisiting him here might be helpful.  At age 19 Waterman lost his CKP from the 
neck down due to sensory neuropathy and had to reconstruct it from his body image.  We saw 
that although somewhat helpful in framing the issues we were exploring in this area, there 
were also problems, since he had a CKP up until age 19, and when he lost it, it was only from 
the neck down.  Nonetheless, it did highlight some important issues for us to think about.  
When it came to gesturing, Waterman lost the ability to gesture when he lost control of his 
posture and basic movements, and it only returned when he regained some control over these 
areas.  However, whereas he only got his posture and movement back when he concentrated 
on them, his gesturing returned as a spontaneous action that seemingly took place on its own.  
This suggested to Shaun Gallagher that gesture did not come from the practical motoric 
system, but was instead expressive and controlled by the linguistic/communicative system that 
lay beyond the CKP/CKI systems.  Gallagher argued that this expressive intersubjectivity is 
something which, although constrained by our motoric systems, has a communicative – 
language component.  Gallagher, I want to argue, has gone too far in his emphasis on gestures 
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being controlled by the linguistic/communicative system.  What we need to do instead is see 
this as all part of the dynamic forms of vitality that make up our kinaesthetic experience.  In 
the words of Sheets-Johnstone: “there is a richly subtle and complex nonverbal world that is 
out there from the beginning of all our lives, a dynamic world that is neither mediated by 
language nor a stepping stone to language, but that is literally significant in and of itself.”220  
The evidence that we looked at showed that only with deaf people did gesturing evolve into a 
structured language, the rest of the time gesturing was something personal, it is a means of 
how we accomplish the expression of our personal thoughts; something which makes up our 
minimal self.  It contributes to our autobiographical and narrative self, but it has its beginnings 
in the PEMS and permeates our entire being.  We have seen that language and communication 
have a gestural base.  Although gestures can’t be entirely reduced down into the PEMS, the 
PEMS does seem to play a role even in something as important as the expression of thoughts 
through various modes of communication (the expression and exchange of vitality affects 
between infant and caregiver is one means of communicating basic desires, gestures, as a 
means of transition into spoken language, is another).  The PEMS has shown us that it is a vital 
part not only in how we understand and move about within our environment, but that it even 
underlies and plays a role in how we think and express ourselves. 
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Conclusion to Part I 
"Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle 
alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system."221 
 
 The conclusion to this part is going to serve two purposes.  First, it is going to 
summarize what we have encountered so far in our journey, and look at the case that has 
been made for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self.  The second purpose for this 
conclusion is to point out some of the questions that were left hanging, unanswered, or 
undeveloped, regarding the phenomenological and enactive components of the self.  Thus, it 
will give us a hint as to what will lay ahead in part II.   
The overall theme and argument of this first part was to look at how we are embodied 
and enactive beings in the world, and that it is through bodily exploration with the 
environment and others that our earliest phenomenological sense of minimal selfhood 
emerges and develops.  Another argument that was being made was to show that the animate 
body forms the basis for our cognitive thought, understanding, and meaning.  That is, the 
bodily basis for the minimal self also provides us with one of the elements of the robust – 
narrative – self.  Part I was the first part of my case for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal 
Self.   
Chapter 1 showed us that from the time we are in the womb to the very earliest 
months of life after birth, the infant is engaged in a sensorimotor exploration of itself, objects, 
and others.  We saw that brain and body develop together in interaction through an enactive 
mutual process of interacting with and understanding the world.  And it is through this bodily 
exploration of the world that our earliest phenomenological sense of mineness and self-
meaning emerges.  The body, in its explorations, provides a foundation – and gives structure – 
to our earliest sense of self.  We saw that these ‘dynamic vitality affects’ are based in an 
enactive sensorimotor foundation.  It is in the earliest stages of an infant’s development where 
we can see the beginnings of the PEMS and robust aspects of self emerge. 
Chapter 2 delved into mirror neurons.  The work in this area demonstrated that even a 
neuronal focus on understanding action required us to realize that it is the body, at a pre-
reflective level, which is engaged in understanding motor acts within a situation, rather than in 
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some type of analysis of individual movements.  In most situations where we are interacting 
with others, we have a sense of immediate meaning, mirror neurons provide us one of the 
ways in which we arrive at this primal intersubjective understanding of others.  The 
researchers on mirror neurons alluded to this basic ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ which the 
mirror neurons seemed to possess of intentional motor chains.  The ‘immediate resonance’ 
with others is a key element of self development, and mirror neurons play a role in this.  This 
chapter hinted at the pre-reflective phenomenology of self-other understanding, the goal was 
to explain that this represents part of an enactive bodily basis to understanding the PEMS. 
Chapter 3 took us out of the margins of arguing for an enactive account, and took us 
directly into the vocabulary of what phenomenology and enactivism means and what it 
describes.  This chapter provided us with a large-scale view of the landscape of the enactive 
perspective which underlies our phenomenological sense of self and Being.  We saw that the 
body schema (later labelled corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP)) is the most basic and important 
aspect of the developing organism.  It provides the organism with its ability to move and 
understand movement at a level of which we are unaware.  Proprioception was the next thing 
we looked at.  It gave us a way to see situations in which elements of the body may arise to a 
state of semi-awareness in some circumstances.  It was somewhat transitional between the 
unaware CKP, and the aware body image (relabelled corporeal-kinetic intentionality (CKI)).  
The beginnings of the phenomenological mineness could be said to emerge here in CKP, CKI, 
and proprioception.  And in our brief look at CKI, we learned of our conscious understanding of 
ourselves as enactive beings.  The phenomenology and discussion of robust aspects of self 
were left largely out of the discussion, but again, the emphasis was to lay down and emphasize 
the bodily basis for development of the PEMS. 
Chapter 4 continued by exploring our sense of ownership and our sense of agency and 
the difficulties that existed between these two concepts.  We also clarified the important 
terms for understanding the PEMS: CKP, CKI, kinaesthesia, and dynamic forms of vitality.  The 
important terms relevant for the PEMS theory were presented, defined, and analyzed.   
Chapter 5 rounded out our journey into the PEMS by looking at gesturing.  Although 
easily overlooked by many as being of secondary importance to spoken language, we instead 
found that it is gesturing that actually helps lay the foundations for cognitive-based language, 
and in the case of one group of people (those who are deaf), it actually becomes the language.  
Although based in our motoric possibilities, gesture is something which represents something 
more than mere motor expression; it is also expressive of something personal.  It is a bodily 
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movement which transcends the CKP from which it seems to be partially born.  It is unique in 
that it represents our specific personality and even seems to assist us in our thinking, yet we 
are many times unconscious of ourselves doing it, and unaware that it is helping us think and 
express ourselves.  It assists us in a largely unaware way of accomplishing thought and 
personal expression.  The purpose of the chapter was to emphasize what gesturing means and 
represents to the PEMS. 
 So what have we learned from our look at the motoric origins of early, or basic, bodily 
origins of the self?  We have seen that there is already meaningful and given being which exists 
prior to any form of reflection.  This pre-reflective, bodily-kinetic meaning – the PEMS – forms 
the basis for the reflective meaning which comes after – and builds on top of – it.  We also 
have seen that perception is not just exteroceptive, where what we experience is just a 
collection of sensory facts with form and content; instead, the most basic and primitive aspect 
of bodily meaning argues against abstractions made from stimulus and response, and instead 
is an immediate reaction to an entire, or whole, situation within a specific context.  Bodily 
perception is action oriented towards intentional objects.  Changes in bodily movement and 
habit have direct consequences toward our (sense of) being, both consciously and 
unconsciously.  Who and what we are is shaped by our body.  The self, at its most basic level, is 
bodily-kinetic based.  The bodily kinaesthetic self is a pivotal component of the PEMS.  A 
theory of self requires an understanding of our corporeal-kinetic dynamics and kinaesthesia.  
Part I focused on that aspect.  This look at the bodily PEMS also showed us something very 
important that needs to be kept in mind as we move ahead; and that is: the elements of the 
more robust narrative self are intertwined with our sense of the minimal self.  
We just looked at one component of the PEMS theory, but the PEMS theory has one 
other vital component, one largely neglected by others in their exploration of what makes up 
ipseity – affects.  Just as this first part tried to argue that bodily understanding lies prior to – 
and forms the basis of – our conscious cognitive functioning (and our robust self); the next part 
is going to give primacy of focus to affects (moods, feelings and emotions).  Far too often in 
the philosophical literature of the self, affects have been either neglected completely, or 
otherwise placed in abstract intellectual categories for which it is questionable whether they 
belong.  We may be ‘rational’ animals as Aristotle stated, but we are also ‘emotional’ animals, 
and it is important to see how that should fit within a theory of selfhood.  This focus on affects 
will also provide us with further insights into how the minimal and robust selves function, for 
through our exploration of feelings and emotions, we will be looking at what many times are 
the motivating factors for how we think or interpret situations, and experiences in which we 
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find ourselves.   So in the next part we will be taking affects seriously as our phenomenological 
and enactive journey continues. 
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PART II : The Affective Self: Emotions, Feelings, and Moods  
 
 Part II: Introduction  
“What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically the most 
familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned.  Prior to all 
psychology of moods…it is necessary to see this phenomenon…and to outline its 
structure."222 
 
What are affects, what role do they play in our lives, and why is this important?  
Affects, as discussed here, will be seen as encompassing three areas: moods, feelings and 
emotions.  These ideas are difficult to define in part because they have been used in different 
ways by different people depending on what their goals were and what they were trying to 
achieve.  As such we will avoid presenting hardened definitions at the moment, and instead 
examine and expand upon the ideas as we progress through the next four chapters. 
  Try to imagine going through life without ‘being in a mood.’  Imagine not having any 
feelings towards anything.  Imagine not feeling any emotions towards persons, places, or 
things.  We can’t.  What it is to be a human being means that we must deal with moods, 
feelings, and emotions.  They are what give our encounters with the world meaning.  Affects 
are what makes things personal.  Some of these experiences are distinctly human in how they 
are produced and experienced, others may have a more evolutionarily basic component which 
can be traced back to our primate, or mammalian (or even earlier) development.  If we are to 
explore and come to an understanding of what a self is (especially the most minimal conditions 
that make up a self), then we need to have some idea of what affects are, and what role they 
play in our lives; for we cannot know who we are without having an account of how affects 
contribute to who we are, and how they drive, direct, or focus, our attention in different 
directions and situations.  
In Part I we set out a bodily conception of the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self 
(PEMS).  This focused on a sensorimotor foundation that was prior to the reflective or 
narrative self.  Much of our understanding of our self and others is based on a pre-noetic 
corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP), a mirror neuron system, and proprioception, the last of 
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which straddles the boundary between the pre-noetic CKP and the noetic – or reflective – 
corporeal-kinetic intentionality (CKI).  We also saw in our look at infants, however, that there 
was an underlying ‘feeling of vitality’ which allowed the infant to make an intersubjective 
connection with its caregiver.  What is this feeling of vitality?  What are the other ways that we 
come to understand how the phenomenological sense of experience which is given to us 
immediately and noninferentially as mine – the mineness that is always part of our experience 
(as we saw in our look at CKP/CKI and sense of ownership/agency)?  Part II will look in detail at 
affects (feelings, emotions and moods).  Affects are an area that has been sorely neglected in 
the philosophical and scientific literature until recently.  They have been either ignored, or de-
emphasized when it comes to the role they play in our cognition and our sense of self and 
development.  What Part II will do is demonstrate that affects are a vital and key component in 
our cognitive structuring, and in the creation and development of self in a way which hasn’t 
been seen before.  But to do this we need to spend a significant amount of time developing an 
account of affects before we can apply that account to the notion of the self – we need to 
analyze affects in their own right first.  After this is done, we will be provided with an account 
of how affects figure in the PEMS.  What we are doing here is a synthetic project that is 
bringing together ideas in affective neuroscience, psychology of emotion, phenomenology, and 
enactivism in a new way which hasn’t been seen before.  We will also see how affects connect 
with the bodily self, which will further show how our animate being, kinaesthesia, and dynamic 
forms of vitality emerge from an affective and animate body.  Much like we saw in the first 
part regarding our understanding of our body, we will see again that emotions, feelings, and 
moods are not nearly as cognitively sophisticated – or filled with a noetic cognitive self-
awareness or reflection – as we have typically thought.  Instead, we will realize that the pre-
noetic elements take priority.  Part II – with the different emphases that each chapter will take 
– will show us that affects are not primarily ‘judgement’ driven by beliefs, but instead, that 
they frequently underlie our ability to have cognitive thoughts at all.  Unlike the previous part, 
which surveyed several different areas, Part II will allow us to focus our attention on a single 
subject – affects – while occasionally drawing on the themes we covered relatively separately 
in Part I.223  
When it comes to affects, scientific explorations have taken several approaches in 
trying to find an evolutionary understanding of why emotions evolved and what they evolved 
to do for us.  One approach has tried to take into account behavioural, psychological, and 
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neuroscientific contributions, and interpret them from an evolutionary perspective.224  The 
idea with this approach is to try to locate the homologous origins of affective experiences in 
the brains of all mammals.  That is, there should be a way to find the causal foundations of 
human emotions through a comparative study of similar emotional systems in relevant 
mammalian models.225  Another approach looks at the biology of subjectivity based on 
biophysical analysis.226  This analysis has argued that emotions and emotional behaviour are 
associated with and emerge from a state of tension within the biophysical field of the 
organism.227   
Philosophical discussions have also ranged through much territory when it comes to 
developing a theory of emotions, from arguing that emotions are simply physiological 
reactions, to disturbances caused by our awareness of different objects, subjects, and events 
which we find in our environment;228 to the view that emotions are rational, and something we 
choose.229  The first view – the physiological reaction view – argues that if we find ourselves 
crying, we aren’t doing so because we feel sad, in fact, we feel sad because we are crying.230  
Something physiological has happened to us and the emotion is our experience of that physical 
reaction.  The second view – the cognitive theory of emotions – says that emotions are like 
beliefs, and just as we can choose a course of action, so too, can we choose an emotion.231  
Another approach is that of Matthew Ratcliffe, who finds some middle-ground between the 
above two views, and indeed it will be argued has found the more basic position needed to 
understand where emotions emerge from.  Ratcliffe, drawing on Martin Heidegger’s views on 
mood, introduces the idea of ‘existential feelings,’ which he says consist not only of 
physiological reactions, but also intentional structures.  These intentional states, according to 
Ratcliffe, have a background structure that is based on feelings.  For Ratcliffe there are three 
aspects to these bodily feelings: (i) They possess a structure of intentionality.  (ii) There is a 
distinction between “the location of a feeling and what that feeling is of.” (iii) A bodily feeling 
does not need to be an object of our consciousness, for feelings many times are “that through 
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which one is conscious of something else.”232   It is these ‘existential feelings’ which form the 
background for the emotions which we are conscious of, so if we want to understand 
emotions, then we need to get a grip on what these existential feelings are.  One of the main 
points that will be argued for in Part II is that Ratcliffe’s idea of ‘existential feelings’ is indeed 
the important thing to focus on, especially as an insight into the phenomenological component 
of the PEMS theory.  Ratcliffe’s approach will provide us some key ideas that will allow us to 
understand the immediate, experiential, first-personal givenness or mineness that we possess.  
One final approach would be the perspective provided by enactivism.  An enactivist might say 
that the mind cannot be reduced to structures within our brain, for the mind is embodied 
within the entire organism, and it is embedded in the world.  Moreover, our meaning and 
experiences are enacted – or brought forth – through the continuous reciprocal interaction 
between our brain, our body, and the world.  Drawing on the work of Giovanna Colombetti, 
we will be applying the enactivist model to affects.  Part II will examine the structures that 
create the affects which we feel and which provide us with our most core phenomenological 
sense of meaning in the world. 
Part II will begin in chapter 6 with a scientific overview of what emotions are and what 
they do for us.  The focus here will be that of both Jaak Panksepp’s and Joseph LeDoux’s 
neurobiological accounts, along with Antonio Damasio and David Rudrauf’s account of tension 
in the biophysical field.  It will lay the groundwork for a physiological-reaction understanding of 
how emotions are based (i.e. they are physiological reactions to environmental disturbances) 
and where they arise from, although it will hint at a cognitive interpretation that can be made.  
Chapter 7 will take us into philosophical accounts.  Here we will look at the ‘cognitive’ theory 
(i.e. that emotions are similar to beliefs that we can choose) as it has been put forth by Robert 
Solomon.  We then will explore some modified versions of the cognitive account – a ‘cognitive 
labelling’ account put forth by Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, and an ‘appraisal’ account 
put forth by Richard Lazarus.  We end that chapter by returning to a physiological-reaction 
account that has found support in Jesse Prinz.  That chapter will argue that the physiological-
reaction account is more foundational and important to our understanding of what emotions 
are and what they do for us.  Chapter 8 will take the physiological reaction account and look at 
it in light of the phenomenological account of Matthew Ratcliffe and the enactive account of 
Giovanna Colombetti.  This chapter will show that the enactive approach can provide us with a 
deeper understanding of how affects emerge and what they do to give rise to the 
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phenomenological sense of meaning and mineness so essential to the PEMS.  Finally, in 
Chapter 9 we will look at affects and the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self, and bring 
them all together to demonstrate the importance of affects to the minimal self. 
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Chapter 6: Emotional Affects - Scientific and Evolutionary Accounts of their Origin 
and Function 
 
“The different modes of state-of-mind and the ways in which they are 
interconnected in their foundation…have long been well-known ontically under the 
terms ‘affects’ and ‘feelings’."233 
 
We begin our investigation and characterization of affects by exploring some of the 
most recent scientific understandings of where affects come from, what their purpose is, and 
how they operate.  The purpose of this chapter is not just to lay out the scientific explanations 
of affects, but in fact the material introduced here will provide us a necessary background to 
the discussion that will follow, along with providing us a hint of how the material on the bodily 
self introduced in Part I connects with affects.  This chapter will focus predominantly on the 
work of three neuroscientists: Jaak Panksepp, Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio. 
  Let us start at the beginning and ask: what are the functions of affects – why did they 
arise?  It is perhaps uncontroversial that many animals experience some type of affective state 
in their daily experiences (whether they cognitively reflect on them is more in question, and 
indeed how much we reflect on them is also an important question, one which we will explore 
in chapter 7).  Several possibilities arise when it comes to why they emerged.  It seems that 
affects may have helped animals anticipate their survival needs, allowing them to prepare for 
some of these needs in advance.  Affects can provide animals with a sort of prototypical action 
readiness (note the emphasis on animate corporeal kinetics as being an important component 
of affects; we will build upon this more in a moment).234  Developing fear of a certain type of 
situation, or animal, can further one’s chances of being able to survive – and also avoiding 
dangerous situations in the future.  A sense of fear can make an animal more alert to what is 
going on in its surroundings and prepare it to bolt away in a moment’s notice.  An emotion, 
then, can serve the function of life-support, and to anticipate and seek life-supportive 
situations.  We can develop our understanding of this most basic, instinctual, affective 
experience and behaviour in animals in more detail by labelling three specific areas of affective 
experience: (i) interoceptive homeostasis of the body; (ii) exteroceptively driven affects; (iii) 
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emotional affects.235  The first area of bodily homeostasis emphasizes the attempt to maintain 
chemical balance of the body (hunger and thirst can be included here).  Exteroceptive affects 
deal with senses that occur outside the body, such as sight, touch, and hearing (pleasure from 
contact or aversion to some object or event can be included in this category).  And emotional 
affects are what we see reflected in an animal’s instinctual actions (fear, anger and separation-
distress are emotions reflected in this area).236  These three varieties of affective experience 
give rise to the (cross-species) raw emotional feelings that animals have. 
Panksepp’s desire is to explore the emotional system of mammalian brains by looking 
at how “affects accompany instinctual emotional behaviors.”  These raw affective experiences, 
or arousals, are for Panksepp “pre-propositional gifts of nature,” in that they are “cognitively 
impenetrable tools for living that inform us about the states of our body, the sensory aspects 
of the world that support or detract from our survival.”237  By looking at mammals, we can look 
at what Jaak Panksepp puts forth as the seven primal ‘emotional action dynamics’ which he 
thinks all mammals possess, they are: seeking, fear, rage, lust, care, panic, and play.238  For 
Panksepp, these seven most primal or basic emotional processes all prepare the mammal for 
some type of action, and they tie-in with the most basic behaviour that mammals engage in 
based on their internal neurodynamics.  Looking back at the three taxonomized areas of 
affective experiences, we see reflected in all three a slowly emerging increase in noticeable 
external actions (from the action tendencies).  So by looking at the seven ‘primal’ emotional 
actions, we see that:  
(i) Seeking. This involves movement that deals with our appetitive desires, for 
example, our exploration for food.  It reflects our goal-directed urges. 
(ii) Fear. This is manifested with body tenseness and sometimes shaking, or 
shivering.  This can be based in anticipatory fear to avoid dangers, or fear 
of an actual threat. 
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(iii) Rage. This frequently involves violent interaction with the offending object.  
For animals this is usually connected with situations where there is 
competition for resources and the animal has not gotten what it wants.   
(iv) Lust. This is sexually manifested with rhythmic thrusting associated with 
the animal urge to reproduce.   
(v) Care. This can involve caressing, which is connected with the nurturing 
nature of many animals (the ‘maternal instinct’).   
(vi) Panic. A paradigmatic example is crying for human children who can’t find 
their parent in a large crowd. In other animals that may have lost contact 
with a parent, they may express distress from separation anxiety by 
panicked searching, whimpering, moaning, or howling. 
(vii) Play. This can produce light hearted care-free movement based in the way 
which animals navigate their way around – and develop – the social 
possibilities of interacting with their own kind.239   
Now, one might say that some of these outward emotional action dynamics actually possess a 
cognitive component, or themselves may be instigated by actual ‘judgments’ or ‘appraisals’ of 
situations.  This topic will return and be the focus of our discussion for chapter 7; however, for 
the moment we can simply say that although Panksepp thinks there are cognitive emotions, he 
thinks they most likely rely on the primal emotions just laid out for their manifestation (primal 
emotions are not themselves cognitive in character).  Panksepp is trying to show with this 
layout of primal emotions that “there exist homologous neuro-evolutionary foundations for 
affective experience in all mammalian brains,”240 and we also see that they are tied-in with 
sensorimotor actions or action tendencies.  Put another way, the three areas of affective 
experience function as the foundation for complex affects, and the seven primal emotion 
action dynamics are, then, the foundation for the action that results from them.  By exploring 
this further, we will be able to see what these (bodily) structures are that underpin these 
processes, how they interact with and modulate each other (in an enactive way), and how this 
gives rise to the phenomenological feel that makes up our ipseity. 
Let’s consider a predator-prey relationship (which would include several of Panksepp’s 
primal emotional action dynamic categories, such as ‘seeking’, ‘panic’, and ‘fear’), to see how 
this might work in the wild.  Killdeer are ground-nesting birds that have a unique defence to 
protect their young if a predator approaches them.  As a predator approaches, they move to a 
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spot near the nest and then move away from the nest while fluttering their wings in a way 
which causes the predator to think they have an injured wing.  This leads the predator away, 
and once the killdeer feels its young are safe, it flies away from the predator.241  This is 
behaviour which has kinetic intelligence to it, and which has to be applicable for a number of 
predators, and based on approach from any direction – it is thinking in action.  As Sheets-
Johnstone says in this regard, “[p]redator-prey interactions…are spontaneous, real-life 
interactions that can be captured in nothing less than real-life situations.”  They are not 
interactions that can be “orchestrated in advance, but [are] played out from moment to 
moment, it is a drama that involves thinking […] tied to the evolving, changing situation 
itself.”242  This ‘kinetic bodily logos,’ or corporeal-kinetics – which all animals have – comes 
with the type of bodily form that each animal has, it is something which is a common 
disposition found in all animate life forms.243 
But where in the brain do emotions develop and occur?  If the emotions are as 
Panksepp describes them, primal and instinctual, and there is a homologous foundation for 
affective experience across mammals, then looking into the sub cortical parts of the brain 
(which all mammals have in common) would be a good place to start.  These are not only brain 
features which mammals have in common, and which means that they might show how the 
seven primal emotions can be exhibited and experienced by all, but this area is also tied in 
with basic body dynamics and the movement of different body parts244 (this perhaps helps 
explain why the core emotions typically have an expression of bodily movement, or why there 
seems to be commonality of behaviour in some emotional expression).  We can narrow down 
further the sub cortical foundation for emotion.  Panksepp says the “affects have a sub-
neocortical locus of control; they arise from broad-scale state control functions.”245  This 
process in the brain is “less computational” and produces the “intentions-in action that guide 
action-to-perception processes.”246  The higher-level cognitions he calls ‘channel functions.’  
Channel functions are neo-cortical in location as opposed to the sub-neocortical location of the 
‘state control functions’.  The cognitive channel functions are more discrete and computational 
in form.  Let us consider an example to see these ideas at work and see how malleable or 
flexible these categories can be.  Several years back in the United States there was the case of 
a woman named Terri Schiavo who entered a persistent vegetative state (PVS).  Brain scans 
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revealed there was no measureable cognitive activity; and when her feeding tubes were 
removed, she died.  What Panksepp wants to ask in PVS cases like this, is that even though 
there is nothing going on in the higher-level ‘channel functions’ of the brain, might there be 
some activity in the broad-scale ‘state control’ functions?  The question that arises is: have the 
feelings of these people been as completely removed as their cognitive abilities?  Do felt 
experiences as opposed to cognitive experiences persist, and would more in-depth brain 
imaging reveal this?247  If we give thought to the period of time that Schiavo was dying of 
starvation and thirst, Panksepp asks, “did she die with excruciating feelings of thirst 
accompanying her final passage?”248  
Affective states for Panksepp fundamentally involve “‘energetic’ conditions of the 
brain-body continuum, while cognitions parse the many differences in exteroceptive space and 
time.”249  An implication of this is that our raw affects do not arise from higher-order cognitive 
abilities.  It is true that as we mature we are able to use cognition to repress some of our 
emotional affects, but overall, the sub-neocortical aspects of the brain provide the core of our 
affects.  This gives us the broad flow of our brain-body interaction.  The neocortical ‘channel 
functions’ give us a more focused cognitive and informational assessment of what is 
happening outside our body.  “This is not to suggest that our ancient emotional operating 
systems were not intimately linked to emerging cognitive processes in brain evolution.  They 
surely were.”250  Rather, the argument is that the raw affects did not arise directly from these 
higher cognitive functions.  It is true that our emotional affects can be altered or oppressed by 
our higher-level cognitions, and we may even be able to alter our state of mind and future 
reactions to a situation through this informational and higher-level cognitive approach (one 
type of psychotherapy – Cognitive Behaviour Therapy – relies on this view and method), 
however, the point is that the primal core of our affects is based on a less cognitively aware 
brain-body balance.   
  Let us step away from Panksepp for a moment and look at David Rudrauf and Antonio 
Damasio’s idea of how the creation of emotions seems to be based on ‘an internal state of 
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tension’ within the body.  Work done by Rudrauf and Damasio has resulted in them arriving at 
the following hypothesis: “that the core of subjectivity and feeling is a dynamics of resistance 
to variance.”251  What do they mean by this?  Variance has to do with “changes in the internal 
state of the system propagating through connected domains within the system’s functional 
architecture”252 (think of Panksepp’s idea of homeostasis of the body).  “Variance influences 
the behaviour as well as the biomechanical and cognitive dynamical structure of the 
system.”253  And resistance is the ensemble of neurophysiological and neurocognitive 
processes which are in operation when we are alert regarding some matter.  The 
neurocognitive system “during the process of cognition” has to maintain “impending 
perturbations under adaptive limits,” integrating them with other “functions coupled to the 
process.”254  When something catches our attention, or something triggers a need for decision 
making, or we have a certain motivation, then our neurophysiology and neurocognitive 
capacities need to compensate for this – there is a need to put adaptive limitations 
(monitoring and control) on conflicts that might arise through pressure, tension, vigilance and 
arousal.  These changes can affect us locally, or on a larger scale by sending out waves of 
changes (again, think of Panksepp’s broad, sub-neocortical ‘state-control’ function and his 
more focused, neo-cortical ‘channel-functions’).  By way of example to see these processes in 
action, imagine you are walking in a relaxed, distracted, and leisurely manner past someone’s 
fenced-in house where bushes are obstructing your view, when suddenly a large, loud, 
growling and barking dog appears next to you with its teeth bearing.  This might cause you to 
jump, your eyes widen, you break out into a sweat, and your heart beats quickly.  You are 
experiencing variance (increased heart rate and related internal bodily changes related to this 
startling sight and sound), as well as resistance (preserving sensorimotor coherence and 
controlling the affective disturbance) to this situation.  When the “various neurodynamical and 
biomechanical forces act in opposite direction in order to compensate for a state of 
disequilibrium,” this produces a tension in the brain-body continuum which needs to be 
overcome.255  We can see that this ties in well with Panksepp’s idea of disruption of the 
homeostatic (chemical balance) of the body as being part of the most basic aspect of our 
affective experiences.  The idea of ‘resistance’ and ‘variance’ can be seen as another way of 
seeing how these affective experiences (chemical upheaval in the body) and primal emotions 
(body tenseness, jumping when considering the primal emotion of fear) are a part of our 
                                                          
251
 Rudrauf and Damasio.  "Biological Mechanism of Subjectivity and Feeling."  241. 
252
 Rudrauf and Damasio.  "Biological Mechanism of Subjectivity and Feeling."  240. 
253
 Rudrauf and Damasio.  "Biological Mechanism of Subjectivity and Feeling."  ibid. 
254
 Rudrauf and Damasio.  "Biological Mechanism of Subjectivity and Feeling."  ibid. 
255
 Rudrauf and Damasio.  "Biological Mechanism of Subjectivity and Feeling."  240. 
106 
 
evolutionary affective desire to maintain life-sustaining and avoid life-detracting stimuli and 
events.  
 Of course, this is not the only scientific perspective that one can have on affects and 
how they work and function.  Joseph LeDoux is concerned with what he calls the ‘credibility 
problem.’256  He points out that most of what we know regarding the brain mechanisms 
connected with affects relies on studying emotional behaviour.  However, just because some 
animals and humans exhibit similar behaviour does not mean that they are experiencing the 
same internal subjective states of mind.257  So how does one study affects when (except for 
humans) you cannot rely on verbal behaviour; and relying on behaviour in general is 
somewhat questionable?  Indeed, even when dealing with verbal recollected responses from 
other people regarding their emotional state of mind, we run into difficulties, for our 
memories of a certain emotional experience are many times quite different from what actually 
happened during the emotional occurrence. This is because research has shown that 
“memories are constructions assembled at the time of retrieval.”258  Our remembered 
experience is in fact a distortion of the experience we actually had.  To get around this LeDoux 
endorses a ‘processing’ approach to overcome the credibility problem.259  This processing 
approach focuses on studying the underlying processes which humans (and animals) undergo 
when emotions occur.  Since we are able to study emotions as processes in both human beings 
and animals, LeDoux thinks this a way to escape the credibility problem. 
 Emotion according to LeDoux’s emotional processing account “can be defined as the 
process by which the brain [of humans and other animals] determines or computes the value 
of a stimulus.”260  For LeDoux an emotion has the following structure.  “First, [unconscious] 
emotional reactions occur.  These overt bodily responses and associated changes in internal 
body physiology are the advance guard of emotional responsivity.”261  Next, a feeling emerges 
with which we become aware that something has occurred.  Then, at this point, we might 
perform some type of action (the action doesn’t always have to occur).262  The process of 
detection and reaction that occurs, in LeDoux’s opinion, happens automatically and 
independently of our “conscious awareness of the stimulus and feelings about it.”263  Consider 
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the following example.  You are walking through the woods and suddenly out of the corner of 
your eye you notice an object falling toward you from above and you immediately leap out of 
the way.  It is only after you leap to the side that you realize that it was a large, dead, branch, 
which had broken off from the canopy above.  It is at this point that you find your heart 
beating quickly and you are breathing heavily.  Using LeDoux’s above scheme, we first had a 
physiological reaction (leaping), we then realized what had happened and felt fear after the 
fact.  LeDoux says that the emotion of fear that we experienced occurred after you had 
jumped, and after your heart began beating faster.  In his words: “the feeling itself did not 
cause the jumping or the [heart] pumping.”264  Let us change the example to see all three 
components of LeDoux’s account in action.  We are walking through the woods again and hear 
a frightening roar and some branches break off immediately to our right.  This causes us to 
jump from the incoming sound we just heard and the branch debris that has just appeared off 
to our right.  At this point we feel fear: our heart is racing and our heart is pounding.  We then 
decide that we need to run to our left to avoid what is approaching (which we might have 
cognitively identified at this point as an angry, charging, bear).   
 We now are going to look in more detail at the emotion of fear and how we can learn 
the emotional context of an emotion.  This will be instructive, not only for what neurobiology 
can tell us about this emotion in particular (and perhaps how emotions in general might work), 
but it will provide us with a foundation for the discussion which will follow in chapter 7 on 
whether emotions are primarily physical reactions, or whether there is some type of cognitive 
appraisal occurring (even if this ’appraisal’ occurs outside our conscious awareness).  
 The region of our brain which sits at the intersection of our inputs and outputs of fear 
is the amygdala.265  When it comes to fear, there is a ‘contextual conditioning’ that occurs.266  If 
I am walking in the woods and encounter the angry bear, yes, it is the broken branches, the 
loud roar, and the charging animal that becomes part of my immediate awareness, yet once 
this occurs (assuming I survive the encounter!), any future visits I make to a wooded area – 
especially if I revisit that specific area of the woods again in the future – will make me feel 
uneasy.  The context that emerges from this situation is something we psychologically 
construct.  It is a memory which is created at the time of the occurrence which incorporates 
the various elements which make up that situation (the woods in general, broken branches, 
and perhaps a larger clearing of brush and shrubbery which allows space for a bear and its cub 
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to wander through, etc).  This contextual conditioning relies on both the amygdala and the 
hippocampus.267  Let us begin, however, with just the conditioning part of contextual 
conditioning.  The conditioning part, LeDoux says, “is an implicit form of learning, one that 
does not require conscious participation.”268  As the fearful situation occurs, however, parts of 
the situation enter into our working memory; from there – if this information is significant – it 
is moved into the explicit memory system.  This, then, becomes part of our enduring 
memory269 (which, to stick with our previous example, would be a fear of the woods because 
of the bear encounter).  This may seem straightforward: contextual conditioning of fear is 
taken care of by the amygdala, and the elements of the environment which make up that 
situation are then put into working memory – and perhaps even explicit memory if the 
information is significant enough.  However, there is something that needs to be emphasized: 
“the amygdala modulates the formation of explicit memories in circuits of the hippocampus 
and related areas.”270  This is why our memories are more easily triggered if we are in a similar 
emotional state as we were when the memory was first laid down (e.g. revisiting the woods a 
week after the bear attack); the storing and retrieval of information in memory are assisted 
and coordinated (in part) by our emotional state of mind.  This is what is meant by ‘emotional 
learning;’ the fear that we encounter is taken in by the amygdala and the signals it receives are 
then distributed to other areas which will in turn affect our “attention, perception, memory, 
[and] decision making.”  Emotions organize and coordinate the activity of our brain.271  For our 
purposes, the key point to take away from this is that “[f]ear conditioning by the amygdala…is 
an implicit form of learning, one that does not require conscious participation.”272 
 This ‘context conditioning’ can be further expanded upon by looking at Antonio 
Damasio’s views.   Drawing on the recent research that has been done with mirror neurons 
(which we looked at in chapter 2), Damasio speaks of ‘simulated body states,’ or the ‘as-if body 
loop.’273  As he says, “the brain can simulate…certain body states, as if they were occurring.”274  
He elaborates on the similarities between his as-if body loops and mirror neurons:, “[s]o called 
mirror neurons are, in effect, the ultimate as-if body device.  The network in which those 
neurons are embedded achieves conceptually what I hypothesized as the as-if body loop 
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system: the simulation, in the brain’s body maps, of a body state that is not actually taking 
place in the organism.”275  As we saw with LeDoux, as an emotion unfolds, things are being 
‘learned’ and certain memories are being selected for, or enhanced.  With Damasio’s 
explanation, the brain can construct a map of the body which is similar to that if the person 
were to actually be in the situation (if I am walking in the same area of woods a week after my 
initial bear encounter, my body and mind may enter a very similar emotional state to what it 
was in when I first encountered the bear, even if there now are no bears around).  Now this is 
a slightly different instance than what we covered in chapter 2 on mirror neurons.  There we 
saw how observing someone else perform an activity (such as picking up a mug) can trigger the 
same neurons as are active when we perform the same activity.  What Damasio wants to argue 
for here, is that “the as-if system applied to others would not have developed had there not 
first been an as-if system applied to the brain’s own organism.”276  Thus, the neurons that deal 
with the emotion of fear in the amygdala would trigger in the situation where we revisit the 
place of our encounter with the bear a week after it occurred.  So what we have in this case 
are neurons in areas where emotions occur (such as the amygdala) activating regions of the 
brain that map out the state of our body and prepare it for action.   
 Let us now summarize this chapter and pull together some main ideas.  The ideas that 
began this chapter provided not only a new perspective on the self by looking at the role and 
importance of affects; they also showed how affects have an evolutionary basis that goes back 
to other mammals and animals.  Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp presented three areas which 
make up the most basic, instinctual, life-supportive affective experiences of animals.  They 
begin with homeostasis of the body and the maintenance of bodily chemical balance.  They 
continue with three exteroceptive driven affects that occur outside the body, including sight, 
touch, and sound.  And they end with the emotional affects that indicate the animals’ 
instinctual actions.  These cross-species varieties of affective experiences provide animals – 
including us – with the emotions and feelings which they have.  Notice that the emotional 
affects display instinctual actions; this is again an important idea to keep in mind – that even 
our affects are based in movement.  Panksepp argued for seven basic ‘emotional action 
dynamics’ that inform us and other mammals about the states of our bodies, and sensory 
aspects of the world that affect our ability to survive or perish.  These seven were: seeking, 
fear, rage, lust, care, panic, and play.  All, according to him, were primal, basic emotional 
processes which prepared all animals for some form of action.  Although other experts in this 
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area have argued for the addition or elimination of some of these categories, there seems to 
be a consensus on there being primal emotions, and Panksepp’s argument that they are poised 
for action lends support for a phylogenetic heritage for ‘thinking in action.’   
So to put it succinctly, (1) Affects are life-supportive in function.  The purpose of 
‘primal’ emotions is to provide us with a type of homeostasis of the body (at the chemical 
level), and a brain-body balance overall.  The organism and environment are constantly 
influencing each other (think of the killdeer example; or the example of us walking through the 
woods).  The primal affects, as Panksepp pointed out, also give us our phenomenological and 
experiential feeling of ‘livingness,’ or ‘feelings of vitality’ of the minimal self.  For example, 
think of the primal emotions of ‘care’ or ‘play,’ these can easily fit with what we saw with 
Stern, and Meltzoff and Moore with the examples of interplay between infant and caregiver 
which gave rise to the ‘feelings of vitality.’  These emotions, although perhaps at higher levels 
something we are consciously aware of, at their most ‘primal’ or ‘primordial’ level, seem to lie 
beneath our reflective awareness, yet contribute a vital element to the primal mineness of 
minimal selfhood.  (2) Affects are tied-in with the sensorimotor part of the brain; some type of 
action-readiness is usually part of an emotional experience, this is related to the corporeal-
kinetic patterning or proprioception system.  However, we saw that there seems to be some 
type of ‘emotional learning’ going on.  Affects seem to sometimes straddle the boundary of 
noetic awareness and pre-noetic awareness.  This boundary is something which we are going 
to explore in greater depth over the next couple chapters. 
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Chapter 7: Cognitive vs. Physical Reaction Accounts of Affects 
 “…’fearfulness’ is not to be understood in an ontical sense as some factical 
‘individualized’ disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential state-of-
mind."277 
 
The last chapter argued for affects as being traced back to chemical and physical 
reactions that the organism must deal with in order to maintain its own homeostasis, or to 
maintain life-supportive equilibrium.  This gives rise to the most basic and primitive element of 
experiential first-person givenness that reveals experiences as our own (the discussions in part 
I of infant-caregiver interaction gain further support by seeing how the vitality dynamics 
between them rely in part on primal affects like ‘care’ or ‘play’).  Although a ‘physiological-
reaction’ view of emotion was popular in the beginning of the 20th century (and as we saw in 
the previous chapter, support for it is returning), a ‘cognitive’ view of emotion began to gain 
influence in the 1970’s.  Spearheaded in part by philosopher Robert Solomon, this view has a 
good number of adherents, and is a theory of emotion which dominates many areas of 
philosophy and psychology today.278  If we are to understand what affects are and how they 
contribute to our (sense of) self, then we need to see what the cognitive view of emotion is 
and why it has come to prominence in the field of emotion studies during the last 40 years.  
What this chapter will do then, is to lay out the cognitive view as argued for by Solomon, along 
with the physical reaction response.  We will then look at some hybrid views and survey some 
of the territory that covers this area.  We end with a look at Jesse Prinz’s ‘embodied appraisal’ 
theory of emotion as we work our way back towards a PEMS (Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self) view.  The analysis done in this chapter will show that although the ‘cognitive’ 
view of emotion has a place for explaining some of our emotions and how and why they 
manifest themselves (at the narrative level, for instance), the evidence will show that the 
‘physiological-reaction’ has a priority (at the minimal level and after), both in laying the 
framework for the ‘cognitive’ view, and for providing that most basic phenomenological 
belonging-to-the-world which makes up our PEMS.  This supports the PEMS argument that 
states although a narrative notion of self is important and plays a role for us, it is something 
more minimal (bodily, affective) which plays a more important role for us initially, as well as 
effecting us throughout our life. 
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 The physiological-reaction viewpoint we saw in the previous chapter suggested that 
affects happen to us and are largely out of our control.  We saw from the neuroscientists we 
surveyed that affects seemed to precede cognition.  Solomon disagrees with this assessment, 
he thinks of emotions (which for him are an important category of affects) as “a process and 
not a mere reaction.”279  Affects for him are not just some momentary occurrence, but are 
indeed much longer lasting experiences which possess more complex components.280  He says: 
“In recent work done by Joe LeDoux, Jaak Panksepp, and Antonio Damasio, for 
example, an emotion is sometimes presented as if it is more or less over and done 
with in 120 milliseconds. […] An emotion, so understood, is a preconscious, 
precognitive, more or less automatic excitation of an affect program…[B]ut I am 
interested…in processes that last more than five minutes.”281 
Solomon argues that if we are having some type of ‘response’ to an object, person, or 
situation, then surely this must indicate some type of ‘recognition,’ and recognition, for 
Solomon, implies some form of cognition.  However, cognition does not necessarily mean for 
him something that is only conscious, or articulate, for he allows that there are “primitive 
preconceptual forms of cognition,”282 so what does he mean?  Although short-term 
neurological arousal has a place, he is interested in the longer term ‘narratives’ that make up 
our ‘meaning of life.’  Before we go any further, we should further lay out some of the 
definitions of terms associated with affects.  So let us look at Solomon’s understanding of what 
a feeling and a mood are in relation to emotions, for from this point till the very end of Part II, 
these three affective terms (emotions, feelings, and moods) are going to have to be 
understood and demarcated somewhat better if we are to come to an understanding of a 
theory of affects and how they influence our sense of self (although the focus on feelings and 
moods will make its main appearance in chapter 8).  
 Solomon claims that emotions are purposive and rational judgments.  They are also 
something that we do.  We choose an emotion, he thinks, much like we choose a course of 
action.  But one way this ‘choosing’ is different from some other judgments is that these are 
non deliberate choices.  Emotions are intentional – they are about something particular.  So if 
we are about to leave the house to arrive at an important appointment, and find that our 
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partner left us a note saying that they took the car keys to run an (unnecessary) errand, then 
we might be angry at our partner for taking the keys.  We are angry at a specific person, for a 
specific reason, in a specific situation.  As we can see, the situation behind an emotion can 
include some complex factors.  Solomon sees moods as similar to emotions; however, one 
difference is that moods do not have a specific object; in fact, they may not have an object at 
all.  They can perhaps be regarded, according to Solomon, as ‘generalized emotions.’  Indeed, 
it may be the emotion which generates the mood.283  If we are in a depressed mood, the 
melancholy that fills us may not be about anything.  It may have been triggered by something 
specific (such as seeing the photo of a dead loved one and missing their presence), but the 
mood may go on to cloud the remainder of the day even if the thought that triggered it (the 
loss of the dead loved one) does not enter one’s mind for the rest of the melancholic period.  
On the other hand, the melancholic mood may not have had an object (like the picture of the 
dead relative) to trigger it at all.  The difference between an emotion and mood, then, is what 
they are about.   An emotion focuses on something particular or specific, whereas a mood may 
not be about anything, or perhaps might encompass the world at large without a specific 
focus.     
We’ve taken a quick look at Solomon’s view of emotions and moods; consider next his 
view on feelings.  Whereas for Solomon emotions and moods have a direction (either to 
something specific in the world for an emotion, or in the case of a mood, to the world in 
general), the thing that stands out about feelings is that they do not have a ‘direction’ or 
intentionality to them (so whereas an emotion cannot be identified apart from the object that 
is associated with it, a feeling doesn’t have this connection).284  If I am angry, I am angry about 
‘something.’  If you remove that ‘something’ I am angry about, I won’t be angry anymore (I 
can’t be angry about the missing keys if they are not missing!).  We could also say (as Solomon 
does) that emotions are dependent on a ‘belief.’  I am angry about not being able to take the 
car to get to my appointment because I have a belief that my partner took the keys.  So, if I 
was first emotionally angry about the keys being taken and then they are returned, the anger 
might dissipate, but a lingering feeling might remain: “the feelings are at most an 
accompaniment to the anger...My anger vanishes instantly, but the feeling – that is, the 
pulsing and flushing – remains for a moment.  Even though those feelings were induced by my 
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anger and are now the same feelings I had when I was angry a moment ago, they are no longer 
feelings of anger.”285 
 It might be thought that rather than thinking of emotions as triggering a mood or 
feeling, that instead the opposite is true – emotions arise out of feelings.  Advocates of this 
‘feeling theory’ could argue that an emotion is simply a feeling plus something else (that is, a 
feeling plus the particular object or situation to which it is directed).  Although emotions many 
times involve feelings, Solomon says “feelings are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
differentiate emotions.  An emotion is never simply a feeling, even a feeling plus anything.”286  
Importantly for Solomon, emotions are more like a belief, and like a belief, our emotions will 
alter if we change our opinion; whereas changing our mind or belief does not alter our 
feelings.287  Those who hold a ‘feeling theory’ of emotions may not be convinced by Solomon’s 
response, and may think that the feeling could still form the basis of an emotion, for example, 
if a person is angry, how could they not actually ‘feel’ what they are feeling when they are 
expressing the anger?  We will return to this later, but for the moment will pass on this point 
and return to Solomon’s case for a cognitive theory of emotion. 
   Let us consider in more detail Solomon’s idea that an emotion is like a belief.  Although 
an emotion may resemble a belief, it can more accurately be described as an evaluative 
‘judgment.’ And not just any type of judgment, but one which is normative and ethical; it is a 
judgment that is about a situation of mine, about myself, or about other people.288  “The 
object of an emotion…is not an object about which one makes a judgment but is rather 
defined, in part, by that normative judgment.”289  Thus, my anger at my partner for taking the 
car keys for some trivial errand when I needed them for an important appointment is 
something inseparable from my view that this action they took was thoughtless.  If this is true, 
then there is some type of conceptual dimension in how emotions arise and operate.  In the 
case of the example at hand, if I am angry at my partner for taking the keys, then I cannot be 
angry at her for not taking the keys; there are a series of conceptual ideas which form the 
back-drop to taking the keys which belong to the emotion that is manifested.  Following up on 
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this, much like other judgments, if our knowledge changes, so too will our emotion.290  If, after 
I get angry when reading the note from my partner that she took the keys to run an 
unimportant errand, she then comes out from behind me and says “Hey, just kidding, I actually 
did not take the keys,” I might still be angry at her for producing a bad joke (but at this point 
the conceptual background to and the reasons for my anger have changed, and there are other 
reasons why I might be angry), or I may find that my anger has completely dissipated knowing 
that I can take the keys and go on my way to the appointment.  As can be seen, as the 
evidence for the anger changes or disappears, so too does the emotion itself change or 
disappear.   
Something else emerges from this as well.  Whereas some judgments are more long 
term, emotions seem to be made in haste, or could be considered ‘rash judgments.’  “The 
evidence upon which I become emotional is typically (but not necessarily) incomplete, and my 
knowledge of what I am emotional about is often (but again not necessarily) superficial.”291  
But isn’t there a problem here, since Solomon wants to argue that emotions are rational?  
Consider this: if emotions are urgent judgments, and our responsive actions are a type of 
emergency behaviour (perhaps I pounded the table with my fist in frustration when I first 
found out why the keys were taken), then does that not make them irrational?  First of all, 
Solomon wants us to remember that it is the “situation in which one becomes emotional that 
is disruptive…not the emotional response.”  And second, because the emotion is an urgent 
judgment, it is by definition a ‘short-term response.’  Not all of our purposive thoughts, 
behaviour and actions are consistent or coherent either.  Frequently our short-term goals 
conflict with – and alter – our long-term goals in ways which do not always make sense.292  
Thus, one could say that the emotion may be rational or irrational, but one thing which they 
are not is non-rational, so whether they are considered rational or irrational, they still possess 
a type of rationality.293  One concern with this is that unlike other judgments, we do not always 
identify the reason or purpose of our emotion at the time it happens, for if we were aware of 
why we were angry, that itself might be enough to diffuse or undermine the anger.  But 
Solomon wants to add that an emotion is not just a single judgment; it is made up of a whole 
interconnected system of judgments.294  For example, I judge that I need the keys, when I find 
out my partner took them, I judge that she didn’t need them as badly as I did, I then judge that 
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what she did was bad, and this leads to me to a feeling of outrage or anger for this entire 
situation.   
Let us pause for a moment and summarize the main points of the argument for 
emotions being cognitive and then look at some objections that one could make by bringing in 
the neuroscientific ideas we covered in chapter 6, before moving on with further ideas and 
discussion.  Solomon’s argument for a cognitive theory of emotions is based on the idea that 
emotions are judgments,295 and this theory is comprised of the following theses296: 
1. Emotional judgments are spontaneous, or urgent, based on a situation which 
arises without warning.  This isn’t always so, of course, for we can sometimes 
‘work ourselves’ into an emotional state; in most cases, however, emotions are 
non-deliberative and occur without any reflection or conscious attention.  This is 
why we sometimes find that we have misinterpreted a situation and find the 
emotion to have been in ‘poor judgment.’297 
2. Emotional judgments are evaluative, and are a type of appraisal.  As stated in (1), 
most of the time emotions are spontaneous and occur pre-reflectively.  However, 
the ethical judgments we hold are many times related to our emotional reaction to 
an issue – they embody our convictions.  Emotional judgments are connected to 
our judgments of responsibility.298 
3. Emotional judgments are rational or (sometimes) irrational, but they are not non-
rational – they answer to norms of rationality.299 
4. Emotional judgments are a systematic judgment that set up a situation.  A related 
collection of beliefs, desires and other judgments typically make up an emotional 
reaction to a situation.  When in a state of anger, I may make a gesture which can 
be interpreted as conveying this emotion; and in such a situation the anger is 
understood and an offensive response may be given in return.  The emotional 
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judgment may at some point be discovered to have been wrong, or get refuted by 
facts that later come to light, but this is true of any type of judgment.300 
Both physiological-reaction and cognitive theory advocates agree that emotions can 
arise quickly and trigger an action or behaviour.  The question arises, however, whether this is 
some bodily-based type of perception and motoric reaction, or whether there is some type of 
(usually) unconscious judgmental process going on; and moreover, whether emotions are 
many times a judgment arising from a system of interconnected judgments that make up a 
situation.   
 From the discussion we’ve had on judgments, there have been several references to 
emotions being ‘cognitive,’ a question might have come to mind, and that is what do we mean 
by ‘cognitive,’ or what is a ‘cognitive process’?  For our purposes ‘cognitive’ will be considered 
along the lines of how Solomon has been using the term, that is, as something associated with 
an appraisal or judgment.  There have been other terms that have been bandied about as well: 
‘rational,’ ‘deliberation,’ ‘thinking,’ ‘reasoning,’ and ‘learning,’ have all been words used by 
both physiological-reaction and cognitive emotion theorists to describe what is going on 
according to their theories.  Let us examine this more closely.  
To look at this closer we can revisit a discussion we had in the previous chapter on 
Joseph LeDoux’s idea of ‘emotional learning.’  There we encountered the idea of ‘contextual 
conditioning.’  If I am walking through the woods and hear branches breaking and a roar to my 
right, my amygdala unconsciously triggers a type of conditioning, which is a type of implicit 
‘learning.’  As the series of frightening events unfold, elements of this enter my working 
memory, with the possibility of it entering my explicit – and enduring – memory, if the 
information taken in is significant enough.  If you recall from that discussion, the amygdala in 
this situation is modulating the formation of memories in the various parts of the brain 
relevant to dealing with this situation and storing it for future reference.  LeDoux had argued 
that emotions were organizing and coordinating the activity of our brain.  But what kind of 
‘learning’ are we talking about here?  Could this emotional learning be interpreted as 
‘cognitive’ in a Solomonian way?  Jaak Panksepp has a response:   
“We humans do not learn to experience affects, but we learn when 
and how to experience them and what to do about them.”  [They are] 
“instinctual tools rather than constructions of nurture.”301   
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He goes on:   
“Those core feeling dynamics cannot cognitively reflect on themselves, 
but they may be experienced as cognitively unadulterated forms of pure 
affective livingness that may be an essential foundation for all higher mental 
functions. […] Perhaps many individuals lose touch with…such emotional 
values as they cognitively mature. […]  Thereby, affects may become part of 
our dynamic subconscious.  Still, those ancient aspects of mental life probably 
continue to influence our emotional experiences from birth to death.”302   
And he makes the point more strongly: 
“Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, 
and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an 
essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms 
of consciousness.”303  
Consider Panksepp’s first statement.  He says we ‘do not learn to experience affects,’ but 
rather how to experience them, ‘and what to do about them.’  Many of our emotional 
reactions (such as jumping and fleeing from the sound of the bear in the forest) are instinctual 
in nature; and ancient ancestral reactions seem to support a physiological-reaction (primal, 
instinctual) rather than a cognitive (rational, judgmental) reaction, since instinctual reactions 
can be traced back to much earlier mammalian and animal life forms with arguably simpler 
forms of cognitive ability.  What are these ‘cognitively unadulterated forms of pure livingness’ 
that form the core of ‘all higher mental functions’?  If they are some type of ‘core emotional 
feeling’, and if these instinctual feelings are a precursor to a more cognitively aware emotion, 
or function as a component of an emotion, then we need to take a much closer look at what 
feelings are and whether or not they come before or after emotions.  Now, if affects do form a 
basis or foundation for emotions as Panksepp thinks, this would not at first seem to threaten 
Solomon’s view, for we could still have the core affects which laid the foundation for 
emotions, and the rational and judgmental emotions which now exist in the present.  Indeed, 
as Solomon says: “An affect program may be a ‘proto-emotion’…but it is not yet an emotion.  
An affect program may emerge as an emotion, but by itself it is just a physiological 
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reaction.”304  However, a problem for Solomon still seems to persist.  Panksepp performed an 
experiment where he surgically eliminated the neocortical influence in young laboratory rats 
(about 1/3 of their brain – which left them with the more evolutionarily ancient part), and 
found that their behaviour was virtually indistinguishable from normal rats.305  And when he 
looked at comparable issues of brain damage in humans, he found that if it happened in 
adults, then behavioural deficits appeared, however, in the case of children, it seems they 
adjusted much better, leading him to conclude that “the lower regions of the brain suffice to 
sustain organismic emotional-affective coherence… [and this] affirms that the higher cognitive 
regions of the brain are not essential for the generation of emotionality.”306  It then seems that 
these sub cortical affective systems, “provide the experiential background ‘context’ for all of 
the rest of conscious mental activity,”307 and not just as background evolutionary foundations 
for later higher level cognitive emotions to emerge from, but as actual components of the 
emotions themselves.  It is here where we see Solomon’s problem, for he had thought that 
“[a]ll emotions have a neurological basis, but the identity of particular emotions lies 
elsewhere.”308  Although part of the way the children in Panksepp’s studies were able to adjust 
was through socially supportive environments (thus providing that extra bit of input that 
helped the children to emotionally develop), just as importantly – perhaps even more 
importantly – we see that it was the evolutionarily basic part of the brain which still played the 
most important role in emotions.  Thus, the primitive affective systems are not just a platform 
or foundation for the emergence of higher level emotions; they are in fact a component within 
this structure that in some circumstances can play a primary role in their development, and it 
is this insight which seems to reduce the strength of Solomon’s view.309 
 Let us continue the discussion of the cognitive theory of emotion by revisiting Antonio 
Damasio’s version of the physical reaction account of emotion.  Just after we looked at 
LeDoux’s idea of contextual conditioning in the previous chapter, we looked at Damasio’s idea 
of the ‘as-if body loop’ or ‘simulated body states’ as furthering LeDoux’s argument.  Drawing 
on the work of mirror neurons, Damasio stated that ‘the brain can simulate certain body states 
as if they were occurring.’  This means that when we encounter a situation (say we are 
entering the forest where we will soon encounter the rabid bear), the brain constructs a body 
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map (or a representation of the body) for the situation, so when we re-encounter a similar 
situation (visiting the forest again a week after the incident), the brain simulates the change in 
bodily state and moves directly from the perception of the object (hearing a branch break in 
this area of the forest) directly to the perception of the body change (thinking: ‘oh no, here 
comes another bear’).  This allows the body to be placed in the same emotional state just by 
entering that area of the forest without the input that existed in the original encounter.  If the 
person can skip over the change in bodily state (through a brain simulation), and move directly 
from the perception of the object to perception of the bodily change, this would seem to imply 
some type of cognitive information processing of the situation.  It is these contextual 
conditionings and the ‘as-if body loop’ or ‘simulated body states’ which might be able to 
explain (at least partially) the alleged complex systematic structure that Solomon argues 
emotions possess.  For once something occurs many of these steps can be skipped over so-to-
speak in future scenarios. 
One way to rebut this argument would be to argue that the ‘as-if body loop’ only 
applies after one has already encountered a similar situation (and during this first encounter 
one could say there is nothing ‘judgmental’ or ‘cognitive’ about it – it is purely an instinctual, 
bodily reaction to a scenario).  But even if I discover on my second visit to the forest that the 
branch I hear breaking is not another approaching bear but simply the wind, or maybe my 
friend sneaking up on my right to say ‘boo!  I am a bear!’ I will still have been emotionally 
conditioned (from the first encounter) to respond with a certain emotional reaction.  There is 
still a type of emotional learning occurring.  However, this emotional ‘learning’ is not some 
kind of cognitive judgment.  This emotional learning occurred because of the amygdala 
modulating the formation of my memory, and this implicit ‘learning’ was conditioned during 
that first contextual encounter.  And although memories do seem to be something which most 
of us would consider cognitive (with which we can use to form judgments of situation), the fact 
that it is the amygdala which is performing this function does not make them cognitive in a 
conscious or judgmental way.  Still, do cognition and emotion occur together at the same time 
– and how might they interact? 
It might be wise at this point to look at a hybrid perspective between a strict cognitive 
view and a strict physiological-reaction view to further see how one can understand this.  
Experimental psychologists Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer have arrived at a theory of 
emotion which says that although an emotion may be based in a bodily excitation, there is also 
a cognitive component which involves a ‘labelling’ and ‘discriminating’ among the physiological 
arousal.  This view argues that there is a bodily change that occurs in a certain scenario which 
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then forces an emotional response, but this bodily excitation leads to an act of cognitive 
labelling or interpretation that is applied to that physical state.  This is an act of naming the 
emotion, whether it is correct or not.   The cognitive element (naming the emotion) “exerts a 
steering function” on the state of arousal.310  Their ‘cognitive labelling’ theory has the following 
three components: 
1. If we are in a situation where we enter a state of physiological arousal for which 
we have “no immediate explanation” we will “‘label’ this state and describe [our] 
feelings in terms of the cognitions available to” us.  That is, we will provide a name 
to label the physiological change, and this will steer us in a certain direction.  So, 
when we first encounter the bear in the forest (via the roar and snapping of 
branches), this is an entirely new, surprising situation for us, and we don’t initially 
know whether we should be frightened by what is approaching, or whether it is a 
false alarm, etc.  Nevertheless, we will try and label – or name – the events and 
this in turn will cause us to interpret the situation in a certain way. 
2. If we enter a situation where our physiological arousal has an ‘appropriate 
explanation’ (perhaps I hear a branch snap in the forest, but I realize that a friend 
of mine is going to be playing a trick on me), then there will be no need to evaluate 
my needs and I will not have to label my feelings in terms of the different cognitive 
labels available. 
3. The last situation would be one where “emotion inducing cognitions are present 
but there is no state of physiological arousal” (perhaps an individual has to give a 
public speech, but public speaking frightens them, so they have taken drugs which 
inhibit their physiological reaction).  Does that person experience the emotion of 
‘fear’ if it is physiologically hidden?  Schachter and Singer say that “given the same 
cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his 
feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological 
arousal.”311 
Experiments that Schachter and Singer devised were able to demonstrate that people 
“given precisely the same state of epinephrine-induced sympathetic activation,” were “by 
means of cognitive manipulations…able to produce in [the] subjects…very disparate states of 
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euphoria and anger.”312  From this they concluded that cognitive factors contributed greatly to 
determining the emotional labels which we apply to states of arousal.  Under this theory, then, 
we could say that different emotions can emerge from the same physical or bodily state.  So, if 
I’ve been in the woods on several occasions and heard branches getting snapped off, and the 
first was because of a rabid bear, the second was a friend playing a prank, and in more recent 
times have been the result of the wind, or a squirrel moving about in the trees, I might get the 
same ‘jumping’ emotion when I hear twigs snap nearby me, but I could have different 
emotional reactions each time.  To anyone observing me it may look like I am reacting the 
same, I may be having the same bodily reaction, yet I may actually possess a different 
emotional state of mind.  I might jump in the same manner and get a heavily beating heart 
each time I hear a twig snap, but the emotion I may be having each time could be different, 
such as: fear (bear!), or annoyance (friend playing prank), or a mild and brief panic which 
subsides almost immediately (it’s just the wind, or it’s just a squirrel).  What we have here are 
two claims: (a) that although emotional displays look the same, the actual emotions are 
different, and (b) that although these emotions are different, the actual bodily state is the 
same.  These claims say “that bodily states cannot distinguish between different emotions.” 313  
Jesse Prinz has a response to this.  He says that if Damasio – drawing on the work of the mirror 
neuron researchers – is correct that there are ‘as-if body loops’ or ‘simulated body states,’ 
then these body loops can cause activation within the brain that registers certain bodily 
changes even in their absence.314  Now, the question that arose earlier was that if a bodily 
change is being bypassed, and the brain is registering this change and instigating an emotional 
response, then this could be a good piece of evidence for a cognitive theory of emotion.  
However, we need to recall from our discussion of mirror neurons (which would be the brain 
system tied in with this ‘as-if body loop’) that they were tied in with the sensorimotor part of 
our brain, the part of our brain that deals with our most basic physical management and 
navigation of our environment.  Thus even here we are seeing a bodily basis to 
‘understanding.’  The Schachter/Singer view is helpful because it acknowledges a physical basis 
for emotions, but includes a cognitive ‘labelling’ component which provides an interesting 
extra step in understanding how emotions develop and emerge without sacrificing the 
important role the body plays. 
Having examined Solomon’s cognitive theory of emotion earlier, let us look at one 
other cognitive view that provides a perspective that is perhaps more easily assimilated into a 
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theory which includes the importance of the bodily reaction.  Psychologist Richard Lazarus 
presents a unique modification of the cognitive view that is worth looking at.  Much like 
Solomon, Lazarus sees emotions as immediate and virtually automatic recognitions and 
appraisals of the world, even though they are not conscious to us most of the time.315  Lazarus 
thinks that when we look at emotions we see they typically involve “certain substantive 
features of the relationship between a person and an environment.  Although...most emotions 
involve two people who are experiencing either a transient or stable interpersonal relationship 
of significance.”316  This relationship involves something significant or personal at stake; it 
involves dealing with some type of relational harm, either potential or actual.  The roar of the 
bear that I hear in the woods, relationally, makes me fear physical harm to myself from the 
animal.  Finding the car keys missing on the table gives me the relational harm that may come 
to my well-being if I can’t make it to my medical appointment in time.  Lazarus refers to the 
emotions that are involved in this relational meaning as ‘core relational themes.’  For example: 
Anger might mean an offense against me or my close friends and family.  Anxiety is facing an 
uncertain threat.  Sadness involves an irrevocable loss.  Pride is the inflation of one’s own ego.  
And relief could be viewed as release from a tense situation.  The different components of 
these appraisals focus on ‘motivational variables’ and ‘available coping options.’  When an 
emotion occurs, there is a process that we go through.  This ‘decision tree’ that we follow 
proceeds from the most general to a more particular reaction.317  The decision tree which 
determines which emotion is going to be exhibited is based on ‘goal relevance.’  If I go to the 
table to get the keys for my car and find they are missing, the emotion that I feel will depend 
on how big a goal of mine is being affected.  If I am going to miss a vital appointment, I may be 
angry, but if I – like my partner – was only going to run an unnecessary errand, then I may only 
feel a moderate or light frustration, or simply shrug my shoulders and go for a walk, or do 
something else.  If a branch breaks and it is because of a bear approaching, I will feel fear, as 
my life is at stake and one of my most important goals in life is to stay alive.  However, if it is a 
squirrel, then I will exhibit a much weaker emotion, as a squirrel is not much of threat to my 
well-being.  
This approach, I think, can be much more easily assimilated into a physically-oriented 
approach (and we will see in a moment how Prinz incorporates one of Lazarus’s ideas into his 
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own ‘embodied appraisal’ approach).  Lazarus’s view can also be tied in with the work that 
we’ve explored in this project in chapter 1 when we looked at infant development.  One might 
recall that we described the sensorimotor basis of an infant’s early development of self as they 
interacted with their environment.  Looking at research that was performed on infants, Lazarus 
found an emerging process in how appraisals developed as the infants grew.  If an infant’s arm 
is restrained at the age of three months, it shows distress.  At four months it becomes 
obviously angry; it looks at whom or what is restraining it, and makes an attempt to free itself.  
Lazarus thinks this shows that the infant is grasping the fact that a goal it has of being able to 
move freely is being curtailed.  By seven months it will look at the face of the person who 
restrains it, which suggests to Lazarus that it can recognize the agent as a specific person who 
is performing this deed.318  Taking into account the views of Papoušek and Stern (whom we 
met in chapter 1), Lazarus thinks that an early sense of self – an attempt to maintain ‘self-
esteem’ – seems to be in development as early as the fourth month of life.319  Although the 
anger the infant has in these situations is perhaps not the same as what we see in adults, we 
can see it emerging and developing.  I think that this provides evidence of how a physical and 
motoric origin response to an occurrence can grow into something which can become more 
cognitive or judgmental later on.  Although Lazarus argues for a cognitive theory of emotion, I 
think it can be adapted to a hybrid version, which allows for a physical basis that includes a 
place for development from a minimal amount of cognitive appraisal to perhaps something 
more in other situations. 320  We now end this chapter by looking at Jesse Prinz’s ‘embodied 
appraisal’ view.  His view brings back a physiological-reaction-based view, but one which 
includes a type of appraisal like we’ve seen in this chapter.  This ‘embodied appraisal’ will give 
us a good alternative position of how a bodily perception account of emotion can work.  At 
that point we will move on to chapter 8, where we will bring back moods and feelings, and 
show how a phenomenological approach can further enhance our understanding of emotions 
and a sense of self.    
Prinz’s theory of emotions, departing somewhat from previous physiological-reaction 
views, is based not so much on how emotions represent internal states of our body, but rather 
things which we find external to us (if we look back to chapter 6, and Panksepp’s breakdown of 
the three basic instinctual emotional experiences, Prinz’s focus would not be on (i) the 
homeostasis of the body, but on (ii) the exteroceptive driven affects).  He also does not think 
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we need to rely on cognitive evaluations to help us explain how we use emotions; they are to 
be understood as perceptions of the body.321  We can understand this by looking at how he 
(drawing on a distinction made by Anthony Kenny) demarcates between the formal and 
particular objects of emotions.  An emotion in Prinz’s view is something which focuses on the 
formal and not the particular object.322  What does this mean?  Let us say I possess the 
following mental state:  
‘sadness that my grandmother died.’   
In this mental state, the thought of ‘sadness’ represents the formal (or more general) object of 
my mental state of ‘loss’ (i.e. the elimination of something which I hold to be valuable); and 
the thought ‘that my grandmother died,’ represents the specific or particular object of this 
mental state of loss which I am experiencing.323  Prinz sees these as constituting two 
compound ways in which the intentionality of emotions manifest themselves.  The general 
(formal) sadness is associated with death in general: life is something which I value, and thus 
sadness is an appropriate general reaction to the death of an organism, for it is the elimination 
of something which is valued.  The death of someone close to me is something even more 
valuable, and that is why the more specific (particular) sadness associated with the death of 
my grandmother causes a greater intensity to the emotion.  
Prinz, by focusing on the formal rather than the particular object, provides a twist to 
the conception of an emotion.  A ‘cognitive’ or ‘judgmental’ theory of emotion would seem to 
argue for our response to the particular object, or in the case of Solomon, that emotions might 
be systematic judgments (i.e. beliefs, desires and other judgments) which typically make up an 
emotional reaction to a situation.  Take the scenario of me becoming angry because the car 
keys were taken (I am angry at my partner, because the keys of the car were taken, and I will 
be late for a specific appointment).  Prinz says: “Emotions are unlikely [most of the time] to 
have the complex structure that cognitive theorists presume they have.  They do not 
decompose into meaningful, propositionally structured parts.”324  Yet there is still a relational 
property to an emotion.  This relational property Prinz wants to tie-in to some degree with 
Lazarus’s idea of ‘core relational themes;’ but where Lazarus thought that ‘core relational 
themes’ involve inner judgments, or the inner structure or form of an emotion, Prinz wants to 
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focus on its content.325  The unstructured representations are better seen in Prinz’s view as 
‘indicators’ or ‘detectors,’ and what these detectors track are the changes that the core 
relational themes cause in the body.326  It’s time to revisit our scenario of the bear encounter 
in the forest again to see how Prinz’s theme works out.  Here is how it maps out:  
(1) The dangerous situation of the roar of the animal and the breaking of branches occurs.   
(2)This is perceived by my mind.   
(3) A series of bodily changes occur as a result.   
(4) This leads to a perception of the body.   
The bodily perception is most directly caused by an actual change in the body (the heart begins 
to race); however, indirectly there is the core relational theme of fear (the direct threat to my 
well-being) which originally caused or triggered the entire chain of events.  This shows in 
Prinz’s view:  
“that emotions can represent core relational themes without explicitly 
describing them.  Emotions track bodily states that reliably co-occur with important 
organism-environment relations, so emotions reliably co-occur with organism-
environment relations.  Each emotion is both an internal body monitor and a detector 
of dangers, threats, losses, or other matters of concern.  Emotions are gut reactions; 
they use our bodies to tell us how we are faring in the world.”327    
The bodily changes are preparing us for a response to the situation we encounter.  The 
emotion is associated with a body state ‘prototype,’ that is, “a mental representation made up 
of parts that correspond to a range of ‘diagnostic features’” in the environment.328  What we 
don’t find is a single physiological emission that is unique to any single emotion, rather, we 
end up activating a body state prototype when an appropriate number of its different 
‘diagnostic features’ have been detected in the environment.329  So, back to the bear in the 
woods: In (1) we hear a bear roar and branches being broken, based on our location (the 
woods), and what we know about such environments (there might be bears here), this causes 
us to tick a series of boxes in the diagnostic features relevant to this area and trigger a reaction 
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when this is perceived in our mind (2).  This then sets and creates the bodily changes in (3), 
and the bodily perception in (4). We might want to view this as similar to Lazarus’s ‘decision 
tree,’ where we move from a general reaction to a more particular reaction, but in this case 
the emphasis is not on some cognitive or judgmental process, but on the bodily perception 
which results directly from a bodily change.  Prinz’s ‘embodied appraisal’ theory of emotion, 
then, claims that the purpose of emotions is to “monitor our bodily states;” and they 
“represent changes in organism-environment relations by tracking changes in the body.”330 
We have now looked at some hybrid versions of the cognitive appraisal theory of 
affects and the physiological-reaction view, it seems we can say that although cognitive 
appraisals and judgments make up some of our emotional states of mind, that a case has been 
made for a physiological-reaction, or kinaesthetic view of affects (affects are kinaesthetic in 
that – as we saw with Panksepp’s primal affects – emotions like ‘play,’ ‘care’ and ‘lust’ give us a 
feeling and way of interpreting and reacting to the world, and they are based in movement).  
We came into this chapter with a neuroscientific view of affects developed in chapter 6 which 
was bodily based – or oriented – in its focus and perspective (Panksepp, Damasio, and 
LeDoux).  We then took up a cognitive interpretation of emotions (through Solomon).  From 
there we looked at difficulties with some of the more ‘pure’ physical and cognitive theories, 
and slowly moved toward a hybrid view (through Schachter/Singer and Lazarus) which 
incorporated ideas from both the cognitive and physiological-reaction perspective, and we 
ended with a modification (via Prinz) of a physiological-reaction view.  What we should see at 
this point is that the physiological-reaction perspective should have an advantage when it 
comes to what operates as the core or primary motivation for affective behaviour.  The 
physiological-reaction perspective has a greater importance from a PEMS standpoint, because 
it demonstrates evolutionarily that it is the physical – action-based – affects which lay the 
groundwork for the higher-level cognitive-appraisal affects.  Affects have an important 
embodied component which emerges through and with action and action readiness.  They are 
connected (in part) with evolutionary self survival (which Panksepp’s seven primal affects 
demonstrated).  These are important components when in search of how personal mineness 
emerges and develops.  As mentioned above, the cognitive appraisal view may make up some 
of our emotional states; however, these would not occur at the ‘minimal’ level of self, but 
rather at the narrative level of self most of the time – that is where the cognitive judgment 
view may make its best contribution.  But we are not yet done.  For further development with 
this more nuanced view we are now ready to return to investigation into the ideas of moods 
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and feelings which have thus far only briefly been touched on in this chapter, and to draw 
them out to see the phenomenological and existential results that come with further inquiry.   
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Chapter 8: Feelings, Moods, and the Phenomenological Account of Affects 
 
“In having a feeling for something there is always present at the same time a self-
feeling...feeling is not a simple reflection upon oneself but rather a feeling of self in 
having a feeling for something."331 
 
Our discussion in the last two chapters has focused almost exclusively on situations 
where some specific affect is triggered, and we looked at how it could have been triggered and 
what the nature or structure of it is (whether it was some bodily physical reaction or some 
cognitive judgment).  Occasionally we’ve stepped back to look at the context which may have 
triggered the affective response, but we have overall been silent when it comes to the larger 
environment which we find ourselves dwelling in – the ‘ways of finding oneself within a world’ 
– which serves as the foundation and background for all our affective reactions to occur.  What 
more can we say about this background state which forms the basis for emotional reactions?  
We now need to look closer at moods and feelings, and discover what their role is in this 
inquiry of ours.  One of the main people who we will be focusing on in this chapter is Matthew 
Ratcliffe.  When it comes to the relationship between emotions and feelings, he says, feelings 
“are ways of ‘finding ourselves in the world.’  Indeed, our sense that there is a world and that 
we are ‘in it’ is, I suggest, constituted by feeling.”332  His analysis of this goes under the title 
‘existential feelings,’ and it is to these existential feelings to which we will turn in this chapter 
to acquire a phenomenological perspective on the issue of affects.  It will then be the purpose 
of chapter 9 to take the insights from Part II (chapters 6-8) and show how they support and 
shape the idea of the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self.   
The exploration of affects we’ve carried out thus far has been in two areas: we have 
looked at their bodily or physical basis, and we have seen them understood in terms of some 
type of cognitive, or mental, appraisal.  But is there another perspective to take?  One way to 
look at this is that not only is there a location in the body for an affect, but there is also a 
‘space of dwelling’ that exists, and that the body as a whole can be the basis for an affective 
experience.  Our encounter with Ratcliffe will provide us with a way to explore this idea in 
more detail.  As we said, a physical location has been established in various parts of the brain 
for emotional affects (e.g. the amygdala), but what of a phenomenological ‘location’ of what is 
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being felt?  According to Ratcliffe’s view the ‘phenomenological location’ of a feeling is “the 
part of one’s body where one takes the feeling to be occurring…having a sense of where a 
feeling is occurring does not require that the feeling itself be an object of experience.”333  How 
might this phenomenological location of a feeling alter our understanding of emotions, 
feelings, and moods?  Ratcliffe states that our relationship with the world “does not simply 
consist in an experience of being an entity that occupies a spatial and temporal location […] 
Ways of finding oneself in a world are presupposed spaces of experiential possibility, which 
shape the various ways in which things can be experienced.”334  Put succinctly, Ratcliffe wants 
to argue that: “all intentional states are structured by an experiential background and that this 
background always incorporates feeling.”335  Ratcliffe’s alternative to what we’ve looked at 
previously in the last two chapters is going to take the following three ideas as primary: 
1. Bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality.  They contribute 
to how one’s body and/or aspects of the world are experienced. 
2. There is a distinction between the location of a feeling and what that 
feeling is of.  A feeling can be in the body but of something outside the 
body.  One is not always aware of the body; even though that is where the 
feeling occurs. (This point shows the change in emphasis from seeking a 
physiological location for a feeling, to exploring a phenomenological 
location for it). 
3. A bodily feeling need not be an object of consciousness.  Feelings are often 
that through which one is conscious of something else.336 
Let’s unpack this and see what Ratcliffe is getting at.  We saw at the beginning of the previous 
chapter when we briefly looked at Solomon’s idea of what a feeling was that he viewed it as 
something without direction or intentionality.  Ratcliffe wants to take the conception of a 
‘bodily feeling’ and expand it so that it encompasses or includes a part of our structure of 
intentionality, and this then becomes his new notion of an ‘existential feeling.’  To better 
understand the concept of a feeling, Ratcliffe looked to see how the term is used in everyday 
use.  His search showed that the term ‘feeling’ is not confined to emotional talk; rather, it is 
used in everyday discourse to specify one’s relationship to the world.337  If we look at the 
phrase ‘the feeling of being…’ we find that the everyday usage of this term is usually 
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completed by words and phrases such as: ‘flawed and diminished’, ‘lost’, ‘in control’, ‘empty’, 
‘watched’, ‘there’, ‘abandoned’, etc.338  These descriptions reflect one’s relationship to the 
world.  They show how the world can appear to us as familiar/unfamiliar, real/unreal, 
distant/close.  Furthermore, these ways of finding oneself in the world “are presupposed 
spaces of experiential possibility, which shape the various ways in which things can be 
experienced.”339  When we are engaged in an activity which is important to us (perhaps 
building a model), or even if we are doing something mundane or even boring (washing dishes, 
or going for a walk), these absorbed activities cause our body and our view of our body to fade 
into the background.  Moreover, we can look at those situations found within psychiatry, 
where the person under consideration has an altered sense of reality, himself, or the world at 
large (and which may disrupt or distort normal or mundane activities).  When this happens, 
the relationship between the person and the other has changed and is different (clinical 
depression is a good example of how the person suffering from it has an altered relationship to 
themselves, others, and the world; we will look at this example in much greater detail in a 
moment).  The body is not simply the locus as an object engaging with other objects, rather 
the body “is that through which things are experienced,”340 and through which we get our 
sense of mineness.  It should be quite clear what importance this has when it comes to the 
PEMS viewpoint.  One of the things that PEMS is concerned with is: ‘what is this experiential 
givenness or mineness which we possess?’  ‘What can account for this sense or feeling?’  
Ratcliffe’s account should give us that added insight into the phenomenology of the PEMS. 
We can perhaps understand Ratcliffe’s position better by contrasting it with the views 
we covered in the previous chapter.  With regards to Solomon and Prinz, Ratcliffe says:  
“Prinz unites intentionality and feeling by ignoring experience 
altogether.  Solomon widens the category of ‘judgment’ to such an extent that 
it is unclear what a judgment is or how the judgements that some call 
‘feelings’ differ from other kinds of judgement.”341 
Let us take a closer look at this critique beginning with Prinz.  Ratcliffe thinks that Prinz 
views “most emotions as passive states, rather than states that we can actively control, they 
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are more like percepts that we are presented with than concepts that we manipulate.”342  This 
interpretation seems largely correct.  We saw with Prinz that if we were to encounter a bear in 
the woods, the situation would look as follows: (1) There is a dangerous roar of the animal and 
a breaking of branches (something is happening outside in the world which causes us to jump 
and our heart begins beating faster).  (2)This is perceived by our mind (there is a passive, 
internal registering within our heads of this outside occurrence).  (3) A series of bodily changes 
occur as a result.  (4) This leads to a bodily perception.  As Ratcliffe says, this perspective 
assumes a break between the body and world.343  Additionally, it dissociates “the intentionality 
of feelings from their phenomenology.”344  Prinz’s account focuses on the intentionality, but he 
neglects the phenomenology of the experience.  What of the phenomenology of the ‘core 
relational themes’ or the ‘gut reactions’ which he emphasizes?  Prinz doesn’t seem to address 
that, yet a person’s phenomenological experience importantly structures their intentionality 
toward the world, that is, a person’s background experience structures their intentional states.  
When it comes to Solomon, Ratcliffe claims that Solomon broadens the category of 
judgment to such an extent it could “accommodate just about any behavioural disposition.”345  
This seems to be largely correct, for as Solomon has said: “animals make all sorts of judgments 
(e.g., whether something is worth eating, or worth chasing, or worth courting),” and yet the 
animals don’t reflect upon any of these things according to him. 346  Others have taken issue 
with Solomon from a slightly different but related emphasis regarding how Solomon 
distinguishes judgments from other beliefs.347  For example, L. Nathan Oaklander and Richard 
Gull have said that there is an issue of how Solomon can distinguish emotions from other non-
emotional judgments – such as beliefs – since they both seem to have (for Solomon) the same 
structure of intentionality,348 but surely there is a difference between the intentionality of an 
emotion and the aboutness of a belief?  Even if Solomon were to say (as he does) that 
emotions are constitutive of a situation and thus can encompass a system of different 
judgments, this still doesn’t help us, since regular non-emotional beliefs do the same thing.   
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What Ratcliffe is trying to do is look for a position which can accommodate the 
features of affective states that Prinz and Solomon’s theories don’t: 
Bodily feelings…are neither states that are altogether bereft of 
intentionality nor states that can have only the body or a part of it as their 
object.  Instead, they are part of the structure of intentionality. […] Things are 
experienced through bodily feelings and the body itself may or may not be the 
most salient object of feeling.  Even when it is not the object of experience, it 
still feels in a way that is phenomenologically accessible.349   
 This approach will help us move beyond many of the dualisms which we have looked 
at between cognition and affect, the internal and the external, and the subject and the object.  
All of these approaches emphasize or promote a fragmentary way of viewing or interpreting 
the world and our place in it.  Existential feelings – the way in which we find ourselves within 
the world – are a unitary phenomenon.350  It is the background from where our sense of reality 
arises.  It is the background in which these other attitudes are embedded; it is something 
which is mostly taken for granted by the previous theorists we’ve looked at.   
Let us take a closer look at an example of existential feelings and how they determine 
our sense of reality; our focus will be on the experience of severe, clinical depression.  Andrew 
Solomon (not to be mistaken for Robert Solomon), has written about what major depression 
feels like for the sufferer.  The description is worth citing at length.  He describes the general 
feeling as follows: 
To be creatures who love, we must be creatures who can despair at 
what we lose, and depression is the mechanism of that despair.  When it 
comes, it degrades one’s self and ultimately eclipses the capacity to give or 
receive affection.  It is the aloneness within us made manifest, and it destroys 
not only connections to others but also the ability to be peacefully alone with 
oneself…In depression, the meaninglessness of every enterprise and every 
emotion, the meaninglessness of life itself, becomes self-evident.  The only 
feeling left in this love-less state is insignificance.351 
[Depression] is tumbleweed distress that thrives on thin air, growing 
despite its detachment from the nourishing earth. […]  Such depression takes 
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up bodily occupancy in the eyelids and in the muscles that keep the spine 
erect.  It hurts your heart and lungs, making the contraction of involuntary 
muscles harder than it needs to be.  Like physical pain that becomes chronic, it 
is miserable not so much because it is intolerable in the moment as because it 
is intolerable to have known in the moments gone and to look forward only to 
knowing it in the moments to come.352 
It is not pleasant to experience decay, to find yourself exposed to the 
ravages of an almost daily rain, and to know that you are turning into 
something feeble, that more and more of you will blow off with the first strong 
wind, making you less and less. […]  Depression starts out insipid, fogs the days 
into a dull colour, weakens ordinary actions until their clear shapes are 
obscured by the effort they require, leaves you tired and bored and self-
obsessed.  […] Major depression is a birth and a death: it is both the new 
presence of something and the total disappearance of something [this birth 
and death occur at the same time].353 
In the onset of depression, Solomon uses by way of illustration the analogy of the branches of 
a vine as one of the things that are born from depression; and as for the death that depression 
causes: 
The death is one’s own decay, the cracking of the branches that 
support this misery.  The first thing to go is happiness.  You cannot gain 
pleasure from anything…But soon other emotions follow happiness into 
oblivion: sadness as you had known it, the sadness that seemed to have led 
you here; your sense of humour; your belief in and capacity for love.  Your 
mind is leached until you seem dim-witted even to yourself.  If your hair has 
always been thin, it seems thinner; if you have always had bad skin, it gets 
worse.  You smell sour even to yourself.  You lose the ability to trust anyone, 
to be touched, to grieve.  Eventually, you are simply absent from yourself…you 
are less than yourself and in the clutches of something alien.354 
These passages powerfully describe the sense of alienness that overcomes a sufferer of severe 
depression.  You can see that it affects the way he thinks about himself within the world and 
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how he feels about himself within the world; his entire perspective on the world and the way 
his senses perceive it changes into something unrecognizable.  Neurobiologically, depression 
can be affected by drugs that can alter the brain chemistry, but this won’t resolve the problem.  
“Drug therapy hacks through the vines…poisoning the parasite so that bit by bit it withers 
away,” but as he says, “even with the vine gone, you may still have few leaves and shallow 
roots, and the rebuilding of your self cannot be achieved with any drugs that now exist.”  The 
“Rebuilding of the self in and after depression requires love, insight, work, and, most of all, 
time.”355  We see here how our bodily feelings can alter our relationship with the world, and 
how various objects, persons, and situations alter their appearance in this new reality; the 
first-personal sense of experiential mineness becomes distorted.  We can also see how all of 
this is a unitary phenomenon – it presents an entire way of perceiving, interacting with, and 
dwelling within the world.  Robert Solomon, our advocate of the cognitive theory of emotion, 
has argued that depression “is a self-imposed purge,” that it is a way of “wrenching ourselves 
from the established values of our world.”356  He says that although it can sometimes be 
pathological, it is not in itself pathological and may even be essential to a person’s normal life, 
of overcoming obstacles, and of self-realization (consider for example an artist who 
experiences a burst of activity after a depressing episode).357  (Robert) Solomon makes several 
other claims about depression.  First, like a mood (on his interpretation), depression can 
spread out in all directions, however, he thinks it is primarily directed ‘inward, toward oneself.’  
He also says there is an all around negative evaluation of everything.  He says the responsibility 
is usually self-blame or guilt.  And he says the strategy is “[t]o shake oneself loose from the 
outmoded sludge of encrusted tasks and values which one finds worthless.”358  This idea that 
our depression involves ‘evaluations’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘strategies’, might possess some 
truth for someone suffering from a mild depression, but for someone caught within a major 
depression, it is not a cognitive ‘evaluation,’ ‘strategy,’ or ‘self-imposed purge,’ but rather a 
sense of being-in-the-world which they find themselves in.359  The example above should have 
shown us why a cognitive theory of emotion based on judgments and beliefs cannot provide us 
with a complete understanding of certain experiences of the world.  A phenomenological 
description of depression plays an important role in providing us with that extra insight and 
understanding into a completely new way of dwelling within the world.  In general then, the 
feeling of our sense of reality is not something which is added to our experience, it is 
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something which changes the very structure of our experience.360  As the examination of 
severe depression demonstrates, our normal sense of meaningfulness is perversely mangled 
into the exact opposite.  Our normal, everyday being-in-the-world decays and fades, the self is 
distorted; the structure of our first-person experience changes, the PEMS is put at risk.  
Severe clinical depression is a dramatic case, what about a less severe mood?  
Consider anxiety.  Solomon thinks that anxiety is directed at the whole world – at anything and 
everything we find in it.  It is a desire on our part to ‘hide,’ or make ourselves ‘disappear.’361  
But as Ratcliffe has rightly pointed out, “by regarding moods as emotions that are directed at 
the world as a whole, he [Solomon] fails to characterize the distinctive way in which certain 
‘emotional’ states constitute a sense of belonging that is presupposed by any object-directed 
state.”362  Moods attune us to the world.  When the familiarity through which we encounter 
and engage with things and people in the world starts to fall away, this creates anxiety within 
us.  The practical familiarity we had with the world has eroded; there is an absence with how 
we connect to things in the world.  As Martin Heidegger said: “anxiety is not an entity within-
the-world [...] [i]n anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something 
threatening, must have an involvement.”363  When we are no longer feeling anxiety, we many 
times say that ‘it was really nothing,’ what had oppressed us at the time was not a particular 
object or thing in the world which we were focusing on, but rather certain possibilities.  When 
familiarity falls away and our possibilities become murky, we develop a genuine apprehension 
of what we might call ‘the nothing.’  The inability for us to pinpoint a specific object or thing 
produces anxiety, and thus the familiar becomes unfamiliar. 
There is another way we can look at what existential feelings have to tell us about our 
self and our interpretation of the world.  Ratcliffe draws on the concept of a ‘horizon’ that is 
discussed by Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  This view says there is a horizonal 
structure to experience.364  When we gaze at the world, we are not just seeing static objects in 
a certain way and from a certain sense modality, but rather as the space of possibilities that 
might arise in situations as they unfold.365  This is not just a theory of perception, this just as 
importantly is our way of belonging to the world – a shared world; feelings are an essential 
component of our way of experiencing this shared world.  A clear case where we can see this 
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in operation has to do with those who suffer from autistic spectrum disorder (ASD).  It is 
believed that those with ASD have problems with their mirror neuron system (see chapter 2 to 
revisit the details on this subject).  Peter Hobson has argued that the main deficit that an ASD 
person has is the lack of emotional connection with others.  A child with ASD does not react to 
the emotional expressions that appear on another’s face as someone non-autistic might do, 
instead, if they are presented with the photograph of someone smiling, they don’t recognize 
the smile as representing happiness or approval, but rather a face that is contorted.366  
Additionally, if ASD children are given the task of imitating the way a person uses different 
objects in a room, the children with ASD don’t imitate the person like a typical subject might, 
but instead simply imitate the action.367  These studies show that ASD impairments critically 
damage the person’s social and affective forms of imitation – the dynamic possibilities for 
interaction are reduced by just interpreting the action, and not the whole person.  Coming 
back to the discussion of existential feelings, we can see here that in cases of ASD there is a 
diminished sense of the personal.  Hobson says that “[t]o be emotionally connected with 
someone is to experience the someone else as a person,”368 and this is something which is 
lacking in those with ASD; and this is why those with autism frequently do not make eye 
contact with others and seem distant and detached from other people.  We saw in the infant 
studies in chapter 1 that a baby discovers the type of person it is through the affect 
attunement or emotional connectedness with its caregiver and others.  It is a means of feeling 
and sharing things in all the various dynamic possibilities.  “We have a basic human response 
to expressions of feelings in others.”369  If the autistic person is responding to the ‘action’ and 
not the ‘person,’ then this will alter how they view their possibilities for interaction within the 
world.  It seems we can say that the existential feelings that Ratcliffe talks about, although 
they may not entirely constitute our sense of self, are nonetheless an important and vital 
component of what helps constitute who we are.370   
A question can be asked regarding these ‘existential feelings’: how accessible are they 
to our conscious awareness?   In chapter 3 we looked at proprioception through, in part, the 
work of Shaun Gallagher.  There we saw that proprioception contributes to the background 
structure of how our external senses operate in the world – it provides us our experiences of 
our posture as we sit and type, and of our gait as we walk across the room to pull a book off a 
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book shelf.  In chapters 3 and 4 we also looked at the differences between the pre-noetic 
corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP), which shapes our experience without our knowing, behind 
our conscious awareness, and the noetic – or overtly conscious – corporeal-kinetic 
intentionality (CKI), where we attend in an intentional way to some aspect of our body.  Where 
would existential feelings fall within these categories?  At first we might be inclined to say that 
existential feelings are akin to CKP, in that they emphasize the background framework which 
lays the groundwork for how we experience the world.  As you might recall, Gallagher says the 
body schema (i.e. CKP) is not phenomenologically accessible to us on a conscious level under 
most circumstances: in his words, “[a] prenoetic performance is one that helps to structure 
consciousness, but does not explicitly show itself in the contents of consciousness.”371  
Ratcliffe adds to this by saying that prenoetic performances are “not part of experience, [they 
are] an implicit background that underlies all experience, a set of capacities that shape 
experience but are not themselves experientially accessible.”372  Just as a normal CKP 
occurrence lies outside our conscious awareness until something occurs which causes us to 
focus on it (entering it into our CKI), this seems to be true with existential feelings.  They many 
times only enter into conscious awareness when there has been some change in our bodily 
interaction with the world, that then reveals the structure of our experience which we had 
until that point taken for granted.  It only becomes conspicuous when there is a disturbance.373  
However, when it comes to existential feelings, Ratcliffe says they are accessible to us on a 
phenomenological level.  He says that although “[e]xistential feelings are not ‘objects’ of 
everyday awareness…they are indeed ‘felt’ in some way.”374  Most of the time we are sitting at 
our desk, it is a pre-noetic CKP occurrence which lies outside our reflective awareness, but it 
provides us with a structure to our experience of the world; an existential feeling, on the other 
hand, such as a feeling of being abandoned, also structures our experience of the world, but in 
addition is something which we feel.  It gives us a sense of belonging to the world (or perhaps 
sometimes, not belonging), but it is not something which we normally reflect upon.  So, 
although these existential feelings may not be ‘objects’ of our awareness, we do in some way 
‘feel’ them.   
In chapter 8 we have encountered two main groups of people with psychological 
disorders: those with severe depression, and those with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD).  In 
the first case we saw how an existential feeling of severe depression severely limits a person’s 
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view of what opportunities and actions they have in the world.  In cases like this, a person with 
clinical depression may be extremely lethargic and not be able to do anything, and simply curls 
up and gives up on all actions, or they may become over-excited and wander around in a 
frenetic way, desiring to do something, but having no understanding or hope regarding what it 
might be.  In the second case, we saw that ASD severely limits a person’s ability to understand 
or relate to other people’s feelings; rather, people appear more as objects.  What we see in 
the depression case is that if you can’t see the world as a world of action and possibility, then 
the very ability ‘to be’ oneself is impaired.  In the case of severe depression a sufferer may see 
themselves as ‘less than’ what they used to be, or perhaps unable to achieve what they want 
to be, or even – in the worst case scenario – as having an actual negative impact on 
themselves, others, and the world, and may attempt suicide.  Not only is any sense of a robust 
or narrative self impaired in such a case, but even their PEMS is impaired, since possibilities for 
the self at the most primal affective level (e.g. a reduction of ‘care,’ ‘seeking’ and play) are 
inhibited, or are stripped from their horizon of possibilities.  In cases of ASD, a robust or 
narrative self can never fully develop, since even the PEMS, which encompasses some kind of 
understanding of ‘other’ is impaired or undeveloped to some degree, due to a reduction in the 
ability to understand the ‘meaning’ of another’s movements.  
Chapter 8 has seen us try to fit ‘existential feelings’ in with CKP and CKI.  This has 
allowed us to make our understanding of these phenomena more sophisticated.  As Ratcliffe 
points out, existential feelings “participate in all experiences, albeit as something that is 
usually pre-reflectively taken for granted.  There is, however, a fine line between what is 
phenomenologically accessible and what is not.  It is primarily through changes in existential 
feelings that we can catch a ‘glimpse’ of them.”375  This is why Sheets-Johnstone’s kinaesthesia 
idea works better, for the term involves ideas of ‘motion’ and ‘feeling;’ sometimes this felt 
movement is consciously reflected upon, other times it is a pre-reflective phenomenon.  What 
is essential is that it is this felt movement which generates our sense of mineness.  Although 
my emphasis on the bodily motion aspect is more than what Ratcliffe would perhaps want to 
accept for his idea of existential feelings, I think his idea of ‘existential feelings’ provides an 
essential phenomenological addition and support for the PEMS view.376  Dynamic forms of 
vitality were given life in Part I through infant/caregiver interaction; the insights on existential 
feelings have directed us towards another vital component of how dynamic forms of vitality 
operate, by indicating how our being-in-the-world operates; through an example like severe 
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depression, we saw how our sense of mineness can fade away.  A broadly conceived 
Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self needs to draw on many different perspectives (for 
the self is a broad and many splendored thing!), what Ratcliffe provides is an insight into how a 
change in possibilities or opportunities – which rely on courses of action – is such an important 
aspect of understanding the self, for it is a phenomenological insight into how an impairment 
in options for actions actually feels. 
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Chapter 9: Affects and the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self 
“Although we experience ourselves as things, as fixed entities occupying a physical 
space in the world, we are in reality a process, a continuous unfolding in time, 
constantly becoming."377 
 
 
We’ve spent three chapters examining and critiquing different approaches to 
understanding emotions, moods and feelings. How do we interpret our findings from the 
PEMS perspective?  Chapter 6 gave us a physiological-reaction view, chapter 7 presented the 
cognitive viewpoint and responses to it, and chapter 8 provided the phenomenological 
viewpoint as being of importance.  The PEMS view wants to emphasize the phenomenological 
perspective as the most important when it comes to understanding ipseity.  PEMS also wants 
to say that the physiological-reaction view holds greater importance than the cognitive view 
(PEMS admits that the cognitive view is important, it would just place it at a different level 
than the ‘minimal’ level of self, that is to say, whatever the cognitive view can contribute will 
most of the time be taking place at the level of the narrative self).  What we can do at this 
point is show how the three different elements of affects that we’ve looked at (physiological-
reaction, cognitive and phenomenological) fit together, and how they relate to the PEMS.  Let 
us start with Panksepp, our main figure from chapter 6.  Jaak Panksepp has elsewhere put 
forth a theory of what he thinks constitutes a self.378  The theory is interesting not only for the 
idea of self that he puts forward, but also as a way of conveying his arguments for the 
evolutionary origins of affects.   
We are beginning to see how affects have a phylogenetic basis in corporeal-kinetics, 
and how this produces the first-personal experiential mineness.  Panksepp has a theory of self 
which he developed based on this type of affective neuroscience, which PEMS draws upon for 
some of its support.  Panksepp supports the idea of a ‘SELF’ (which stands for Simple Ego-type 
Life Form).379  The primal SELF of Panksepp is based on the neural schema of bodily actions 
that create the primitive affective values that provide us our raw subjectively experienced 
feelings.  He also thinks this may serve to help us conceptualize our higher forms of 
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consciousness.380  When we think of a self, we usually think of some kind of stable mental 
presence that gives us our unity and continuity of experience.  What Part II has shown is that 
this has a strong basis in affects.  The roots of this self according to Panksepp emerge from 
sensorimotor circuits in the mammalian brain that “generate a primitive sort of intentionality 
[a type of action readiness] and primitive forms of psychic coherence (global affective states of 
the brain) by interacting with various emotional and attentional circuits that encode basic 
biological values.”381  When you take a ‘primitive sort of intentionality’ or action readiness, and 
add to it a sort of ‘psychic coherence’ that can last over time, you arrive at something that fits 
closely with the PEMS I am arguing for.  Let us examine the ‘five assumptions’ that Panksepp’s 
view of SELF is based on and compare and elaborate upon it with an enactive approach based 
on corporeal-kinetics.  
1. We have a ‘primordial self’ which arises from ‘body-linked brain processes’ which we 
share homologously with other members of the animal kingdom.  This is something 
we’ve already looked at and shouldn’t be controversial.   
2. Our consciousness evolved from unconscious neural processes.  These neural 
processes have served as an important and essential element for all our higher levels 
of analysis, as well as our ability to recognize the primordial connection which exists 
between these unconscious and conscious processes.  Furthermore, “every moment of 
our conscious lives is undergirded by feelings” and if this infrastructure were inhibited 
or destroyed in some way, our sense of self would degrade.”382  This supports the 
PEMS view that as living entities we are agents that generate and maintain our own 
identities, and if we disrupt this process, then the whole organism is affected.  So at 
any point if there is a disruption in the homeostasis of the body, the exteroceptively 
driven affects, or the emotional affects, then this will alter our sense of self.  The 
amount of disruption we are talking about depends on whether it is a minor or major 
change (go back to the discussion of Rudrauf and Damasio’s idea of variance and 
resistance in chapter 6 for an example of this).  The PEMS view agrees that this 
affective process is based (in part) on sensorimotor neurons (amongst other things), 
and as we have seen with Panksepp, affects have their origins in action-based 
behaviours.  Actions and affects are part of our corporeal-kinetic make-up; they are an 
integral part of our dynamic forms of vitality that give us that phenomenological sense 
of personal mineness.  
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3. When it comes to the hard problem(s) of consciousness, perhaps the hardest of these 
is trying to understand the most evolutionarily basic qualitative experiences which tell 
“organisms where they stand with respect to environments and actions that will 
enhance or detract from the likelihood of their own survival as well as of their kind.”  
Panksepp calls these most basic and ancient qualitative experiences ‘evolutionary 
qualia’, or more succinctly: ‘equalia.’383  This evolutionary understanding of our 
qualitative experiences of how we stand within our contextual situation can be seen as 
part of a larger mammalian aspect of our dynamic forms of vitality.  It shows that there 
is phylogenetic basis that appears in other mammalian and animal life forms that 
strengthens the connection between us and them. 
4. The mechanisms that underlie our sense of self, or selfness, are “a neural process that 
is re-represented hierarchically at many levels of neural and mental development.”  So 
if we view this neural hierarchy as a tree, then although the roots and perhaps even 
the trunk of this tree are processes which we share with other mammals, the upper 
branches and canopy provide means for variation.  The most important level of these 
neural processes, Panksepp says, has to do with “the interface between the 
unconscious properties of neural tissues and those that permitted the emergence of 
consciousness.  I refer to the latter as the ‘periconscious substrates of 
consciousness.’”384  In chapter 10 we will look in much greater depth at problems that 
arise from a hierarchical system of consciousness, so this discussion will have to wait 
until later.  Suffice it to say for the moment, these ‘neural processes that can be re-
represented hierarchically,’ can be explained using what neuroscientist Todd Feinberg 
calls a ‘nested neural hierarchy.’   This is a system which can fit within a PEMS 
framework; again, more on this later. 
5. Panksepp tells us that if we want to establish the self on ‘stable neural coordinates,’ 
that we will find that the “sources of primary process core-consciousness are 
intertwined more intimately with intrinsic motor than with exteroceptively driven 
sensory processes.”385  This is important because it brings to the front of the discussion 
the pivotal role of motor processing in providing an anchor for the ‘periconscious 
substrates of consciousness.’  Panksepp emphasizes:  
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“Although highly valenced feelings can certainly be triggered by 
external events and higher appraisals [...] the most fundamental forms of 
affective consciousness within the mammalian brain arise from a 
neurodynamic scaffolding that provided a stable self-referential set of internal 
motor coordinates upon which various sensory and higher perceptual/learning 
mechanisms could operate.”386  
 
These five points of Panksepp’s primal SELF add a piece to the PEMS view.  With Stern and the 
others involved with infant development, we saw how a minimal self emerges in our early 
human development.  Now with Panksepp we see this fit within a much larger mammalian-
evolutionary picture that also includes feelings and emotions as a vital component.  We can 
see how developmental psychology is supported by an evolutionary affective neuroscience.  
Both views show that corporeal-kinetics are vital for giving us the forms of vitality that fill us 
with the phenomenological feeling of meaningful existence; it is Panksepp’s neuro-centrism 
which is questionable from the PEMS perspective, PEMS accepts Panksepp’s affective 
neuroscience as simply one of the important components of meaningful, felt existence.  
Affects are linked with action – or action potential (as shown by Panksepp), and corporeal-
kinetics ties in with vitality dynamics (as Stern and others demonstrated).  Notice in this 
summary that consciousness is based in feelings, that these neural processes – although 
occurring at many levels – are tied in with motor processes which anchor the ‘periconscious 
substrates of consciousness.’  Some of these ideas should call to mind what was covered in 
Part I on the bodily self.  There we saw a sensorimotor basis to our understanding and use of 
our body, and this motoric basis was located to a great extent in the pre-noetic and pre-
reflective corporeal-kinetic patterning and basic proprioceptive processes.  Panksepp’s theory 
includes emotions and feelings as part of a similar process.  We should be able to see now a 
larger perspective emerging and many strands from diverse areas beginning to come together.   
How does the PEMS view relate to ‘cognitive’ theories of emotion?  Chapter 7 
introduced various ‘cognitive judgment’ approaches to affects, with a strong emphasis on 
Robert Solomon’s view.  Dominant views regarding affects in the last 30 years have focused a 
great deal on this perspective.  If such views had held up, then the PEMS view would hold less 
strength because what I have argued is an important aspect of our minimal ipseity could be 
associated, in a fundamental way, with higher-level cognitive occurrences.  Our exploration of 
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the situation in chapter 6, however, showed that affects have a deeper underlying basis that is 
based on intrinsic, instinctual, action-based behaviour, and chapter 8 showed how affects – 
such as moods and feelings – make up the phenomenological background for our higher level 
thoughts.  Thus, the 6th chapter served as the link between these two views. 
 Whereas neuroscientists such as LeDoux, Panksepp and Damasio focused on emotions 
that took place in a matter of seconds, Solomon wanted to explore emotions that spanned 
several minutes.  Rather than focus on automatic responses, he wanted to emphasize these 
longer-term emotions that were in his view purposive and rational judgments; they involve 
something that we do, analogous to choosing a course of action.  The example we looked at 
involved desiring to use the car to get to an appointment and finding that our partner had 
taken the keys and the emotional anger or frustration we would feel as a result.  These 
emotions are an evaluative judgment in Solomon’s view.  The thought was that if I am angry at 
my partner for taking the keys, I am angry at her for a particular reason that is built up from a 
series of other rational judgments and appraisals that are constitutive of a situation, and the 
thought was that there are particular objects/persons/situations that figure in the judgments 
(i.e. I have an appointment, I need the keys to drive there, my partner also uses the car, there 
are considerations of how long I need to get there, and what route I might take, etc).   
Panksepp’s objection to this view, however, clearly represents a PEMS-friendly 
response:  
“[C]ore feeling dynamics cannot cognitively reflect on themselves, but 
they may be experienced as cognitively unadulterated forms of pure affective 
livingness that may be an essential foundation for all higher mental functions. 
[…] Perhaps many individuals lose touch with…such emotional values as they 
cognitively mature. […]  Thereby, affects may become part of our dynamic 
subconscious.  Still, those ancient aspects of mental life probably continue to 
influence our emotional experiences from birth to death.”387   
‘Cognitively unadulterated forms of pure affective livingness’ is a terminological match to the 
idea of ‘dynamic forms of vitality’ that we’ve so frequently focused on.  We saw these dynamic 
processes in regards to infant development and how infants interact with their caregiver, and 
here we see it including affects, along with seeing it connected to a much larger evolutionary 
developmental picture (think of Panksepp’s primal affects of ‘play,’ ‘care’ and ‘seeking,’ which 
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build up our relationships with the environment and others’; our sense of meaning in the 
world is constituted by these encounters and interactions – as opposed to higher-level 
cognitive occurrences).  This passage shows how our experiences and interactions early on 
become laid down in us and become part of our minimal self; these core feeling dynamics are 
a foundational framework which maintain themselves as a constant element of our being, 
most of the time while not being aware of it (much of the time the primal affects may go 
unnoticed by us), yet they remain there giving us that sense of unity that provides us that 
feeling of mineness (i.e. that first-personal mode of the experience we are having as being my 
experience); or that sense of ownership that it is me that is stuck in this mood.  The learning of 
when and how to experience these affects, one could argue, comes through a corporeal-kinetic 
patterning (CKP) which serves as part of the process by which they are formed.  We can quote 
again one other point Panksepp makes:    
“Primitive emotional feelings appear to lie at the core of our beings, 
and the neural mechanisms that generate such states may constitute an 
essential foundation process for the evolution of higher, more rational, forms 
of consciousness.”388  
We can see here that these ‘core feeling dynamics’/‘primitive emotional feelings’ (a) come 
before – and do much of the work of – the judgments that Solomon focuses on, as well as (b) 
supporting the PEMS position.  
As mentioned already, when we get to chapter 10 we will explore Todd Feinberg’s 
concept of a ‘nested neural hierarchy.’  The details will have to wait till later, but for a brief 
teaser of what is to come, think of these nested neural hierarchies as three interlocking 
systems which we can envision as three concentric circles.  The most interior of these he calls 
the ‘interoself system,’ it is associated with the evolutionarily most ancient part of the brain, 
and its function is to regulate the homeostatic bodily systems of the organism (i.e. self-
protection, other instinctual responses, and pain, hunger, and thirst).  These regulatory 
systems that Feinberg presents fit neatly into Panksepp’s conception of the self (with its 
emphasis on homeostatic equilibrium and exteroceptive responses).  All that we need to do is 
take Panksepp’s ideas and transfer them into a nested neural hierarchy relationship and the 
result is an account of affects – along with Feinberg’s neuroscientific account of consciousness 
– that fits within the PEMS account of the Self.  Step-by-step we are beginning to see that the 
PEMS view encompasses a corporeal-kinetic development of the human infant, an 
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evolutionary development of the human mammal, an understanding of the origins, function, 
and role for affects, and an enactive understanding of consciousness.   
 Another notion which we encountered in chapters 6 and 7 is Antonio Damasio’s idea 
of the ‘as-if body loop,’ or ‘simulated body states,’ which we saw had connections with the 
insights found in mirror neuron research.  Damasio’s idea that ‘the brain can simulate certain 
body states as if they were occurring,’ is consistent with the corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP) 
we’ve looked at with Sheets-Johnstone.  Think of the ‘as-if body loop’ as one of the 
mechanisms of the CKP, much like we argued for the role mirror neurons played in CKP in Part 
I, only in this case we are expanding upon this idea to understand how affects fit within this 
picture.  This patterning is something established and developed early on, and becomes 
something which we can rely on later in life.  Damasio’s development of this idea extended 
beyond mere body simulation (i.e. mirror neurons), and tied-in with affects as well.  This came 
alive for us with the example we returned to often regarding the encounter we have with an 
angry bear in the forest and the reaction we have at that time and the way we emotionally 
prepare ourselves in the future when we revisit that area.  We saw at the time that the alleged 
complicated structure that Solomon thought we had in using a series of evaluative constitutive 
judgments could be (at least partially) explained through this type of ‘contextual conditioning’ 
(to use LeDoux’s terminology).  We also do not have to just focus on the evolutionary or early 
developmental aspect of this PEMS, for we can see that CKP and contextual conditioning are 
phenomena which continue throughout our entire lives.  Think of the culture shock associated 
with a major move to another country.  When I left Minnesota in the United States and moved 
to Scotland, I had to adjust to new cities, city layouts, means of transportation, differences in 
language use, styles of humour, means of expressing oneself, etc.  This required a corporeal-
kinetic adjustment, and new types of contextual conditioning for new physical and social 
contexts.  In situations such as these there is a period of adjustment where the person has to 
find a new way to settle-in and get comfortable in the new environment, for old and 
comforting ways of getting about and through various situations may not be available, since 
people may use different gestures, and body language, and over time these differences stack 
up and there is no recourse to the familiar that one could so easily fall back on when they were 
in their original home.  So in cases like these the processes of contextual conditioning and CKP 
are adjusted.  Sometimes this adjustment is something we are aware of, but bodily and 
affectively much of this will be occurring in the background. 
Chapter 8 presented a PEMS-friendly phenomenological approach to affects, mostly 
through Matthew Ratcliffe’s idea of ‘existential feelings.’  We saw through Ratcliffe’s analysis 
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that there is a background sense (or bodily feeling) of personal belonging to the world – a 
sense of reality.  Ratcliffe argues that “[b]odily feelings…are not altogether bereft of 
intentionality nor states that can have only the body or a part of it as their object.  Instead, 
they are part of the structure of intentionality.”389  He goes further and says, “Things are 
experienced through bodily feelings and the body itself may or may not be the most salient 
object of feeling.  Even when it is not the object of experience, the body still feels in a way that 
is phenomenologically accessible.”390  These ‘existential feelings’ are supportive of the account 
which I want to emphasize for the development of the PEMS.  Ratcliffe claims that there is a 
horizonal structure to our experience, in that as we gaze at the world what we see is a space of 
possibilities that might arise as different situations could unfold.  The examination of 
depression demonstrated that with a restricted PEMS, a person’s possibilities wither away and 
their entire sense of self and worth fade.  This world of possibilities is not simply our world, but 
a world which includes others as well; so if a person is overcome with severe depression, their 
interaction with – and reaction to – other people can become strained or crumble as the 
person they were becomes unrecognized to their friends (and their friends may become 
unrecognized to the depression sufferer).  A world of possibilities and opportunities is an idea 
based in action and intentionality.  Affects are part of this process, we live through the body 
and there is this essential link between body and affects and our sense of mineness. 
But what of enactivism – how does that fit in?  In this case let us focus on Giovanna 
Colombetti and her idea of an ‘enactive appraisal.’  She thinks “that appraisal is constituted by 
arousal and action,” and her arguments are designed to show how that idea relates “to an 
embodied and affective notion of personhood.”391  She objects to some approaches to 
understanding affects because of what she describes as their ‘corporeal impersonalism.’  This 
is the idea that an appraisal (which is usually viewed as a cognitive process separate from the 
body)392, is “an objective index of emotion, rather than...the processes of a lived body.”393  
Colombetti’s enactive approach of affective appraisals sees them as constituted by bodily 
events (such as states of arousal and actions).  In terms of our inquiry in chapter 7, corporeal 
impersonalism and this detached and objective type of appraisal may be found in Schachter 
and Singer’s ideas that the experiences of the body had to be ’interpreted’ in some way; the 
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bodily events occur and then have to be ‘interpreted’ in some way, and it is this interpretation 
which confers meaning to the emotion.394  Lazarus fits within this category as well, for he views 
cognitive processes as necessary and sufficient for affects, that is: since arousal and behaviour 
are to be viewed as the effects of the appraisal process, the emphasis on how to explain 
affects is put on the appraisal process itself.395  We saw how Solomon fits within this category 
with his idea of affects being beliefs or judgments.  All of these approaches tend to view the 
body as an object rather than part of lived experience.  Even Prinz, who spoke of ‘embodied 
appraisals’ still utilized a passive conception of embodiment with there being a cognitive 
‘appraisal’ element.  The work that enactivism will do is bring back the active body we saw 
throughout Part I, and this should provide part of the muscle to support the phenomenological 
viewpoint. 
Preferable to corporeal impersonalism is the enactive perspective.  According to 
Colombetti and Evan Thompson, several major ideas make up an enactive approach to affects.  
The most important of these are: 
(i) The cognitive and sensorimotor structures mutually modulate each other 
due to coupling between the organism and environment (think back to how 
the mirror neuron system described in chapter 2 operates, or the as-if body 
loop described in chapter 6).  Thus, “the whole embodied organism can be 
seen as a self-organized autonomous system that creates meaning.”396  
Meaning is brought forth through this self-organized sensorimotor coupling 
(think back to the infant discussion in chapter 1, or the emotional learning 
we encountered in chapter 6). 
(ii) The world of the agent is not prespecified or represented in the brain 
internally, but is instead relational in form.  This relational domain is 
enacted or brought forth through the way in which the organism and 
environment are coupled.  This provides us a link with phenomenology.  We 
have a constitutive relationship between ourselves and the environment.  
That is, the sense in which the world is given to and experienced by a 
subject is conditioned by the subject through their being-in-the-world; this 
being-in-the-world is frequently something which lies below reflective 
awareness (we saw this throughout Part I as well as chapter 8).  Thus to 
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reveal this understanding we need to engage in phenomenological and 
enactive analysis. 
(iii) Understanding experience is of central importance to our understanding of 
the mind of an agent.  What Part II has shown us (in chapters 6 through 8) is 
that affects are an inseparable part of our experience.  More broadly 
speaking, this point is another link between enactivism and 
phenomenology.  It requires that we engage in a dialogue between 
cognitive science and phenomenology, through examining the processes by 
which organism and environment maintain themselves as well as bring 
forth new structures and meaning, this provides a complementary way for 
enactivism and phenomenology to inform each other.397 
The main claim that emerges from the enactive approach is that “[m]eaning and experience 
are created by, or enacted through, the continuous reciprocal interaction of the brain, body, 
and the world.”398  These enactive principles can be used to: 1. Collapse the distinction 
between emotion and cognition (think of our critique of Solomon and the other cognitivists in 
chapter 7).  For the enactivist, cognition is fundamentally a process of sense-making through 
adaptive coupling between the subject and the environment, a coupling which produces 
viability-maintaining activity in relation to what has valence – what attracts or repels, what is 
good or bad for – the subject.  Affective states and processes are vital elements in such 
valence-sensitivity, meaning that cognition as sense-making is always affective.  Cognition as 
problem solving presupposes affects (recall Panksepp’s primal affects).  Cognition is filled with 
values.  At their simplest these values might be primal evolutionary affects based on self 
survival.  These shifts in primitive affects and bodily homeostasis later develop into higher level 
emotions.  Our examination has shown that meaning arises in evolutionary physiological-
reactions (i.e. homeostasis of the body and the primal affects from chapter 6), and from there 
can become more cognitive and sophisticated (chapter 7), but the back and forth coupling 
between subject and environment remains, even as new affective and cognitive structures and 
meaning are brought forth.  2. Affects are based in action (see chapter 6 and the primal 
emotions).  3. Our phenomenological experiences are affective (chapter 8).  Affects and 
experience are inseparable.  Our affective experiences are what makes our world meaningful, 
if we suffer from severe depression, then that affective state we are in alters all our 
experiences.  Enactivism is the conceptual framework we can use to tie phenomenology in 
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with the sciences (for example, the sciences that may deal with depression).  That is, we’ve 
looked at a diverse amount of theories concerning affects; what we can see is that the way the 
pieces come together fits within an enactive framework.  Affective, enactive, sensorimotor 
experience leads to the makeup of the PEMS. 
We can further this discussion by looking at more of the details of Colombetti’s 
enactive approach to affects.  Drawing on the work of Susan Hurley, she wants to draw out the 
distinction between the personal and subpersonal aspects of experience.399  Whereas the 
personal level is one where we as the agents can be said to perceive, believe, desire and act 
for specific reasons, Colombetti argues that the subpersonal level is the physical mechanism 
from which the personal level is generated.400  According to her view, the subpersonal level is 
itself composed of overlapping systems and processes, and these are what action and 
perception depend on, and can be described (using Hurley’s terminology) as ‘constitutively 
interdependent.’  What this means is that our actions and perceptions are not just related 
instrumentally as a kind of means to an end, instead, “action constitutes perception and...thus 
a kind of action.”401  These interactive and dynamical relations between the different 
subpersonal processes underlie the three main enactive ideas we looked at just a moment ago.  
It is these subpersonal and pre-reflective processes which create the phenomenological 
background of our experiences and make up the ‘lived body.’402  You might ask: ‘what are 
these subsystems that are being referred to?’  There are many: think of the mirror neuron 
system from chapter 2 (and Damasio’s as-if body loops referred to in chapter 6), another 
subpersonal system includes the parts of the brain-body that deal with what Panksepp (also 
chapter 6) called the ‘homeostasis of the body’, and a third subpersonal system would be the 
contextual conditioning that LeDoux (chapter 6) spoke about that drew on processes in the 
amygdala and hippocampus.  And of course there are other processes which we haven’t had 
room to explore.  These different subpersonal mechanisms we’ve examined are the 
prereflective, affective, corporeal arousal which the subject experiences as the background 
sense of self.  Colombetti’s enactive account of affective appraisals argues that “the appraising 
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experience is pre-reflectively lived as corporeal.  The body condition that characterizes an 
emotion episode…is lived through in the very process of evaluating the meaning of one’s 
environment.”403  Our bodily processes are distributed across a vast network of processes 
across the brain and body.  The ‘constitutive interdependence’ of these distributed networks 
of subpersonal systems and bodily processes is a key characteristic of the enactive approach to 
affects.  Our affectively aroused body is something that is immediately available to our 
experience, it is also that through which we evaluate our world.  Our experience of evaluating 
our environment is affective and corporeal.   
Chapter 8 has taken our discussion of affects and connected it with the notion of 
phenomenological background experience, thus showing how phenomenology can operate as 
an over-arching framework which can assist us in understanding these affects (and the PEMS).  
Let us take one more look at what can be learned from this work.  We have argued that the 
PEMS is based on corporeal-kinetics.  The dynamic forms of vitality which make up this PEMS 
have as vital components corporeal-kinetic patterning and intentionality.  Affects – which are 
action based – play a vital role in the establishment of minimal selfhood.  Chapter 6 showed 
the action basis of affects (the primal affects compose the basic feelings behind the self), 
chapter 7 showed affects were the basis for higher-order thought, and chapter 8 furthered 
these ideas by showing that affects play a role as background feelings which function as the 
fabric from which reactions and thought are sewn together (how the world appears to the self 
and how the self responds).  Matthew Ratcliffe has been our key figure in this.  He argued that 
“all intentional states are structured by an experiential background and that this background 
always incorporates feeling.”404  We can also see that both Stern’s ‘dynamic forms of vitality’ 
and Sheets-Johnstone’s ‘kinaesthesia’ and ‘thinking in action’ support this view.  
Phenomenological accounts typically lay out well the importance of the first-personal 
mineness of experience, but they don’t tell us what the mechanisms are that bring this about.  
Here in Part II we have found some of these mechanisms, and with the binding framework of 
enactivism, we can see how they all come together to support the PEMS.  Affects are an 
essential element of minimal ipseity.  Part I showed how animate movement was an essential 
part of ipseity, it demonstrated the importance of kinaesthesia – the felt sensation of bodily 
position.  It also emphasized corporeal-kinetics – bodily movement as essential to ipseity.  Part 
II has now shown that affects are also essentially connected with action (or action potential).  
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Feelings of vitality – the dynamic forms of vitality that ground the minimal self (and include 
affects) – have an essential affective component.  
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Part II: Conclusion 
“…all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs 
to understanding itself.  To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of 
what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all 
comportment toward beings…we therefore call it the pre-ontological 
understanding of being."405 
 
The goal of Part II was to find and explore the important role that affects have for 
helping determine what our sense of self is.  In chapter 6 we laid the foundation for our 
discussion by looking at the science behind affective experiences.  Jaak Panksepp’s insights 
provided the evolutionary underpinnings of what function affects play.  We saw that they (i) 
helped maintain homeostasis – or the chemical balance – of the body; (ii) they helped us deal 
with stimuli outside our body – the exteroceptive driven affects; and (iii) that emotional affects 
reflected an animal’s instinctual actions.  From Panksepp we learned of the ‘state control 
functions’ which provided the sub-neocortical (non-cognitive) point of control at a motoric and 
action based level, and the ‘channel functions’ with which we could make use of higher-order 
cognitions to deal with emotional encounters.   
We moved on to a specific human-oriented understanding of affects through David 
Rudrauf and Antonio Damasio’s discussion of an internal tension within the body of the 
biological organism.  As internal states within our body, these changes can affect us either 
locally or on a larger scale (at both the level of state control functions and at the channel 
function level).  An emotional reaction according to them is in part our way of dealing with 
different biomechanical forces at work.       
We then looked at how affective processing works through Joseph LeDoux’s insights.  
He showed us the emotional structural process that the brain goes through when a stimulus is 
received.  (i) Bodily responses are associated with internal changes to our body’s physiology; 
(ii) We next become aware of a feeling based on this; (iii) Some action then takes place.  There 
is a type of ‘contextual conditioning’ that takes place.  A truly fearful experience (such as a 
bear charging toward us in the woods), will cause part of our brain (the amygdala) to place the 
experience into our working or even explicit memory.  This emotional reaction modulates the 
formation of our memories, and alters our way of perceiving and reacting to future instances 
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of encounters which resemble it.  We saw in this chapter, then, that affects actually coordinate 
and organize the activity of our brain.  The way we react to the world changes over time as we 
encounter new (and reencounter old) experiences.  For a child and young adult, the world is a 
large and mysterious place, yet as we grow older, the world becomes more familiar to us – we 
know better how to respond to different situations.  This is due in large part to the emotional 
scaffolding which is laid down in our memories as we encounter new, exciting, and frightening 
situations. 
Chapter 7 moved our discussion into more philosophical approaches, by focusing on 
what role does cognitive appraisal or judgment play in our emotional reactions and 
development.  That is, the cognitive appraisal account argues that affects are like judgments or 
beliefs, rather than just physiological reactions.  Robert Solomon thought we should focus not 
just on what happens in a matter of milliseconds, but how emotions play out and what they 
mean for us over a period of several minutes.  At that level, he argued, we find that emotions 
are a type of judgment of the situation we find ourselves in.  They in effect function with the 
intentional structure of belief, and they are rational.  Since emotions were judgments, beliefs, 
and rational, this led him to conclude that although they frequently were pre-reflective, that 
nonetheless (i) there is a type of evaluation going on, for emotions many times embody our 
ethical judgments, responsibilities, and convictions; and (ii) they frequently comprise a chain or 
cluster of systematic judgments that are born out of a particular situation.  However, in spite 
of all these thoughts, we saw that the contextual conditioning that LeDoux described, as well 
as Damasio’s notion of an ‘as-if body loop,’ or ‘simulated body states’ (i.e. mirror neurons)  
could serve as explanations of the kind of features that Solomon takes to be important. 
We continued on in this chapter by looking at hybrid approaches to affective 
experience.  Richard Lazarus introduced us to the idea of ‘core relational themes.’  Lazarus 
thought that this was a good argument for a cognitive approach to affects, in that they can 
provide us with a coping strategy for different situations that begins at the most basic or 
general level and moves upward, toward something more specific.  He envisioned this strategy 
as shaped like a tree (a ‘decision tree’), where the most general reaction was the trunk, and 
more specific reactions would end up higher in the branches based on the motivational 
variables.  However, we took this approach and gave it a shift towards the physically-oriented 
approach to affects.  Where Lazarus could look at developing infants and argue that their 
emotional development was based on ‘goal relevant’ shifts, we saw – by reflecting back to 
chapter 1 when we looked at infant development – that the infant’s development has a strong 
bodily, sensorimotor based focus.   
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We ended chapter 7 by looking at Jesse Prinz’s take on the subject.  Prinz introduced 
us to the idea of the ‘formal’ and ‘particular’ objects of an affect.  If we were feeling sad 
because someone we knew had died, the particular object of this affective reaction would be 
sadness over the specific person, whereas the formal object would just be the sadness.  This 
was an important distinction to be made, for it provided yet again a way for us to see how the 
specific could emerge from the general.  Where Solomon seemed to focus on the particular 
object of emotion, we saw that it is the formal object which is the more important idea to 
focus on.  It was also an important insight, because it arose in its own way via theorists of 
many different philosophical bents.  LeDoux’s idea of contextual conditioning argues for a 
general-to-specific approach.  Damasio’s argument for as-if body loops also emphasizes a 
general-to-specific approach.  Lazarus’s core relational themes present us with general themes 
which make up our affective core.  And perhaps Prinz articulated this best by drawing a 
distinction between the formal and particular object of emotion.  From all of these approaches 
one thing does stand out, and that is the bodily core of the affective experiences.  It is the 
body where these first basic affective reactions emerge (from the homeostasis of the body to 
the exteroceptively driven affects – the five senses).  Then expand to the (instinctual) dynamic 
actions that might result from an affective reaction.  The alleged complex structure that 
Solomon thought emotions had, can perhaps best be viewed as overlapping core relational 
themes, or overlapping contexts which we have been conditioned for, that get honed down as 
the new situation plays itself out.  Affects, rather than being structured representations, or 
propositionally meaningful components, are better seen (as Prinz pointed out in his adoption 
of the core relational themes of Lazarus) as detectors or indicators which take wide and broad 
experiences and branch them out to something specific. 
Chapter 8 took us towards the final stage.  Having established a scientific basis for 
affects in chapter 6, we then explored in chapter 7 the (philosophical and psychological) terms 
that could best describe what we know of affects and how they operate.  With chapter 8 we 
could now shift our focus to how feelings about and perspectives on the world and reality are 
actually experienced and described by people in general, and to see how this can inform us 
from yet another perspective.  Examination of ‘existential feelings’ and cases of severe 
depression and autistic spectrum disorder presented how a world of possibilities opens up to a 
person and how this frames and positions the self in the world at the minimal level.  We then 
sought a unifying framework which could tie together all these approaches, and found it in 
phenomenology and enactivism.  There is also another way to look at the progression of the 
last three chapters.  Whereas in chapter 6 we looked at affects as they registered immediately 
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for us, and in chapter 7 we looked at how affects might operate at a time scale that lasted 
minutes, in chapter 8 we expanded further (temporally speaking) by looking at the feelings 
which form the foundation of our outlook of the world at a time frame of hours or days, and 
how we interpret reality and our place within it in this broader span of time.  The key to this 
approach was to look at Matthew Ratcliffe’s idea of ‘existential feelings.’  If we want to 
understand the self, knowing how feelings provide an opening out to the world, and 
understanding these background feelings which form the phenomenological atmosphere of 
the world which we inhabit and in which we dwell, will provide perhaps the most important 
pieces of that puzzle.  Through a focused look at severe depression and a brief look at autistic 
spectrum disorder, we saw how a certain type of existential feeling can completely alter one’s 
way of dwelling and interacting with the world (the phenomenological feel of our experience 
and existence and how the world opens up or closes in around us, altering our sense of self 
and how we understand and react to other selves).  Finally, Giovanna Colombetti’s enactive 
approach to affects provided us with a uniting principle which can bring together the insights 
of these lines of inquiry.  Existential feelings provided us with the unique and important 
phenomenological ways that show us how the world reveals itself for us in its possibilities and 
can determine our sense of self-belonging (or self-alienation).  Cognitive and physical-reaction 
approaches provided us with an informative look at the different aspects of affects, indeed, 
even some core origin points of where affective phenomena come from and why they arose, 
but the PEMS approach gathered together all this material and began to show us the way in 
which they might fit together.  Previous approaches to the self have looked at the body or 
affects, but the PEMS approach has been showing how they both are intimately linked via 
corporeal-kinetics (through, for example primal affects such as ‘seeking’), and how 
kinaesthesia and dynamic forms of vitality that emerge from the bodily affects (such as infant 
movement) create and maintain the unified PEMS through change in time and experience. 
In the introduction to Part I it was stated that the body serves as the horizon to which 
we experience the world.  We have now seen more of how this horizon of world experience 
emerges and comes together.  The picture of the PEMS that is developing has a bodily basis as 
Part I showed, and now, with Part II, we have seen that moods, emotions and feelings add to 
this biologically, psychologically and phenomenologically to present a fuller picture.  The 
minimal self has two vital and connected components – bodily kinaesthetic movement, and an 
affective element that provides us that sense of mineness (e.g. primal affects) and how we feel 
our belonging or alienation from the world (e.g. severe depression).  What we need to do next 
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is to show how all of this comes together.  We are now going to move on to Part III where the 
Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self will be tied together. 
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PART III: The Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self 
 
 Part III: Introduction  
“Moving organisms indeed create kinetic melodies…by the very fact of their 
aliveness.  These melodies are created because qualia are inherent in movement, 
inherent in the dynamically moving bodies of animate forms.  They are the 
foundational kinetic units..."406 
 
In the first two parts of this project we have looked at two things: the bodily aspects of 
the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (PEMS) and the affective aspects of the PEMS.  
These two parts focused on the two essential aspects of the PEMS – that it is based in the body 
and movement (corporeal-kinetics), and that a vital element which is part of this are the 
affects which show how the phenomenological element of first-personal mineness arises.  The 
analysis showed how we not only react to the world we are embedded in (i.e. infant and 
caregiver, or the flow of emotions when encountering something), but how the world in fact 
appears to us and what it is like to-be-in-the-world (i.e. existential feelings of being).  The 
purpose of this final part is to tie things together and see how the PEMS view relates to other 
similar views.   
This final part will be broken up into two chapters.  The purpose of the first (chapter 
10) is to build up to the PEMS theory by drawing on ideas we covered in earlier chapters, and 
tying them together with some new unifying themes by looking at two theories of 
consciousness.  Chapter 10 will look at the distinction that has been frequently made between 
the noetic and the prenoetic, the reflective and the prereflective, and see what theory can 
best explain this distinction which we have continually encountered.  The first step in this 
endeavour will be to look at the ‘dual process’ theory of consciousness.   Dual process theories 
serve as a good stepping off point to the issue which I want to take up regarding pre-reflective 
and reflective thought by presenting two separate systems which interact together.  This will 
lead to the second step of ‘nested neural hierarchies.’  Here we will see how the nested neural 
hierarchy can take the dual process theory of consciousness and expand it to fit in with the 
discoveries found in neuroscience and sensorimotor movement, it also moves us from 
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separate systems into nested systems that mutually interact.  Chapter 10 will – through its 
stepwise approach through each of these two theories of consciousness – give us an entry 
point into how a unified minimal self might come about and what it comprises.  This 
exploration of different systems or hierarchies of the brain is important for our theory of the 
PEMS for the following reason: our perceptions appear to us under normal circumstances as a 
unified experience (i.e. we typically don’t just smell a flower, or see a flower, or hear a bee 
buzzing near it, we perceive all these things at once), yet if we have different, separate 
systems, levels, or processes at work, then how can we account for this perceptual unity?  We 
also possess mental unity: under normal circumstances we understand ourselves to be 
(roughly) the same person now as we were minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years, or 
even decades before.  How can we account for this self-unity – or sense of self – based on 
brain structure?  What is the relationship between different brain systems which can help 
account for and explain this?  Throughout this project we’ve encountered the problem of how 
the pre-reflective element of consciousness (the corporeal-kinetic patterning) relates to the 
reflective (corporeal-kinetic intentionality).  Chapter 10 will allow us to delve deeper into this 
area and seek a resolution through a progression of separate systems (a quick, evolutionarily 
basic system 1, and a slower and more cognitively attentive system 2) to unified and more 
integrative nested hierarchies for the PEMS theory. 
Once we have covered this, we will be ready to spell out the specifics of a PEMS theory 
in chapter 11, the final chapter.  The work on consciousness, corporeal-kinetics and affects will 
all come together in a way to show that there is a minimal self that each of us has.  The final 
chapter will look at some alternative views of self.  The alternative theories which we will 
examine will be (i) the ‘centre of narrative gravity’ view of Daniel Dennett; (ii) the ‘no-self’ 
theory which is argued for by Thomas Metzinger; (iii) an alternative enactivist view of self that 
has been argued for by Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson; and (iv) Evan Thompson’s later 
expansion of the view he created with Varela.  By drawing together what we’ve looked at in 
the previous 10 chapters, I will (i) point out some conceptual confusions with Dennett’s ‘centre 
of narrative gravity’ view; (ii) present problems that arise with the ‘no-self’ view; (iii) show 
some problems with Varela’s enactivist view; and (iv) argue that the view Thompson has taken 
has some compatible ideas with my own PEMS theory.  The PEMS theory will demonstrate by 
the end that although the body and environment is constantly changing, there is still 
something ‘there’ which we can refer to as a unified minimal self. 
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Chapter 10: Dual-Process, Nested Neural Hierarchy and an Enactive approach to 
Consciousness 
 
“Something inside knows and thinks […] The something is oneself.  A person needs 
a self in order to think.  At the same time, a person needs to think if she is to 
acquire a developed sense of self."407 
 
Introduction 
In our exploration of the body and affects in the previous nine chapters, we frequently 
encountered two types of processes: those which could be labelled pre-reflective, and those 
that were reflective.  Since we are trying to understand what the Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self (PEMS) is, we will need to get a better grasp of what might explain these 
processes and how they relate to one another, so as to acquire greater clarity on pre-reflective 
minimal elements of ipseity and reflective narrative ipseity.  As such, the purpose of this 
chapter will be to explore these ideas in much richer detail.  To do so we will look at three 
different views (explanations to follow): (i) dual-process theory (in two variations); (ii) the 
nested neural hierarchy view; and (iii) an enactive approach.  Moving from dual-process 
theories, through the nested neural hierarchy view (which will give us a greater understanding 
of the unity of consciousness that gives rise to the sense of mineness), to enactivism, will lead 
us to a resolution of how to understand the relationship of the reflective and prereflective 
aspects of experience.  
We will begin with a view which would seem to fit this divide we’ve encountered quite 
well: the ‘dual-process’ theory.  This ‘two minds’ view was initially developed by a variety of 
psychological researchers in the 1970’s engaged in the study of areas such as: deductive 
reasoning, decision making, and social judgments.  “These theories [came] in different forms, 
but all agree[d] in positing two distinct mechanisms for a given task, which employ different 
procedures.”408  The theory argues that the thought processes which we possess are driven by 
two mechanisms.  One of these lies below our conscious awareness and is fast and automatic, 
the other is one which we are consciously aware of, and is slower in its operation.  It is thought 
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within this theory that the slow and conscious mechanism sometimes may operate 
independently and occasionally fight for behavioural control with the fast and automatic 
mechanisms.409  This is a theory which has existed within brain sciences for over 30 years.  We 
will examine two versions of this view, that of Peter Carruthers and that of Keith Frankish.  
What Carruthers and Frankish do for us with their accounts of these two systems is get us one 
step closer to answering questions of interaction and assembly with these two mechanisms.  
The dual-process approach naturally links into the general story of how the minimal and 
narrative selves relate by their examination of how the consciously aware and consciously 
unaware are split.  We should note that the terminology that Carruthers and Frankish use 
frequently states that system 1 is ‘unconscious’ and system 2 is ‘conscious.’  One might think 
that this distinction doesn’t map happily onto my distinction between the ‘pre-reflective’ and 
‘reflective,’ since for me there are prereflective states of awareness.  However, Jonathan Evans 
– who with Carruthers and Frankish has contributed to and developed the dual process theory 
– notes some of the terminological difficulties in the area and offers the following clarification: 
the notion of preattentive processes “[is accurate as a description for system 1], because it 
refers to processes that precede and provide content for focal attention.”  Likewise, “analytic 
processes are those which manipulate explicit representations through...and exert conscious 
volitional control on behaviour,” and serve as a good description of system 2.410  From this we 
see that Evans’ use of the term ‘preattentive’ reflects my use of the term ‘prereflective,’ while 
his use of ‘analytic’ is similar to my use of ‘reflective.’  Thus, the system 1 category can and has 
been interpreted so as to include prereflective (preattentive) states of awareness. 
However, as we will see, the dual-process theory of consciousness does not mesh 
quite as well with an enactive approach to understanding our embodiment within the world, 
which is what we are arguing for.  Thus, we will use the dual process theory as the stepping 
stone onto the nested hierarchy and then the enactivist view, which will move us toward our 
goal of what theory of consciousness best fits a PEMS theory.   
The second stage of this chapter will be to present the ‘nested neural hierarchy’ theory 
of consciousness which has been argued for by the neurologist Todd Feinberg.  The nested 
neural hierarchy theory argues that three anatomical systems produce what we consider the 
self.  These three systems dynamically interact and modulate each other in a much more 
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holistic – or unified – way that moves us toward the goal of an enactive paradigm.  The three 
systems are (i) the interoself, which is hierarchically lowest and earliest when it comes to 
evolutionary development; (ii) the exterosensorimotor system that deals with our 
sensorimotor reaction to the environment; and (iii) the integrative self system that assimilates 
and mediates the other two systems.411  We will see with this theory how interaction between 
different anatomical parts of the brain can produce a unified self which incorporates the 
reflective/pre-reflective aspects of the self, as well as taking into account our animate and 
sensorimotor interaction within the lived world.   
The chapter will end by bringing in the enactivist view of the lived body as put forth by 
Giovanna Colombetti and others.  Although this approach was looked at briefly at the end of 
part two when we were completing our look at affects, here it will be seen how enactivism as 
applied to affects fits within a nested neural hierarchy account of the brain.  Chapter 10 will 
end by laying out some of the steps in understanding the PEMS theory, by providing us a base-
line, grounded theory of consciousness that creates a unified self, and let us see the beginnings 
of what enactivism entails and gives us in understanding the PEMS.  
 
The Dual Process Theory of Consciousness 
Let us begin our analysis of the dual process theory of consciousness by first bringing 
in the perspective of Peter Carruthers.  Carruthers develops this dual process account from the 
perspective of analytic philosophy of mind by drawing on ideas of ‘computation’ and ‘modules’ 
within the brain.  This will provide us a good jumping off point for our move into the variation 
given by Keith Frankish, which will tie-in closer with the work we’ve been doing and give us a 
clearer idea of where these ideas fit in relation to each other in the broader picture. 
First of all, dual process theories state that there are two relatively distinct reasoning 
processes that are realized in our brain, which we will call ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’.412  Peter 
Carruthers’ take on this is to argue that System 2 is realized within the operation cycles of 
System 1.  Let us take a close look at what these two systems are:   
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Table 1:  The properties of System 1 and 2:413 
System 1     System 2 
A set of systems    A single system 
Fast       Slow 
Parallel      Serial 
Unconscious     Conscious 
Not easily altered    Malleable 
Universal in Humans Variable based on cultures and the 
individual 
Mostly shared with other Animals  Uniquely Human 
Not influenced by Verbal Instruction  Responsive to Verbal Instruction 
Independent of Normative Beliefs  Influenced by Normative Beliefs 
Heuristic based     Can involve applications of valid rules 
 
Carruthers’ understands these properties as follows.  System 1 is an evolutionarily ancient 
system formed by “a collection of semi-independent modules whose internal processes 
are…computational in nature.”414  He says this system has three distinct kinds of ‘mechanisms’ 
associated with it: the architecture we associate with our beliefs, desires, and decision making.  
By contrast, System 2 is a single, uniquely human system, which according to Carruthers, can 
operate in different ‘modes’ that correspond to the three mechanisms just mentioned.415 
 The evolutionarily ancient aspects of System 1, Carruthers thinks, were initially for the 
purposes of both controlling our movements and for anticipating their effects.416  Moreover, 
“these systems are ideally suited to subserve the mental rehearsal of action.”417  An example 
of how System 1 would activate some form of action control would look as follows: 
                                                          
413
 Carruthers, Peter.  “An Architecture for Dual Reasoning.”  In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.  
Eds. Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., Keith Frankish.  (UK: Oxford, 2009), 109 (this table is adapted from Table 
5.1).  When it comes to the use of terms like ‘unconscious’ and ‘conscious’ although they don’t map 
perfectly onto the prereflective/reflective distinction (as was mentioned just above), there are 
preattentive (or we might say prereflective) processes going on in system 1, and in system 2 we are 
dealing with beliefs and other concepts which are reflective in form. 
414
 Carruthers.  “An Architecture for Dual Reasoning.”  110. 
415
 Carruthers.  “An Architecture for Dual Reasoning.”  ibid. 
416
 Recall that in our initial look at the scientific foundation for affects in chapter 6 we saw that Jaak 
Panksepp had a similar distinction in play.  We’ll revisit and explore this in more depth later on. 
417
 Carruthers.  “An Architecture for Dual Reasoning.”  113 (emphasis original) 
165 
 
[A]n activated motor schema issues motor commands to the muscles to 
initiate a movement, an ‘efferent copy’ of those commands is created and compared 
with the initial motor intention, thus allowing for swift self-correction before the 
movement itself has even begun.  But the efferent copy is also transformed via one or 
more ‘emulator systems’ that model the kinematics of the body so as to match the 
incoming proprioceptive and other perceptual representations of the action as it is 
executed, again allowing for fast on-line correction.418 
This example suggests that to perform an action (such as running across a field to catch a 
frisbee) there are a variety of components: we have an original motor intention when we take 
that first step in our journey across the field in pursuit of the frisbee.  Efferent copies are then 
created and compared to the original motor intention step.  A series of ‘semi-independent 
modules’ – such as the emulator systems – model the body kinematics as the body makes the 
adjustment for taking that first step, maintaining posture, and avoiding any obstacles.  And 
representations are brought in by perception and proprioception.  All of these coordinate and 
contribute to the motor act of that first step.   
How are all these different modules able to communicate with each other?  
Carrruthers argues on behalf of what he calls ‘global broadcasting theory’ initially proposed by 
neuroscientist Bernard Baars (who calls it the ‘global workspace theory’).  Baars says:  
“Global workspace theory is based on the belief that, like the cells of the 
human body, the detailed workings of the brain are widely distributed.  There is no 
centralized command that tells neurons what to do…the adaptive networks of the 
brain are controlled by their own aims and contexts.”419 
This theory is saying that much of the workings of the brain are performed unconsciously by 
small portions of specialized brain tissue.  The various parts of the brain comprise assemblies 
of brain cells, and these are to be found in various clusters and networks.  All of these 
networks have their own specific functions (based on encoded DNA instructions).  The brain 
has a distributed type of functioning.  There is no single command centre to be found, instead 
all the decision making is made up of a great many (millions) of these distributed systems 
functioning together to produce global coordination and control without detailed instructions 
from some type of ‘command centre’.  Consciousness, then, according to the global 
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workspace/broadcasting theory, is a facility for “accessing, disseminating, and exchanging 
information, and for exercising global coordination and control.”420   
 The global broadcast theory of consciousness also applies to mentally rehearsed 
actions, some of which can lead to new desires or emotions.  That is, by mentally rehearsing an 
action, you suppose that you are performing a certain act, thus triggering a globally broadcast 
response to the situation.  Sometimes what you suppose you may not actually believe outright 
(such as trying to work out if you would be able to get to a certain cafe before it closes to eat a 
particular piece of chocolate cake you desire).  Thus, Carruthers thinks that although we don’t 
necessarily get real beliefs from actions which we mentally rehearse, these images can give 
rise to actual emotions and motivations which come from that image.421  So, you might 
imagine eating your favourite Thai meal at your favourite restaurant, and this image in your 
mind succeeds in making you hungry.  Or, you can visualize a sexual act, and this imagery can 
put you in a state of arousal.  However, as we argued in part II (chapters 6-9), the functional 
role of emotions that we personally rehearse in our mind (e.g. getting angry at hearing about 
an act of corruption committed by a well known politician) are of a different kind from those 
which are spawned spontaneously from the environment without rehearsal (visiting the woods 
for the first time and encountering a charging bear).   
There are several ideas to take from this brief summary of Carruthers’ version of dual 
process theory:  
“Since System 2 is realized in the cycles of System 1 [as it operates] it 
will be slow in comparison.  And since only one action can be mentally 
rehearsed and globally broadcast at a time, System 2 will be serial in its 
operation (but utilizing the parallel-process functioning of System 1).  And 
since the images that result from mental rehearsal of each action in the cycle 
are globally broadcast and we know that such broadcasts correlate closely 
with consciousness, we can explain why each such stage in each cycle should 
be conscious.  (The other stages, by contrast, will be unconscious, including 
the processes that select a given action-schema for rehearsal, and those that 
draw inferences from, or generate emotional reactions to, the broadcast 
image).”422   
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We should also keep in mind that System 2 is action-based, in the following sense.  “[I]t is 
mentally rehearsed actions that initiate and sustain System 2 reasoning, thereby recruiting and 
utilizing the mechanisms that also subserve System 1 reasoning.”423  In the next part of our 
look at dual process theories of consciousness, we will see how Keith Frankish argues how dual 
process theory explains personal and subpersonal levels.  His approach to dual process theory, 
with its subtle shift in emphasis and terminology, will take us a step closer on our path to 
acquiring a PEMS-friendly understanding of consciousness. 
  Frankish wants to take the idea of System 1 and 2 and explore them more as levels 
rather than as systems, and this takes place as the subpersonal and personal level distinction 
(i.e. our prenoetic/noetic distinction, the pre-reflective/reflective distinction, or the distinction 
between CKP vs. CKI).  Frankish says that the diverse System 1 is a set of cooperative 
subsystems that are subpersonal in their processes; and that System 2 is the personal system.  
The personal level processes we have are, according to him, realized in – or emerge from – the 
subpersonal ones.  These processes interact to give us our way of looking at how 
subpersonal/personal ‘reasoning’ operates.  There are two types to this reasoning: Personal 
reasoning is that done by a person, whereas subpersonal reasoning is performed by neural 
subsystems.  A “defining feature of personal reasoning is that it constitutively involves the 
performance of one or more intentional actions that are designed to generate a solution to a 
problem and motivated by a desire to find it.”424  This requires the use of different 
metacognitive abilities, such as attentively monitoring our activities, focusing our attention on 
a certain task, or evaluating different strategies which we might make use of; it is therefore 
conscious.  Although this personal reasoning is conscious, the beliefs and desires which we 
have that provide the underlying motivation for it may themselves not be conscious.  So, for 
example, someone presents us with a maths problem:  ‘What is 5 x 4?’  We respond quickly 
with the answer ‘20.’  When asked how we worked it out, we might very well respond that we 
don’t know.  In this case the answer just ‘came to us’ – answering the question was an 
intentional act by us, yet the reasoning that led up to us giving the answer was a type of 
subpersonal reasoning.  If, however, we are given a more difficult maths problem (e.g. 245 
divided by 7), then we may have to engage in a personal reasoning level process to arrive at 
the answer.  This methodology involves a type of ‘self-interrogation’ – we present ourselves 
with a problem, and then try to come up with a way to resolve it.  Self-interrogation is an 
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intentional action that is a process of personal reasoning, yet all the major work is done at the 
subpersonal level (recall back to the case of Ian Waterman in chapter 3 and how the CKI has 
great difficulty operating if a CKP isn’t in place to provide it with a framework).  In self-
interrogation, there may be an articulation of a problem and a deliberate attempt to resolve it, 
yet this self-interrogation ‘thinking’ is something which is done subpersonally.  Consider again 
the mental rehearsal of an action.  The rehearsal “generates perceptual and proprioceptive 
feedback which is then globally broadcast to subpersonal inferential and motivational 
subsystems, producing cognitive, motivational, and emotional reactions similar to those the 
action itself would produce.”425  This improves the problem-solving abilities of the creature.  
We can see, then, that there is a relationship between the subpersonal and personal levels 
(System 1 and 2), but what are some of the specifics?   
The dual-process theory argues for a foundation based on the evolutionarily basic 
neural subsystems of System 1, and System 2 is either a ‘higher-order’ of mental mechanisms 
or modules operating at a slower and more conscious way from what the quick and 
unconscious subpersonal systems do out of our reflective awareness.  A question we might ask 
at this point is: what is the structural makeup of these systems?  System 1 is supposedly an 
evolutionarily ancient system, and System 2 is more recent and uniquely human, so how are 
these structured?  Frankish says, “[p]erhaps it is not the components of the system [2] that are 
recent, but their assembly.”426  Resources for personal reasoning (such as working memory, 
language, sensory imagination, etc) may have evolved independently and personal reasoning 
appeared only when these resources merged to complete a new task.  The question arises 
since we have understood that System 1 is supposed to be the older, more evolutionarily basic 
system that we may have in common with other animals, and System 2 is something recent 
and distinctly human, so we need to ask whether the new System 2 “evolved independently, 
and that personal reasoning emerged only when these disparate resources were co-opted to 
serve a new task, perhaps with some minor additional adaptations.”427  For example, a view 
which emphasizes the ‘assembly’ view is that of archaeologist Steven Mithen who, by drawing 
on ideas from evolutionary psychology, has argued that humans in their early primate 
evolution had several different mental modules within the brain that served their own specific, 
specialized, purposes (e.g.  modules for linguistic intelligence, social intelligence, technical 
intelligence, and general intelligence), but that over evolutionary time the modules began to 
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overlap and eventually opened up to each other, thus providing us with entirely new ways of 
thinking and performing actions.428   
The question of how the systems interact and how many systems/levels there are has 
taken up much discussion.429 A question that arises is whether two systems is the best way to 
understand how conscious processes operate.  Frankish considers two modified versions.  The 
first modified view – that of Jonathan Evans – is to introduce a type 3 process into the mix, 
which serves to initiate System 2 processing and resolve any conflicts that may arise from it.  A 
second modification is that of Keith Stanovich, who accepts the two system layout we’ve 
looked at, however, he breaks System 2 down into two subcategories – the ‘reflective,’ which 
is our top level of goals and beliefs, and a subordinate ‘algorithmic’ level which is the 
mechanical processes which support the reflective states.430  Following on from this, 
Carruthers and Frankish haven’t properly appreciated the pre-reflective.  As we’ve seen (e.g. in 
footnotes 412 and 413) they – as well as Jonathan Evans and Keith Stanovich – are aware that 
the system 1/system 2 designation is perhaps too rigid to encompass the variety of processes 
which are at work.  So what we need to do next is address these concerns by seeing what 
alternatives exist.  
Let us see how these questions lead us into the next section to seek further clarity.  
We are confused as to how System 2 structurally relates to System 1.  We also see that 
although initially a two system approach seems to work, there is still the nagging question 
(which can be traced to chapter 3) of how they interact – do we need more systems or 
processes, or do we need subcategories within these systems?  The problem here can best be 
described as a problem with the multi-level or hierarchical view of consciousness, where 
different levels are relying or building on others.  The dual-process theory showed how System 
2 can assert some control or restraint over System 1, it provided a first look at how these two 
seemingly different systems can interact and influence each other.  However, we can build on 
– and look deeper into – this relationship by introducing a new idea into our discussion: the 
nested neural hierarchy.  
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The Nested Neural Hierarchy Theory of Consciousness 
The dual-process theory we’ve just looked at – especially with how Carruthers 
envisioned it – involved two systems modelled on the idea of different interacting systems, 
with System 1 having its own semi-independent subsystems, and System 2 – although it is 
realized in the cycles and processes of System 1 – viewed as a uniquely human-system.  
Frankish also follows along this line (although he emphasizes the greater importance of System 
1) and prefers to call the systems ‘levels.’  Dual-process theory also lacks a full appreciation of 
the pre-reflective/reflective difference as well as the enactive approach to understanding 
ourselves as unified embodied selves within the world.  We can acquire a better grasp of how 
the idea of mental unity arises by bringing in the nested neural hierarchy theory of neurologist 
Todd Feinberg.  Feinberg explores the mind-brain relationship by introducing two ways of 
looking at it: the ‘non-nested neural hierarchy,’ and the ‘nested neural hierarchy.’   According 
to Feinberg, non-nested neural hierarchies possess higher and lower levels that are physically 
independent systems, where the higher levels of the hierarchy are not physically composed of 
what is on the bottom.431  If we want to know how we can understand and view the unity of 
action and unity of self which we experience, then a better model to draw upon is that of a 
‘nested neural hierarchy.’  Instead of a pyramidal structure with a series of bottom structures 
which lead us to an ever smaller series of structures that reach toward the pinnacle system at 
the top, what makes more sense is to see how all the components which make up the lower 
levels as physically combined (or nested) within the higher levels in a way that creates 
increasingly complex wholes.432  The nested neural hierarchy we are about to examine will take 
us in the right direction towards enactivism.  
Let us consider this in more detail.  Here are the two main differences between a non-
nested neural hierarchy and a nested-neural hierarchy when it comes to the relationship 
between higher and lower levels:  
Non-nested Hierarchy: (i) the lower and higher levels are physically 
independent; and (ii) the higher – or top – level imposes control on the lower levels 
from on top.  This results in a much stronger constraint of the higher upon the lower 
levels (top-down constraint).  We can metaphorically view this in military terms.  Think 
of a general: he directs and controls the operations of his army, yet he is not physically 
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composed of the lieutenants ranking below him.  We can think of this as a controlled 
hierarchy.433 
Nested Hierarchy: (i) just like an organism, the components of the lower levels 
are physically combined within the higher levels.  This creates wholes which are 
increasingly complex.  (ii) “the constraint of the system is embodied within the entire 
hierarchical system.”434  That is to say, there is no central controller running things for 
the system, instead “the constraint of the organism’s operation is generated from 
within the entire nested system of the organism.”435  This can also be known as a 
compositional hierarchy.  If we think of the body, there is not a ‘general’ directing 
things; instead the body is comprised of constituent organs, which are then made up 
of constituent cells.436 
What does this nested neural hierarchy look like?  The nested neural hierarchy as Feinberg 
envisions it is composed of three interlocking systems.  The three systems should be viewed as 
encompassing three concentric circles.  At the centre of this circle is the ‘interoself system.’  
Anatomically this would be part of the evolutionarily earliest part of the brain – the brain stem.  
This area is responsible for regulating the homeostatic bodily systems of the animal organism – 
those behaviours associated with self-protection, instinctual responses, and ‘interoceptive’ 
stimuli such as pain, hunger and thirst.  Another way of understanding this system is to view it 
as maintaining the internal milieu of the organism: “the internal physiological balance of the 
body, such as temperature, metabolism, and oxygenation, and also with what is commonly 
know[n] as the limbic system, which regulates among other things emotions, motivation, and 
memory.”437  It generates the feelings which come from inside the organism itself, and which 
are vital to the establishment and maintenance of Self.438  Some of this should ring familiar, 
since much of what we looked at in chapter 6 regarding Jaak Panksepp’s ideas are based in this 
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most primitive part of our brain.  Moving out from the inner circle we come to the second 
aspect of the nested neural hierarchy – the ‘exterosensorimotor system.’  This area – as the 
name implies – deals with how we respond to stimuli from the external environment.  This 
deals with the “mental externalization [i.e. the mental projection of sensations into the 
external environment that are characteristic of the distance receptors such as vision and 
audition] of stimuli away from the body that makes self-object discrimination possible, a 
quality of mind that is critical for the creation of consciousness,” and of a self-other 
understanding.439  Finally we end up with the ‘integrative self system,’ which lies at the 
outermost circle in the nested hierarchy.   This system’s job is to assimilate the previous two 
systems and serves to mediate the internal needs of the organism with that of the external 
environment.  It could be viewed as a ‘convergence zone’ for where these other areas come 
together and integrate.  It is also where abstract aspects of our sense of self emerge.440  This 
relates to self referential, or “self-related functions” [such as] “judgments about self-traits, 
autobiographical memory, self-face recognition, and self-agency.”441  The key to understanding 
the differences between these three systems is to look more closely at what being ‘nested’ 
implies, and by looking at how the three parts of the nested hierarchy communicate with each 
other.   
The brain sciences seem to have shown us that there is no one particular part of the 
brain where the different elements of our consciousness comes together (this is typically 
referred to as the ‘binding problem’).442  So how does one explain the unified mind given its 
unbroken elements?  Feinberg thinks the nested neural hierarchy shows how the brain 
functions like all other biological systems – the entire nested system functions 
interdependently to create conscious experience.  The second circle (the exterosensorimotor 
system) puts constraints on the inner system (the interoself system), and the furthest out 
system (the integrative system) constrains the other two within it.  How would this look in 
practice?  Feinberg considers John Hughlings Jackson’s model of the nervous system as an 
example.  Our nervous system evolved from much simpler and involuntary reflexes in the 
lowest part of the hierarchical system all the way outward to the specialized, voluntary, and 
highest cortical regions of the brain.  Considering motor neurons on this view, Feinberg says: 
“[T]he action neurons at these lower levels of the hierarchy are nested within the higher levels 
of the hierarchy and the purpose of the act provides the constraint of higher levels upon lower 
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levels of the motor hierarchy.”443  This can help explain why we do not experience multiple 
conscious experiences coming from different brain regions, and instead experience our actions 
as unified – because the hierarchies are nested within each other.  Do we understand how the 
communication across the hierarchies occurs?  This is an area in which work is still being done 
and we do not as of yet have a definitive answer, however, Feinberg puts forth the following as 
a possible explanation.  Drawing on the views of such people as Christof Koch, Francis Crick, 
and Gerald Edelman, Feinberg says the mental unification that seems to bind our perceptions 
might occur via synchronized oscillations of firing neurons.  That is, the temporal synchronous 
pattern of the firing neurons throughout the different hierarchical regions would act as the 
constraint that necessarily binds and structures the different hierarchical arrangements in our 
consciousness.  “Thus, a combination of convergent pathways and higher level temporal 
oscillation could provide sufficient integration of neural activity to enable the binding across 
and within hierarchical levels.”444  By analyzing the parts of the nervous system involved in 
unifying consciousness and self, we can see several supportive biological features.  Compared 
to the lower levels, at the highest levels there are integrated abstract patterns where the 
neural activity is centralized.  This at first seems to resemble a non-nested hierarchy, in that we 
seem to see a centralization of neural activity to create the integrated abstract patterns.  
However, these lower levels are still contributing to our conscious experience, and they are 
still represented within our total awareness (through the synchronized oscillations that 
operate across all the hierarchical levels.  This, then, shifts its resemblance to a nested 
hierarchy.  The nested integration amongst the levels may arise from the synchronized 
oscillations (mentioned above), which can bridge communication across the different 
hierarchical levels.  When it comes to the nested neural hierarchy, “it appears that all 
conscious things have this structure and function, all things with this structure/function possess 
consciousness, and no things without this structure are conscious.  Thus this feature may be 
necessary and perhaps sufficient for the creation of consciousness and the self.445  
Do we need to go any further?  Have we found a theory of consciousness that 
accommodates what we’ve looked at?  It moves us one more step closer.  Yet this approach is 
not perfect because it still keeps everything broken apart into different components and there 
is a question of how they all fit together into an assembly.  Our experience – under normal 
circumstances – is unified.  The nested neural hierarchy tries to overcome this deficit by 
nesting structures within each other; and rather than have the components assembled in 
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piecemeal structures, the nested hierarchy pulls things together in a way that more closely 
resembles the unity we find within biological organisms that possess a similar anatomical 
make-up.  But there is still more to say.  We are looking for a theory which encompasses mind, 
body, and world, in a way which can explain how a unified sense of self emerges; so the final 
section of this chapter will bring in the enactive approach to show how this can accommodate 
the neural nested hierarchy view, yet also provide a bridge which we can cross that can lead us 
into new and more expansive territory.  
 
Enactivism and Consciousness 
 In the final chapter of part II (chapter 9), the enactive approach of Giovanna 
Colombetti and Evan Thompson was brought in to help us understand how affects work.  For 
this section we will return to – and expand – that discussion to see how it can fit within a larger 
picture of consciousness. 
Let us look at five key areas of the enactive approach, so that we can see what it 
emphasizes: 
1. Living entities are autonomous agents which can actively generate and maintain 
their own identities.  Because of this they can ‘enact’ or create their own cognitive 
domains.  There is not some purely pre-existing information that sits in the 
environment that is taken in and processed in a passive way – we do not have a 
purely separate domain of an ‘inner’ and ‘outer.’   Meaning is brought forth 
through the continuous process of the living entity being coupled with the 
environment.   
2. The information in our nervous system does not pass through a specific sequence 
of steps that follow a particular process which you find in a strict hierarchical 
system – information is not processed in a computational sense.  Instead, the 
nervous system needs to be viewed as a system capable of actively generating and 
maintaining its own meaningful patterns of activity.  This meaningful activity 
operates in a circular fashion as networks of sensorimotor neurons interact 
together. 
3. Cognition should be viewed as a type of embodied action.  The sensorimotor 
coupling that exists between an “organism and its environment modulates, but 
does not determine, the patterns of neural activity,” and the neural activity in turn 
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informs the sensorimotor coupling.  We are dealing with a self-organized system 
that creates its own meaning. 
4. The world of the cognitive being “is not a prespecified, external realm, 
represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought 
forth by that being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the 
environment.”  This links to phenomenological insights that say there is a 
constitutive relationship between cognition and its object.  Put another way, the 
world of the cognitive being “is conditioned by that being’s form or structure.”  
This type of ‘constitution’ is not something apparent to us in our everyday life, but 
requires a scientific and phenomenological investigation to reveal. 
5. Experience is of central importance to any understanding we are to have of the 
mind.  This requires that insights from cognitive science and phenomenology are 
both drawn upon in a complementary fashion and used to inform each other.  
“[E]xperience is not an epiphenomenal side issue, but central to any 
understanding of the mind” and the self.446 
Giovanna Colombetti and Evan Thompson summarize these ideas as follows: 
“[A]ccording to the enactive approach, the human mind is embodied in our 
entire organism and embedded in the world, and hence is not reducible to structures 
inside the head.  Meaning and experience are created by, or enacted through, the 
continuous reciprocal interaction of the brain, the body, and the world.”447 
We can take these five key ideas which are interwoven together in web-like form, and pick out 
three distinctive ‘modes of bodily activity’ which make up the enactive approach, and which 
we will see further on contributing to the development of the Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self (PEMS): (i) self-regulation; (ii) sensorimotor coupling; and (iii) intersubjective 
interaction.448  
An enactive approach which draws on the theory of nested neural hierarchies that 
Feinberg has proposed gives us several important benefits when trying to understand basic 
consciousness. 
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First, our exploration of the PEMS showed us that there seems to be a prereflective 
aspect to our existence.  In part I this was referred to as the prenoetic corporeal-kinetic 
patterning (CKP), of which an example would be the way in which we maintain posture while 
sitting or standing, or the means by which we maintain balance while walking along the 
pavement or running across a field.  The exploration of infant development showed how this 
emerged in our earliest development.  Second, in part II, prenoetic consciousness 
encompassed part of the homeostatic equilibrium that underlies our emotional life in Jaak 
Panksepp’s theory of affects.  This involved the affects which accompanied instinctual 
emotional behaviours.  In our attempt to maintain homeostatic equilibrium of our body and 
deal with external stimuli, the human animal has developed certain ‘pre-propositional gifts of 
nature’ that have created seven primal emotional action dynamics that form the basis for our 
higher-order emotional development.  Finally, in this chapter, the subpersonal and 
prereflective consciousness appeared – and was labelled – as ‘system 1’ under the dual-
process theory of consciousness, and the ‘interoself system’ (and perhaps the 
‘exterosensorimotor system’) under the nested neural hierarchy theory.  This type of 
prereflective self-regulation fits nicely into the enactive approach which states that living 
agents actively generate and maintain their own identities (see point 1 on the enactive 
approach).  Through in part something like synchronous neural oscillations, we have a bridging 
between the different hierarchical levels – everything works together interdependently to 
create conscious experience.  This can explain why although there are always many things 
going on in us internally and externally, we always possess a unified, meaningful, experience.  
So, with systems 1 & 2, and then with the nested neural hierarchies, we have seen 
explanations of some of the mechanisms that fill in the gaps in explaining how the 
phenomenological sense of self exists and develops.  The dual-process theories laid out a 
framework in which to roughly understand the reflective and prereflective aspects of 
consciousness, but didn’t integrate them well enough in a dynamic and enactive way.  
Feinberg’s nested hierarchy integrated the levels much better, but it still didn’t emphasize the 
sensorimotor aspect as much as the PEMS approach wants. However, his theory does include 
dynamic interaction and self-organization.  So although the nested hierarchy view is not a fully 
enactive account, it was another step towards it by giving us a greater understanding of how 
mental unity can be arrived at.  For a PEMS account, we can draw upon the points we learned 
in part I and part II and integrate them with what we’ve seen here.  Infant development (with 
their structural coupling with the environment), as well as Panksepp’s primal affects (which are 
sensorimotor based and associated with environmental coupling), can be integrated with 
elements of Feinberg’s nested hierarchy to solve this problem; by doing so we get a clearer 
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understanding of how the reflective and prereflective elements relate and create a unified 
consciousness and sense of self.  
Second, our look at the self has shown that there is something which is a personal or 
reflective aspect of our experience and existence.  In part I this appeared as corporeal-kinetic 
intentionality (CKI), where we can find an example in how we attend to some part of our body 
when focusing on a task, such as purposely trying to pick up a hot mug of coffee.  In part II 
reflective aspects of experience appeared as some of the cognitive appraisal theories we 
looked at.  For example, upon seeing a picture of a deceased loved one, I might unconsciously 
develop a feeling of sadness, but we can then reflect on this emotion and thus accentuate the 
feeling of sorrow.  In this chapter the reflective aspect of our experience appeared as ‘system 
2’ under the dual-process theory, and as the ‘integrative self system’ under the nested neural 
hierarchy theory.  This also fits nicely into the enactive approach, since it shows how these 
different self-making CKP and CKI structures can influence each other, but it is not simply one 
of dominance or control of a higher level over a lower level, instead it allows for the nuances 
we find in a vast number of systems, and how a constant interaction between these different 
systems – perhaps through synchronized oscillations – work together in a continual process 
generating and maintaining in a circular fashion meaningful patterns of autonomous activity 
(see points 1 and 2 on the enactive approach).   
When we go about our daily life there is a unity to our experience.  We experience an 
entire situation, not just fragments or isolated components.  It is true that occasionally we look 
at something that is happening to us in an isolated way, or we feel detached from the world 
(such as depression); in extreme cases these types of detachments can even become 
pathological.  But this is the exception, not the rule of common experience.  The important 
thing to remember is that basic, self-regulating enactive systems organize and consistently 
maintain a core self.  This problem has been largely ignored by those studying the self.  The 
problem with how this issue has been traditionally looked at is to emphasize too strongly a 
division between one part of the brain and another, or between internal body and external 
world.  What the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (PEMS) gives us is a way to see that 
our self-making bodily and affective elements are not that fractured or simple to break apart.  
The PEMS demonstrates how dynamic interactions generate meaning and unity across systems 
and levels.  This chapter has looked at several theories of consciousness that have step by step 
contributed to an increase in our understanding of how the creation, maintenance and 
meaningful unity of the self might occur.  
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Chapter 11: The Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self: the Changing Self as Unity 
 
“[T]here is a minimal sense of self present whenever there is self-awareness.  Self-
awareness is there not only when I realize that I am perceiving…but whenever I am 
acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness…In other 
words, pre-reflective self-awareness and a minimal sense of self are integral parts 
of our experiential life."449 
 
In this final chapter we will quickly summarize the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal 
Self and then contrast it with three other competing theories: Daniel Dennett's idea that the 
self is a fictional centre of narrative gravity; Thomas Metzinger's Phenomenal Self Model; and 
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch's own enactive theory of the self.  The 
goal is to get a grasp of the big picture of what has been argued for with the 
Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (PEMS), and demonstrate how the PEMS theory 
addresses some of the issues that show up with these other views.   
 
Phenomenology and Enactivism 
We saw in the Introduction that phenomenology explores the structure of our 
experience.  It states that there needs to be an integration of self and experience.450  There is 
an immediate experiential reality to our conscious life that exists in its first-person givenness.  
This minimal self in its experiential givenness, is the most minimal condition for there to be a 
self at all.  The minimal self is both developmentally and causally necessary (but not sufficient) 
for any more sophisticated notion of self to exist.  Nothing that lacks these dimensions can be 
called a self.  We have sought this minimal selfhood – in Merleau-Pontian fashion – with the 
integration of body and environment.  As we saw from a quote from Merleau-Ponty in the 
Introduction: 
“In so far as I inhabit a ‘physical world,’ in which consistent ‘stimuli’ and typical 
situations recur...my life is made up of rhythms which have not their reason in what I 
have chosen to be, but their conditions in the humdrum setting which is mine.  Thus 
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there appears round our personal existence a margin of almost impersonal existence, 
which can be practically taken for granted, and which I rely on to keep me alive.”451 
According to the phenomenological notion of self, our experiences are not to be viewed as 
objects, but rather as what provides us with access to objects. This access to objects is 
accompanied by a sense of mineness.  This built-in, primitive, self-referential sense of mineness 
came to our attention time and again during the development of this project through infant 
development studies and ‘existential feelings.’  The ‘rhythms’ of life that Merleau-Ponty speaks 
are tied to the conditions of our everyday life.  This could be seen in the most basic 
interactions between infant and caregiver, as well as our most basic bodily movements as we 
engage in primal affective behaviour.  It is through these interactions between our self with 
others and the environment that Merleau-Ponty’s ‘almost impersonal existence’ is manifested 
as the minimal self.  It is this ‘almost impersonal existence’ which is largely taken for granted 
by us, yet is a vital pre-reflective element of the minimal self. 
Enactivism (along with the embedded, embodied, and extended views of cognition), is 
an approach to understanding the mind that focuses on the situated context in which the 
organism finds itself.  Broadly speaking, enactivism says that mental processes are constituted 
by a continuous, mutual, interaction of (i) neural processes in the brain, (ii) actions performed 
by the organism in an environment, and (iii) ways in which the environment acts on the 
organism.  Enactivism says that these types of activities not only generate or maintain 
themselves, but more than that, they enact (or bring forth) cognitive domains with meaningful 
patterns of activity.452  It is an approach which shows not only how different perceptual, 
biological, and situated ecological processes are self-maintained and generated, but how 
something new can emerge from these activities. 
Like phenomenology, enactivism has been influenced by figures such as Merleau-
Ponty and Heidegger, and just as Shaun Gallagher’s views were used earlier to support the 
phenomenological aspect of a minimal self, his views also can be used (in part) to support an 
enactive perspective.  What has been done in this project is to take enactivism and apply it to 
the idea of a minimal self, and from that perspective we’ve focused on the following idea: that 
the minimal self is based on the relational dynamic of an individual’s sensorimotor interaction 
with the environment, and how this generates a sense of mineness – a dynamic form of vitality 
– which creates a basic element of identity and provides a foundation for expanded awareness 
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and self expansion (with the expanded self referred to here being the more robust narrative 
self).  This constant dynamic patterning modulates the development of the experiencing self, 
and over time different patterns are laid down which provide some foundation for later 
narratives to arise as a reflective and narrative self emerges.  It is through movement at its 
most basic level that self and subjectivity are built from the bottom up.  Dynamic patterning 
and experiential mineness together show why phenomenology and enactivism are so closely 
linked in this process.  The case studies we looked at went a long way in pulling together these 
ideas and giving them substance. 
 
Types of Selves: the PEMS response to other notions of self 
In the introduction we had a brief overview of various notions of self which included 
the idea that the self was a type of narrative, and a no-self view based in neuro biology.  Let us 
consider first the narrative notion of self.  The narrative self can be looked at from several 
perspectives.  One position – the hermeneutical position – says that as long as you are living 
you cannot establish a fixed or unchangeable self (or self-understanding).  The self is not a 
thing; a self under this viewpoint is something based in self-comprehension, self-knowledge, or 
interpretation.453  You cannot be a self on your own, you only come to know who you are in 
participation with others: “selfhood...implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one 
cannot be thought of without the other.”454  This self is narrative based: “[w]ho we are 
depends on the stories told about us, both by ourselves and by others.”455  Social 
constructivists argue along similar lines: selves emerge from our social interactions.  The self is 
to be seen as more of a social phenomenon – a theoretical concept which we model on a 
public concept of what a person is.  Their basic thesis is that the private or personal sense of 
identity we have, once it is made available to the members of our culture, ends up becoming 
the myth that there is such a thing as the self.456  The self is a culture-relative social 
phenomenon.  According to a hermeneutical narrative notion of self, then, there is no self 
which is fixed or unchangeable, instead the self is something constituted by the stories told 
about us by ourselves and others.457  The PEMS perspective agrees with the idea that the self is 
not unchanging and static, but states that all the narrative elements emerge from the 
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corporeal-kinetic, kinaesthetic and bodily-affective elements that have been generated, and 
even once the narrative elements emerge, the corporeal-kinetic and affective elements (the 
dynamic forms of vitality) continue to play a role because of the constant existence of a brain-
body-environment of relational engagement which allows new elements of a generated self to 
be enacted or brought forth as new patterns of meaningful activity emerge.   
Evidence for this was found in chapter 1 when we looked at the pre-narrative self of 
the infant.  The infant generates and maintains relationships between itself and its caregiver 
though sensorimotor engagement.  We can recall Daniel Stern's four different stages of self 
which show up during the first three years of life.  A minimal self is generated and maintained, 
yet new elements are enacted and brought forth through these vitality dynamics which lead to 
a narrative self, but a narrative self which is still intricately linked with a minimal self attuned 
to the vitality dynamics of interaction.  There was further evidence presented in our 
discussions of gestures in chapter 5 when we saw that gestures and bodily expression precede 
– and even influence – the development of verbal language.  Gestures are an important 
element of self expression, not just at the narrative level, but at the minimal level.  And we 
saw demonstrated by reference to Damasio and Panksepp in chapters 6 and 7 that affects are 
bodily based and emerge and develop – at least initially, and to some degree continually – in a 
largely pre-reflective, minimal, way as, for example, primal affective behaviour.  Perhaps the 
best way in which this view of the Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self can be understood 
is by showing how it – along with the evidence that supports it – stands up to other 
approaches to minimal selfhood (and the relationship between the minimal self and narrative 
self).  What other views of selfhood exist and what might need to be re-thought in regards to 
them? 
 
A Critique of Daniel Dennett's Minimal Self and Centre of Narrative Gravity 
One notion of narrative self that was introduced briefly in the introduction was a 
biologically based one put forward by Daniel Dennett.  He describes the self as a story that is 
‘told’ by the physical organism based on its biological need for self-preservation.458  He does 
allow for a minimal self, but for him it is not an actual ‘thing’ but instead something abstract 
that the organism does “to distinguish, control, and preserve portions of the world,” it is “an 
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organization that thereby creates and maintains boundaries.”459  The last part of his statement 
is enactive-friendly, so we will have to consider that a bit more closely.  But before we do so, 
let us get a more detailed look at what Dennett is trying to say. 
Dennett begins by stating that "[t]he original distinction between self and other is a 
deep biological principle; one might say that it is the deepest principle, for biology begins in 
self-preservation."460  So far his theory and the PEMS are in complete agreement, for you 
might remember from chapter 6 that Jaak Panksepp put forth seven primal, basic affects that 
are to be found in all animals (they were seeking, fear, rage, lust, care, panic, and play).  Self 
preservation would fit in some of these categories (such as, perhaps, fear, or panic).  Panksepp 
also had the idea of a SELF (which stands for Simple Ego-type Life Form) as being one of the 
most basic elements of the organism trying to maintain its homeostasis.   
The similarity between Dennett’s account and PEMS, however, becomes more 
complicated with what Dennett says next:   
"So a minimal self is not a thing inside a lobster or a lark, and it is not the 
'whole lobster' or 'whole lark' either; it is something abstract which amounts 
just to the existence of an organization which tends to distinguish, control, and 
preserve portions of the world, an organization that thereby creates and 
maintains boundaries [...] You are what you control and care for [...] The 
boundaries of the minimal self are not only permeable...but flexible as well."461 
What can we make of this?  First we can agree with the latter part of this quote, where 
Dennett talks about distinguishing, controlling and preserving portions of the world and 
creating and maintaining boundaries which are flexible.  However, a difficulty arises when he 
says that 'a minimal self is not a thing inside' nor the whole organism as a whole, 'it is 
something abstract.'  As we saw with PEMS, the minimal self is the fully embodied organism.  It 
also is not something 'abstract,' but in fact something real based on a relational engagement 
between the organism and environment.  There is more that needs to be said regarding this, 
but let us move on a bit further for the moment to build up a larger understanding of 
Dennett's view and we'll revisit this again afterward. 
Dennett's next step is a jump from something biological and minimal to something 
social and language based: "We...are almost constantly engaged in presenting ourselves to 
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others, and to ourselves, and hence representing ourselves – in language and gesture."462  Here 
I think Dennett doesn't demarcate well enough between a minimal self and a narrative self; he 
has unwittingly passed from minimal self to narrative self, conflating the two.  What is a 
‘minimal’ self for Dennett, and how does it differ from something more than that (what he 
calls our ‘selfy self’)?  This issue is made even more explicit when he says:  
"Our human environment contains not just food and shelter, enemies to fight 
or flee and conspecifics with whom to mate, but words, words, words.  These 
words are potent elements of our environment that we readily incorporate, 
ingesting and extruding them, weaving them like spider webs into self-
protective strings of narrative.  Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-
control, and self-definition is not building dams or spinning webs, but telling 
stories...about who we are...we...do not consciously and deliberately figure 
out what narratives to tell and how to tell them...our  human consciousness, 
and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their source."463   
It should be very clear from this passage that Dennett moves from humans seeking food and 
reproductive partners to stringing together narratives as if they are all of equal status as the 
biological animal that we are.  But how does this compare with the data we’ve looked at in 
support of PEMS?  Several terms need to be looked at here to see how Dennett is using them.  
First we have the idea of the self being 'abstract' (mentioned earlier).  Then we have the 
mention of gesture, language and storytelling, but this is not the hermeneutical variety of an 
actual verbal or spoken narrative that is given, rather, this is a narrative that we are not 
conscious of and do not deliberate upon.  The idea that he is expressing here is not that far 
from PEMS.  PEMS tells us that the primal seven emotions do affect our responses to 
ourselves, others, and the environment.  Ratcliffe's 'existential feelings' showed that our 
moods alter the way in which we interpret our place in the world, what possibilities we think 
exist for a course of action, and what things and actions we place emphasis and focus on.  So 
there are some kinds of 'interpretation' which do occur that we are not conscious of (or are 
pre-reflective), but should we call this a 'narrative,' or 'storytelling'?  Think back to one of our 
examples from chapter 6.  There we considered a scenario where we were walking through the 
woods and hear a branch break off nearby startling us.  This occurrence causes our heart to 
beat faster and we leap to the side, perhaps thinking it might be a large bear, only to discover 
it was the wind that caused an old and rotten branch to fall to the ground.  In this particular 
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case we, as a biological organism, created a narrative or story of sorts ('watch out, a bear is 
coming!') that is based on a quick response to a couple of the primal affects (fear and panic).  
So far, then, what we have with Dennett seems to be a view compatible with PEMS, but using 
questionable terminology to convey it.  The next step, however, brings the problem into the 
light.   
Dennett says that the "streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single source," they 
seem to be about a single, unified agent, this is what he calls the 'center of narrative gravity.'  
"This is yet another abstraction[, an] attractor of properties."464  Dennett says that we as 
human beings need some inner figurehead or 'Head of Mind.'  In the course of our normal 
development we are confronted and become acquainted with many experiences which 
provide us many possibilities for selfhood – we don't originally have a 'Head of Mind.'  But over 
time we unconsciously create more ideal fictional selves and then 'elect' one of them as our 
Head of Mind.  This 'spokesperson' for the person is based on the language-producing systems 
within our brain - "what 'I' (my self) thinks is what 'I' (my language apparatus says)."465  It is at 
this point where the conflation should now be clear.  Dennett is giving the language parts of 
the brain special privilege.  So here we see that his idea of self is a narrative self.  He states it is 
the biological organism engaged in self-preservation which creates (unconsciously) the self, 
but the actual creator of the self is based in the 'language apparatus.'  How does PEMS 
respond?  From what we saw in chapter 1, the infant initially develops identity through 
movement, bodily interaction, and affect attunement.  Chapter 5 showed that in children as 
well as in deaf and blind adults, language development is based in gesture and movement.  
And chapter 6 showed that feelings and emotions have their basis in movement as well, and 
that both are pre-linguistic in origin.  If we are to view this selfhood as based on the organism’s 
self-preservation, then basing it in language-based brain systems would seem to be a mistake – 
we were engaged in biological self preservation before we had language.  This is not to say 
that language may not play a role, for PEMS argues for systems that are in constant, mutual 
interactions that generate and maintain themselves, one or more of which may involve 
language.  But if what we are dealing with is something produced at the level of biological self-
preservation, then the language apparatus doesn't come into its own until later in 
development.  So let us reconsider our conclusion from the previous paragraph.  If I heard a 
branch snap, I jumped, felt my heart rate increase, and thought to myself ('Bear!'), this is only 
something that my adult - language developed - self would say.  If a small child just at the 
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beginning of its language use were to experience this, they may think something much simpler 
and vague like 'monster', or 'forest creature,' since they have not experienced other animals, 
or learned the words or expressions to describe it.  If we are dealing with a pre-linguistic child, 
then the response may rely on imagery brought to their mind of something from their dreams, 
pictures in a storybook, a costumed person at a birthday party, or carnival, paintings, photos, 
or something from the television.  And this response can still be tied-in with one of Panksepp’s 
pre-linguistic primal affects such as ‘fear’ or ‘panic.’ 
But we are not yet done; there is one other area where we can criticize Dennett's view 
of self.  Dennett's way of illustrating his 'center of narrative gravity,' is to look at Multiple 
Personality Disorder (MPD; what is now called Dissociative Identity Disorder, or DID).  DID 
occurs in people who have suffered from severe physical or sexual trauma.  It is believed that 
as a way of protecting themselves from the horrors of the abuse, the person sets up a barrier 
or boundary, so that the horror 'doesn't happen to them.'  The result is that their self 'leaves' 
and either leaves no-one in its place, or else creates 'another self' (or selves) that are better 
able to deal with the physical abuse. These other selves are referred to as 'alters'.466  What 
makes one alter different from another is in their personality and emotional makeup.  If the 
original self was shy, soft spoken and caring, the alter may be loud, out spoken and un-feeling.  
The alters may also have very different value systems.  One other thing we need to keep in 
mind with DID is the relationship the alters have with each other.  Some are aware of the other 
'selves' and can even access their memories.  Sometimes the alters can do more and actually 
observe when another alter is in control of the body.  And yet other times the alters are 
completely oblivious to there being other 'selves' (they just think that they are the self while 
they are in control of the body and may just dimly be aware that there are 'empty spots' in 
their memory and actions).467  It is this insight which leads us to the second problem of 
Dennett in regards to his fictional/narrative self theory.  
Think back to our discussion of chapter 4, where we looked at bodily ownership and 
bodily agency.  A robust self (which we can think of as having a developed minimal self and 
narrative self), has a sense of bodily ownership and bodily agency.  What about an alter?  Let 
us assume for the moment that an alter is a self.468  When one alter takes over from another, 
bodily agency has changed, but has bodily ownership changed?  From the PEMS perspective, 
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we can argue that the different alters we see may simply be the reflection of the underlying 
trauma and breakdown of their bodily unity.  During physical or sexual abuse, the abuse 
victims have lost some elements of agency over their body, and since the victims don't want 
the sense of bodily ownership while they are experiencing physical or sexual abuse, they 
attempt to create a distance from the trauma, and this gets reflected at the level of 
personality.  We in effect are witnessing bodily agents with only sporadic bodily ownership.  
Rather than viewing this from a language-based perspective, it might be illuminating to 
consider this from a bodily PEMS perspective, which would say that the narrative self alters we 
encounter are bodily based and not linguistically based.  That is, PEMS would say that the 
splintering of a victim’s personality at a ‘narrative’ self level is a higher level reflection of the 
split of bodily ownership/agency which lies underneath.  
Consider the following hypothetical scenario.  We have Susan, who is the original self, 
and Katy, who is the alter; they may swap back and forth as agents of the body, but which of 
them owns the body?   If Susan's body is being physically abused, then there is bodily strain 
and pain; and if her narrative self has developed to some degree, it is understandable from a 
PEMS perspective that this bodily trauma will get reflected – in part – at the (higher) narrative 
level.  Susan may be shy, introverted and caring, and she may move about in a way which we 
might consider 'closed,' or non-expressive; whereas Katy is loud, out-spoken, un-feeling, and 
moves about in a very 'open' and expressive way.  PEMS has shown that bodily movement is 
essential to self development.  So if we have a case where Susan, the non-expressive introvert 
is being frequently restrained by her abuser, then perhaps the Katy alter – who is very open 
and expressive – is in part a bodily reaction to this physical trauma.  A PEMS perspective might 
look at this situation and rather than focus just on the alter at a psychological, language-based 
narrative level, look below to see if there is not a minimal bodily perspective worth exploring 
to provide us with a different insight or understanding of this trauma.  We can ask the 
following: has the alternate psychological personality created a new bodily expression, or, is it 
possible that the change in bodily response and expression helps create the narrative 
personality which is expressed and encountered?  A PEMS approach would want to look at this 
body/mind relation more closely from a perspective of multi-directional modulation, and see 
what is doing the generating and maintaining of different selves.  
We need to keep in mind this creation of multiple alters is occurring in individuals who 
have already developed a narrative self (Stern identified the narrative self as emerging after 
age 3, and DID patients are older than this), and we can see that the older the victims are – 
and the deeper they've moved into mature adulthood – the greater in linguistic development 
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and richness the personality their alters have.  The younger they are, the less language-based 
skills they are able to rely upon, since they haven't yet emerged, thus, there is a much greater 
role for bodily movement and affects, and it is these much more basic form of vitality 
dynamics that should be taken into account in assessing this scenario.  Thus, Dennett’s reliance 
on DID as evidence for his ‘center of narrative gravity,’ is an example which emphasizes too 
much the narrative aspects of self, while neglecting the minimal bodily aspects of self.  He has 
blurred the contribution of a minimal, bodily self, and a narrative self, as well as getting their 
character wrong. 
So before moving to our next case (Thomas Metzinger's 'No-Self' view), let us 
summarize the criticism of Dennett.  First, Dennett says that our "minimal proclivity to 
distinguish self from other in order to protect oneself is the biological self, and even such a 
simple self is not a concrete thing but just an abstraction, a principle of organization.  
Moreover the boundaries of a biological self are porous and indefinite."469  We agreed that this 
ability to distinguish self from other because of protection is a biological self, but with the idea 
of an abstraction Dennett is sneaking in a psychological, language-based bias.  This move can 
be seen in the phrases "Out of its brain it spins a web of words and deeds, and, like the other 
creatures, it doesn't have to know what it's doing;" and "selves are...artifacts of the social 
processes that create us [where stability is given to it] by the web of beliefs that constitute it, 
and when those beliefs lapse, it lapses."470  Although we can agree that language use is 
important for human beings and must play a role at some level, Dennett has in effect made 
part of the narrative self part of our more basic biological self, which we have seen is based in 
movement and affect rather than language.  Making this shift from the minimal level to the 
narrative level without properly understanding the boundaries or relationship between the 
two, leads to complications and confusions with the example he used (DID).  When dealing 
with the case of Dissociative Identity Disorder, there were problems of understanding the 
relationship between bodily ownership and bodily agency, and the confusion stems in part 
from the fact that he is focusing on narrative and neglecting a minimal or bodily perspective.  
We also saw how a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self perspective might give us a new 
approach in order to understand this disorder.  The next perspective we will look at also deals 
with certain pathological cases. 
 
                                                          
469
 Dennett, Daniel.  Consciousness Explained.  (MA: Back Bay Books), 414 (emphasis original). 
470
 Dennett.  Consciousness Explained.  (MA: Back Bay Books), 416, 423. 
188 
 
A Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM) 
In the introduction we briefly scrutinized a no-self position that Thomas Metzinger 
argues for.  According to his Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM) view, the conscious model that a 
person has is a simulation which is created in the brain.  Most importantly for our view, 
however, is that he thinks our experience “is not reality itself but an image of reality."471  Let us 
take a closer look at Metzinger's PSM account so that we can see the difficulties with it. 
For Metzinger biological organisms exist, but a biological organism cannot be 
considered a self.  What they have are simply complex brain states.  What sets human 
consciousness apart from most other animal consciousness, is that our consciousness creates a 
type of ‘inwardness’ (“the ability to turn the first-person perspective inward, to explore our 
emotional states and attend to our cognitive processes.”)472  For us as humans our brain states 
are so complex that we don't recognize that what we are experiencing is simply a world-
simulation that these brain states produce.  The image we have of ourselves in the world 
(which includes our body, psychological states and our temporal relationships to other beings) 
are all part of this brain state simulation.  The result is that the self we think we have is simply 
the content of an inner image (the PSM).  From the process of placing this self-model inside a 
world-model a centre-point is created.  The centre-point of this process is the Ego which we 
think of as our self.473   
This view of Metzinger’s gives us a different view of the self from what we've looked 
at.  His PSM states that there is not a real bodily or affective self which we experience, rather 
what exists are just phenomenal selves (that is, selves that are the properties of complex 
representational processes within physical systems).474  Metzinger’s PSM view can be 
summarized in the following points: 
1. Things such as selves do not exist in the world. “Nobody ever was or had a self.” 
2. “All that ever existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as 
models.” 
3. “The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process.”  The self-model is transparent: 
you don’t see this transparent self – you see with it. 
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4. “Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective 
are...representational phenomena.” 
5. The PSM position is representationalist and functionalist in how it analyzes 
conscious experience.475 
What should we make of this?  Dan Zahavi points out that Metzinger seems to rely on 
a classical view of the self as some "mysteriously unchanging essence" which is a "process-
independent...substance that could exist all by itself."476  Since Metzinger denies this 
conception of self (i.e. that it is an independent substance), according to Zahavi, he concludes 
that there are no such things as selves.  In what we’ve just looked at, Zahavi’s point seems to 
be supported.  Points 1 and 3 state that there have never been selves that have been ‘things.’  
So the first issue we’ve identified is that Metzinger interprets the self as some unchanging 
thing. 
On the other hand, Metzinger says that his PSM is a process of complex 
representations within physical systems.  At first this would seem consistent with the 
Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self, for as we've seen, PEMS is based in the dynamic 
processes of the biological organism in its situated and contextual involvement in the world 
and the entities which it encounters.  PEMS is based in a processual metaphysics.  But here is 
where PSM and PEMS part ways, for instead of these processes giving us some detached 
simulation of the world, PEMS argues that the first-personal 'givenness' and 'mineness' which 
we experience is very real indeed (here is where we can look back to chapter 8 and our 
examination of Ratcliffe's existential 'feelings of being' and his examination and emphasis on 
the lived, real, structure of experience; or in chapter 1, the immediate and real affect 
attunement between infant and caregiver).  PEMS has tried to demonstrate through our look 
at infant development and interaction, and Ratcliffe's 'existential feelings,' that the self that is 
being referred to is, to use Zahavi's words: "not something standing beyond or opposed to the 
stream of experiences, rather it is a feature or function of their givenness.  It is the invariant 
dimension of first-personal givenness in the multitude of changing experiences."477  The 
question comes down to asking 'how do we articulate the sense of being someone?'  Zahavi 
states "The phenomenologists would argue that the self is real if it has experiential reality, and 
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that the validity of our account of the self is to be measured by its ability to be faithful to 
experience, by its ability to capture and articulate (invariant) experiential structures."478   
How might Metzinger respond, and what other ideas can he draw upon?  What we will 
look at now is Metzinger's use of bodily ownership.  A sense of ownership is a type of 
immediate or automatic bodily self-attribution that pulls together our conscious content into 
what we experience as our self.  Metzinger says that the model we have of our bodily self is 
the result of a multisensory integration of processes, the bodily self-model emerges from these 
automatic and subpersonal processes, which bind together these various features, achieving a 
type of coherence; these processes include background emotions.  This coherence creates a 
type of ‘body constancy’ – our bodily ownership.479  This bodily ownership can even extend 
outward with objects we use (think of a blind person’s cane – it becomes in part an extension 
of their body).  There is much to agree with here from a PEMS perspective, yet from all this 
Metzinger states that what we have is a bodily self model, an “integrated representation of the 
organism as a whole, in the brain.”480  Why a model?  And what can we make of his talk of 
representations?  Representations imply a copy of something that has been presented to us (a 
re-presentation).  This presents problems with trying to tie together the idea of a continuous 
series of dynamic processes with the idea of some copy or representation of what is 
happening.  If we are engaged in a cauldron of dynamic and complex interactions within the 
brain, body, and environment, what is being represented?  The idea of representation implies 
a type of mirroring of reality (or, as Metzinger clearly states – a model or simulation of reality).  
Metzinger’s representations cut the organism off from the world. Because of this issue, PEMS 
is sceptical of representation, since PEMS gives primacy to the immediacy, real-time fluidity of 
our movement, actions, and affective states, which are sensitive to our current contextual 
situation.  That is not to say that no representational view of any kind can be accepted, 
however, for Andy Clark and Michael Wheeler have spoken of ‘action-oriented 
representations.’  The idea here, from Wheeler’s summary of Clark, is “that the 
representations concerned emerge as being both encodings of how the world is and, 
simultaneously, specifications for appropriate actions.”  Wheeler takes this further by saying: 
“If we think about the functions that action-oriented representations perform within the 
overall perception-action cycle, then of course those structures will be causally correlated both 
with how the world is on the input side and with the actions generated on the output side.”481  
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For Wheeler, then, action-oriented representations “are poised between mirroring and 
control.”482  What do action-oriented representations do, then?  They are based on the idea 
that “how the world is is itself encoded in terms of possibilities for action.”483  Under this 
interpretation, we are dealing not with a representational knowledge that the environment is 
a certain way, but how we deal with the specific contextual situation in which we find 
ourselves.484  PEMS argues for an understanding of the organism as engaged in a real-time, 
direct, coupled manner with the world.  So although PEMS is sceptical of representation, a 
Clark-Wheeler approach is workable within a PEMS scheme as a means of revealing 
opportunities for how we might interact with the world.  So Metzinger’s view of the bodily self 
model as an integration of representations, he neglects important insights of how an organism 
engages in immediate, real-time, direct, coupling with the world that allows for possibilities for 
action.   
We need to return to Metzinger’s idea of the self as a ‘simulation’ or ‘model.’  What is 
most fundamental to selfhood?  Metzinger wonders whether we will still have an Ego if we 
take away thinking, feeling, and autobiographical memory.   To answer this question he 
demarcates between a ‘bodily’ self and a ‘seeing’ self.  The first is represented phenomenally 
as an inhabitant in space, and the latter is an “extensionless point.”485  This further clarifies the 
difference between PSM and PEMS.  According to PEMS, Metzinger is separating the 
phenomenological perspective from the body’s location.  The PEMS approach has tried to 
show that they are inseparable – the bodily self is the perspective of itself and the world in 
their dynamic interaction and possibilities.  Metzinger says that “Emotions, will, and thoughts 
are not necessary for the fundamental sense of selfhood.”486  PEMS disagrees.  PEMS has 
shown that emotions (along with feelings and moods) are an essential feature of the minimal 
self, both from an evolutionary perspective (Panksepp), from a phenomenological perspective 
(Ratcliffe), and developmentally (Stern and Trevarthen).  PEMS also says ‘will’ is important.  
We saw with our look at the difficulties of breaking body schema/corporeal-kinetic patterning 
from body image/corporeal-kinetic intentionality, and bodily ownership from bodily agency 
the overlap that exists.  Then there was the difficult relationship we saw between system 1 
and system 2 as a model for consciousness, deciding that a nested neural hierarchy – and later 
an enactivist perspective – better explained the operation of will and thought and how they 
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relate to each other.  And phenomenologically we saw that will or intentionality was an 
element of our minimal self as we understood and felt the world as one of possibilities 
(Ratcliffe; as well as our discussion on depression). 
Metzinger thinks the essence of selfhood is that “we must have a Now, plus a spatial 
frame of reference, and a transparent body-model.  Then we need a visual (or auditory) 
perspective originating within the body volume, a center of projection embedded in the 
volume of the body...It is the step from selfhood-as-embodiment to selfhood-as-
subjectivity.”487  All this seems to be both over-complicating the matter and setting up artificial 
distinctions where none exist.  It is fair to say that we have a body-model of sorts at the level 
of the corporeal-kinetic intentionality (CKI), although the idea of a ‘model’ at this level would 
still not fit with what Metzinger is advocating (i.e. that the self at this level is a ‘simulation’), for 
it is still based in – and continually being modulated by – corporeal-kinetic patterning (CKP).  
How is a simulation supposed to occur when the supposed simulated model is engaged in real-
time modulation and influence with the CKP?  At the level of CKI there can be simulation and 
representation, but at the level of CKP there isn’t pure simulation going on, and it is 
questionable that there is representation going on as well (at best there would be action-
oriented representation, and any simulation going on would be some of the emulator sub-
systems within the CKP, not the CKP itself).488  A spatial, visual and auditory frame of reference 
does originate within the body, but it is the lived, perspectival, dynamic body.  Projection 
occurs at the bodily level where we are engaged in a dynamic, direct, interaction with the 
world.  Our selfhood-as-embodied and selfhood-as-subjectivity overlap from the very 
beginning, indeed, one might as well say that embodied selfhood is selfhood as subjectivity.  
Let us go back to a specific Zahavian point (which PEMS would support): Metzinger thinks “Our 
self experience, our primitive pre-reflective feeling of conscious selfhood is never truthful in 
that it does not correspond to any single entity inside or outside of the self-representing 
system.”489  Metzinger says that a phenomenal experience while in a dream state is an offline 
hallucination, yet even a phenomenal experience during our waking state “is an online 
hallucination.”490  But as Zahavi then goes on to say “why should the reality of the self depend 
upon whether it faithfully mirrors either subpersonal mechanisms or external (mind 
independent) entities?  If we were wholeheartedly to endorse such a restrictive metaphysical 
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principle, we would declare the entire life-world we live in, and know and care about, 
illusory.”491  I will draw on Zahavi for one final thought on Metzinger’s PSM.  If Metzinger’s 
“phenomenal content cannot count as epistemically justified content couldn’t one by using the 
very same arguments show that there is no such ‘thing’ as phenomenal consciousness 
itself?”492  How can we, under Metzinger’s view, identify something as ‘real’ or as genuinely 
existing if everything is to be interpreted as a ‘hallucination’ or a ‘simulation’ – where is the 
reality?  Where is the real? 
 
A Critique of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s Enactive Account of the Self 
There is one other view of the self that is worth considering here, and that is a no-self 
view based in the enactive perspective.  This will be instructive by allowing us to dig deeper 
into a view which shares many aspects with mine, but which ends up arriving at a different 
conclusion in regards to the self.  In 1991 Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch 
published The Embodied Mind.  The book focused on integrating an embodied/enactive 
perspective, along with cognitive science, and Buddhist philosophy, to try to develop a deeper 
understanding of human experience.  For our purposes we will just be focusing on their 
understanding of what the self is (or is not, as the case may be).  We will then move on to 
some more recent developments of this view that have been proposed by Evan Thompson.   
The first thing to notice in Varela et al’s exploration of the self is who they are 
comparing their view with.  They begin with a reference to the views that challenged the naive 
view of the self that claimed there was “an independent, fixed, or unitary self within the world 
of experience.”493  Hume, for example, had searched for a self and had found only particular 
perceptions; and with Kant (as we saw briefly in the introduction), we had these various 
experiences, but there was something which bound them all together: there had to be some 
‘transcendental ego,’ or self, which we needed to postulate to make sense of these various 
experiences, yet this ‘self’ was something which “can never be known to experience.”494  The 
way Varela and company respond to this is to incorporate an approach that was inspired from 
Buddhist teachings, but includes a strong enactive component to strengthen the position.  
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These ‘five aggregates’ of the self are as follows (we will present them quickly now, and then 
lay them out in greater detail and critique them immediately after): 
1. Forms 
2. Feelings/Sensations 
3. Perceptions/Impulses 
4. Dispositional formations 
5. Consciousnesses495 
The first of these aggregates – the Forms – is physically based.  This category makes 
reference to the body and the physical environment.  Here we are dealing with our different 
senses and how these organs respond to/interact with the environment.496  Varela and 
company promote this category as a way of getting away from the abstract and disembodied 
observer that some have thought of as the self.  Varela et al ask the question: “Is our body our 
self?”497  They initially make important points which support the Phenomenological-Enactive 
Minimal Self (PEMS).  The body is the vantage point from where our senses respond to our 
continuous environmental coupling; the body is the focal point of our perceptions.  All this 
agrees with PEMS, but then they ask: “Yet do we really think of the body as the same as the 
self?”498  And it is here that our disagreement begins to emerge.  Varela and company give the 
answer: ‘yes and no.’  They ask what the cells in my body now, have in common with the cells 
in my body seven years ago.  We can think of this as a question of change versus permanence.  
They view this as similar to the ship of Theseus story: if some parts are lost and replaced by 
other parts over time, does the ship still have the same identity?  They argue that the self 
surely cannot be something which depends on our point of view.  A self has to exist in its own 
right in that it has to have some type of ownership involved; we don’t normally speak of 
having a body, but instead refer to our body.499  They also point out that there are many types 
of microorganisms that can be found within our body – are we supposed to consider them as 
part of our bodily ownership as well?500  So the two main questions put forth regarding 
physical form are: (i) does the changeover of parts of our body over time constitute a self, and 
(ii) what of the different types of entities that make up those parts (other organisms)?  One 
other point can be made regarding change, and that is change doesn’t have to be in the 
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organism or thing (as the discussion so far has emphasized with the ship of Theseus and 
microorganisms), the change could be outside of it (i.e. the environment), or a combination of 
both, since the organism and environment are coupled in ways which mutually influence their 
structures.  These examples of change are important to the discussion of ipseity, since PEMS 
argues for an ever changing self that maintains unity over time, whereas these issues could be 
used to support a splintered self view, or even a no-self view.  
The second aggregate of the self is feelings and sensations.  PEMS would agree with 
Varela et al. when they say that “[a]ll experiences have some kind of feeling tone,” but again 
they raise the issue of how [f]eelings change from moment to moment.”501  This once again 
raises for them the problem of how some unifying identity can exist when the underlying 
feelings are always in a state of flux.  They ask: “what/who is it, then, that feelings are 
affecting?”502 
The third of the aggregates is perceptions and impulses which we can recognize or 
identify as distinct.  They see these as having three root impulses (i) passion/desire (toward 
objects that are desirable), (ii) aggression/anger (toward undesirable objects), and (iii) 
delusion/ignoring (which relates to neutral objects).503  Their concern here is how these 
impulses – which lead to the beginnings of actions – have some over-arching ego behind them.   
The fourth aggregate is dispositional formations.  These are the “habitual patterns of 
thinking, feeling, perceiving, and acting.”504  They point out that our habits, motives, and traits 
can change over time – sometimes quite considerably.  So again they ask where is the 
continuity coming from?   
Finally, the fifth aggregate is consciousnesses (note the plural use of the term).  This is 
“the mental experience that goes with the other four aggregates; technically it is the 
experience that comes from the contact of each sense organ with its object (together with the 
feeling, impulse, and habit that is aroused).”505  It is the aggregate which gives us our personal 
sense of there being an experiencer who experiences an object, the means by which they are 
bound together in some relation.506  Varela et al.  are troubled by how the aggregates combine 
to form a self?  Is it a totality of them, or an emergent property from the aggregates?  How 
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does some kind of ‘real’ ego-self appear from these?507  In the end, Varela and company say: 
“We did not fail to find the physical body...Nor did we fail to locate our feelings or 
sensations...We found dispositions...the only thing we didn’t find was a truly existing self or 
ego.  But notice that we did find experience...we just simply could discern there no self, no 
‘I.’”508 
The PEMS responds as follows.  First of all, what the reader should notice is Varela et 
al.’s continuous concern with how a constant flux of feelings, sensations and perceptions 
seems to have no unity, or firm foundation, and then the way in which they make the 
comparison between this chaotic array and a single, unified, ego-type substance (what they 
called the naive view of the self).  Varela and company conclude that when it comes to the self, 
that although they found a body, feelings, sensations, and dispositions, what they failed to find 
was a self.509  PEMS has tried to show that unity emerges through the flux.  Let us revisit the 
five aggregates again and critique them. 
1. (Physical or Material) Forms.  How do we overcome the ‘ship of Theseus’ problem, that 
is, the problem of how change of material over time can still leave us with the same 
identity?  Think back to our discussion in chapter 3 of Brian O’Shaughnessy and his 
idea of ‘origin properties’ that all organisms possess. This can assist us in 
understanding how an ever-changing organism can maintain stability and unity over 
time.  The first of these origin properties is the ‘changeless innate,’ which is a 
particular feature of our body (i.e. fingers, toes, arms, and legs).  These are features for 
all normal-born human beings from the time we are first being formed in the womb.  
Then there is the ‘developmental-acquired,’ which is the natural developmental 
change over time of parts of our body as we progress from infant to adulthood, to old-
age (again, this is in regards to the growth and change of our fingers, arms, and legs).  
Lastly, we have the ‘experience-acquired,’ which has to do with our experience with a 
particular part of our body (think of how we might use our legs or arms differently as 
we decide to engage in a particular sport; or participate in a particular art form, such 
as painting or sculpture).510  Between the three of these a sense of ‘familiarity’ 
emerges that allows us to say that this body is ‘ours.’  We should notice here that this 
is not the type of body that the ship of Theseus is dealing with; what we need is a 
                                                          
507
 Varela et al. The Embodied Mind. 69-70. 
508
 Varela et al. The Embodied Mind. 79. 
509
 Varela et al. The Embodied Mind. ibid. 
510
 O'Shaughnessy, Brian. "Proprioception and the Body Image." The Body and the Self Eds. Jose Luis 
Bermudez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan. (MA:MIT, 1995), 193. 
197 
 
different sense of embodiment, we need a new way of looking at the body – an owned 
body, not an un-owned body – the body which we grow into is something which gives 
us that sense of ownership. 
2. Feelings/Sensations.  Is there a way to overcome the issue of feelings and sensations 
being fleeting and temporary?  As we saw in chapter 6 with our look at Panksepp and 
LeDoux, affects can get laid down and form a type of pattern which can be recalled at 
a later time.  Le Doux provided a neurobiological account of how this works and 
Panksepp provided us with a slightly different account based on his affective 
neuroscience.  Both had argued that affects and sensations are triggered, moulded, 
and then continuously refined by our life experiences (based on something we’ve 
heard, touched, smelled, etc).  As Panksepp had shown, raw affects rose from a variety 
of “emotional action systems that modulate the dynamics of our core selves.”511  At 
their most basic, affective experiences attempt to maintain the homeostatic state of 
our body.  So we need to remember that something like feelings are based in keeping 
the body stable, and in bodily action dynamics, they are not merely something mental, 
but embodied and enactive.  Panksepp’s seven ‘primal affects’ further explain how 
sensation and feeling play a role in self development.   And as we saw with 
O’Shaughnessy, we begin with ‘changeless-innate’ elements of self, and then 
experience them as they progress through ‘developmental-acquired’ and ‘experience-
acquired.’  So, the body may change, but within that change there is continuity as the 
changes continue to modulate and maintain a basic homeostasis.   
3. Perception/Impulses.  Varela et al spoke about three root impulses: passion/desire 
toward desirable objects, aggression/anger toward undesirable objects, and 
delusion/ignoring toward neutral objects.  Again we see a similarity to Panksepp, this 
time to his seven primal emotional action dynamics.  Panksepp focused on seeking, 
fear, rage, lust, care, panic, and play.  All are based on an action dynamic and reaction 
or response to something in the environment.  Varela and company thought there was 
no one (or ego, or self) that was performing these actions, yet Panksepp had shown in 
chapter 6 that a SELF (a Simple, Ego-type Life Form) can be based in a global 
neurodynamics.  As he says, it is true that the “core feeling dynamics cannot 
cognitively reflect on themselves, but they may be experienced as cognitively 
unadulterated forms of pure affective livingness.”512  We may lose touch with some of 
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them over time, yet they still “may become part of our dynamic subconscious,” and 
“those ancient aspects of mental life probably continue to influence our emotional 
experiences from birth to death.”513  So what seems like a constant change and chaotic 
flux with no foundation or unity may in fact possess a foundation and unity, it is just in 
many cases a pre-reflective or subconscious feeling that gives us that ‘givennes’ or 
‘mineness.’ 
4. Dispositional Formations.  Varela et al were worried about where the sense of 
continuity came from for our habits or patterns of thinking, feeling, perceiving, and 
acting.  As we’ve been seeing as we’ve been making our way through these 
aggregates, PEMS has been emphasizing that in spite of this apparent flux in material 
form, feelings, and impulses, there is still bodily homeostasis and global 
neurodynamics which underlie, maintain and develop the organism as a whole.  So 
although there is change, there is not complete turnover, there are certain stable 
elements of development.  If we are going to consider habitual patterns of thinking 
and acting, then there is a minimal bodily basis, and depending how far up the scale 
we want to go with ‘patterns of thinking,’ then we can even move into a narrative level 
of self, which can lay down a reflective autobiographical pattern of thought, but again, 
this has its basis in the PEMS. 
5. Consciousnesses.  For a discussion of this, the reader is urged to revisit the discussion 
of chapter 10, when we explored dual process theories of consciousness and the 
nested neural hierarchy theory.  Dual process theories showed that a basic 
consciousness underlays our existence, providing us with our most core or ancestral 
reactions and thoughts, and how this level could then influence a second, more 
reflective and evolutionarily recent level.  The nested neural hierarchy showed further 
how these levels could be related and modulate each other.  These nested systems, 
then, are always interacting and modulating each other, laying down new experiences 
and burrowing them away so that they can be drawn upon again later if necessary.  
From this process the PEMS can develop and continue to work with the narrative self 
(the ‘real’ ego).  But underlying the narrative self (which we might even call the 
‘Person’), there is the basic experiential awareness, which doesn’t stand outside the 
experiences, but is the experiences as they are happening and being laid down.  The 
stream of consciousness is constantly creating, developing and maintaining a sense of 
self, which is the self.   
                                                          
513
 Panksepp. "Nature of Core Emotional Affects." ibid. 
199 
 
The PEMS is the bodily dispositions and affects in dynamic modulation with both each other 
and the environment creating the subjectivity of experience.  Put another way, these enactive 
processes create and give rise through the dynamic modulation between brain, body and 
world, the underlying first-personal mineness or givenness to our experiences.  This is the 
PEMS.   
Recently Evan Thompson has revisited the idea of the self on his own and asked the 
following question: “Does self-awareness imply the existence of a self?”514  His answer is ‘yes,’ 
but a qualified one.  Looking at a phenomenological account, he points out that “the subject 
(or subjectivity) of experience is precisely the selfhood (ipseity) of time-consciousness – the 
pre-reflective self-awareness of the stream of consciousness as a stream, including the 
automatic givenness of the past experience.”515  After presenting the phenomenological 
perspective, he follows up with: “this phenomenological notion of selfhood is far from the 
notion of self as an enduring entity distinct from the flow of mental and physical events.”516  
This is an important point to make.  We saw with our look at Varela and company’s 
understanding of self, that they were reacting against the self conceived as some standalone 
unity (according to the ‘naive’ view); their proposal was to say that when you looked at the 
stream of experience (through emotions, perceptions, etc) that there was no self.  But now, a 
little further in time, Thompson is acknowledging that a phenomenological account of selfhood 
includes a ‘pre-reflective self-awareness’ and ‘automatic givenness.’  
Thompson (with Aaron Henry) has gone even further in a direction that is strongly 
PEMS-friendly by emphasizing a bodily subject as self.  Thompson and Henry say:  
“[I]n order to be a subject of experience...one must be prereflectively aware of 
oneself as a living body, i.e., one must be a bodily subject...this ability presupposes a 
more fundamental and distinctly subjective awareness of the living body as the locus 
of perspectival awareness.  [Consequently] merely being a subject of experience 
involves a basic sense of self.”517 
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What we end up with, then, from the proposal that Varela, Thompson, and Rosch promoted in 
1991, has, by Thompson’s account in 2011 come round to a view that would fit well with the 
basic ideas of a PEMS account of minimal selfhood.   
The Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self says that there is a for-me-ness or 
mineness to our experience.  This subjectivity of experience is the minimal self.  The minimal 
self is bodily based.  It is the experience of our embodied encounters in the world, our 
encounters with others, and our affects (emotions, feelings and moods).  We have seen in this 
project that although we go through a multitude of experiences, and although we have 
autobiographical and narrative elements to our self, that these changing experiences still 
possess a dimension of personal, perspectival givenness.  The PEMS view has much in common 
with the phenomenological view of self that Dan Zahavi has put forth.  He has also stated that: 
“[T]here is no pure experience-independent self.  The self is the very 
subjectivity of experience...the experiences in question are world-directed experiences 
[and they] involve self-presence [...] I experience myself in what I do...the self is what it 
is in its worldly relations, self-acquaintance is not something that takes place or occurs 
in separation from our living in a world.  On the contrary, self-experience is the self-
experience of a world-immersed self.”518 
What we have done with the PEMS view is take a Zahavi-like phenomenological account of the 
self, and bolstered – or strengthened – it with support from enactivism (e.g. Thompson and 
Gallagher), affective neuroscience (e.g. Panksepp), developmental psychology (e.g. Stern), 
bodily kinetics (e.g. Sheets-Johnstone), and other areas of research which reflect the 
importance of the body and affects in the development of who we are.  Zahavi has put forth a 
phenomenological account which PEMS would largely agree with, the difference is that with 
the PEMS account, we have given an account of the structures which produce and maintain 
this phenomenological self.  The scientific data we’ve looked at have provided the structures 
of minimal selfhood.  Enactivism has provided the framework in which to understand how 
these structures relate and interact.  And the phenomenological experience is the end point or 
result of what the enactive processes create.  
This project focused on the minimal conditions for selfhood.  To understand the self at a 
fuller, more robust level, we need to take into account other things as well.  This includes the 
autobiographical/narrative/language-based components of self which begin to emerge while 
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we are in our infancy (at around age 3).  As Zahavi says, “we are more than experiential core 
selves, we are, for instance, also narratively configured and socially constructed persons.”519  It 
is this full and robust conception of the self which we might also refer to as a ‘person.’  But 
before we have reached or acquired full personhood status, there is the bodily and affective 
self which lies in the background and lays the foundation for it.  This project, by bringing in 
these different insights from various areas of science and philosophy, has attempted to show 
us something new about our self which we had not noticed or paid attention to before.  The 
PEMS approach shows us the embryonic stage of ipseity, and can perhaps give us a new 
perspective and approach in exploring other areas of philosophy and science.  I present the 
following (abbreviated) topics as possible avenues for future exploration utilizing the PEMS 
approach. 
 Metaphysical debates in Personal Identity. PEMS can be applied in the metaphysical 
debates into what we are most fundamentally.  In recent debates in personal identity, 
there has been disagreement between the ‘animalist’ position and the ‘constitution 
view’ (where the animalist advocate states that we are fundamentally just a human 
animal without any need for psychology for fixing personal identity (or psychological 
continuity), or, as the constitution view states, we are a human person with a 
psychological first-person perspective that is constituted by an animal body).520  A 
PEMS approach can provide this debate with a potential resolution by showing how 
psychology emerges from – and is a part of – our embodied/affective makeup in a way 
which can alleviate the problems the two views see in each other. 
 Philosophy of Mind discussion of whether there is/is not a self, and/or what role 
narrative might play.  PEMS can – as we have seen with our brief look at Dennett and 
Metzinger in this chapter – give us a new way to examine and understand narrative or 
no-self views of the self by re-examining our biology and psychology and how we 
connect with the world.  
 Clinical implications.  PEMS might have clinical applications.  Through PEMS we could 
potentially have new clinical ways to examine cases of (for example) dissociative 
identity disorder, depression, autism, and schizophrenia, by providing the examiner 
with a different and new approach to understanding the self, its place in the world, 
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and how it encounters the world as meaningful or meaningless through the PEMS 
emphasis on bodily and affective phenomenology. 
 Ethical implications.  PEMS also has potential ethical applications.  Consider the 
abortion debate.  Some want to give an unborn foetus the status of personhood, or 
they at least argue that it has the potential for personhood.  Although PEMS would 
deny actual personhood to a foetus, there is the possibility that minimal selfhood can 
be given to it anywhere from the 16th to the 24th week of its time in the womb.  This 
first stage of selfhood (with the autobiographical/narrative self in this case being the 
second stage), may have potential for enriching that discussion. 
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Part III: Conclusion 
“Although we experience ourselves as things, as fixed entities occupying a physical 
space in the world, we are in reality a process, a continuous unfolding in time, 
constantly becoming."521 
 
The Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self argues that there is a minimal 
kinaesthetic self which begins to emerge at a time when we are still within the womb via the 
limited motility it has in its enclosed environment.  During the first few months after birth the 
elements of this minimal self are further established through interaction with objects and 
others.  The PEMS also has an evolutionary basis and connection with other mammals and 
animals, not only under a ‘thinking in movement’ paradigm, but also when it comes to affects 
(feelings, moods, and emotions).  The studies examined in this project showed that movement 
and affective experiences are primary and basic experiences that help mould us in our 
development early and continue to be a part of us in the years ahead.  It was shown that this 
minimal kinaesthetic self is based on enactive ideas of autonomous agents generating and 
maintaining their own identities.  In spite of change and flux, there is nevertheless a unity 
which emerges; this unity is reflected in our consistency of movement and our consistency of 
behaviour and affective response to situations which we encounter; through this identity 
generation and maintenance via corporeal-kinetics, consistent elements of what makes us the 
self we are, are created and maintained.   
This is obviously not the end point for what is our self, but it is a starting point – and 
more than that – it is a continuing influence on us until our final moments.  A narrative Self is 
an idea that is frequently spoken about in the literature on the self; the PEMS view does not 
discount that and the role that this narration might play, it is only showing that there is a 
priority here in what lay at its base, and this is bodily-kinetic in origin.  A significant amount of 
research has been done in areas of ‘narrative constructions’ of self, and when it comes to self, 
consciousness, and affects, the priority of some type of ‘information processing’ going on that 
emphasizes cognitive appraisals which can be found in such a computational theory of mind.  
This project should hopefully have shown that there is an alternative to that view which is 
more appealing and fits better with the data gathered from a variety of sources, from 
developmental psychology to neuroscience.  Theories of self have been far too reductionistic 
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in their approach to what makes us who we are; this study has tried to show that we need to 
take a broader and larger perspective.  The self may be a single thing – who we are – but this 
single thing is made up of an incredibly large assortment of encounters and influences.  It 
begins with movement, interaction, intentionality and affects, and later includes narratives 
and stories which we tell about ourselves which we’ve gathered from societal influences (our 
family, friends, colleagues, religion, politics, society, and the world).  It has been the purpose of 
this project to establish that there is a minimal self based in kinaesthesia, a self which is always 
changing while it is establishing something consistent and unified. 
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